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INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the problem of prison overcrowding in Italy, 
Europe and the United States and to offer some creative proposals for addressing this 
problem.  
 
In chapter I, we will analyze the most recent statistical data on prison population 
growth and prison overcrowding in the United States (with particular emphasis on the 
case of California) and Europe (with particular emphasis on the case of Italy). As we 
will see, California and Italy have two of the most overcrowded prison systems in the 
United States and in Europe.  
 
In chapter II, a comparative analysis of the most recent decisions on prison 
overcrowding by highest courts in the United States and in Europe will be conducted. 
As we will see, these decisions have indeed been taken against California and Italy. 
Then, in an effort to grant inmates a more meaningful protection of their human rights 
in prison, a new approach to prison overcrowding will be proposed for litigators and 
the courts. This approach, which will revolve around what we will identify as the 
European concept of "minimum living space" in prison, will be developed based on 
the most recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
In chapter III, IV, V and VI, some efforts will be made to address the problem of 
prison overcrowding at the source. First, in chapter III, we will provide a detailed 
analysis of the "criteria for criminalization" that have been identified by criminal law 
scholars in recent years, from both the European-continental and the Anglo-American 
literature. These are the criteria that should guide the legislator in the enactment of 
criminal offences. With a view to making them more comprehensible to legislators 
and policy makers, they will be summarized in a schematic, intelligible form. They 
will be provided to limit the dramatic expansion of the criminal law that has occurred 
in Europe and the United States over the last decades (so-called 
"overcriminalization").  
 
Then, in chapter IV, we will define the possible "alternatives to criminalization" in 
theory. We will define "decriminalization" and "legalization", which are terms that 
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often lead to misunderstanding in the debate on reforms. Also, we will analyze the 
role of decriminalization measures within the framework of the Council of Europe, 
and we will identify those areas of the law that are particularly good candidates for 
decriminalization reforms, according to several criminal law scholars. This chapter 
will provide the theoretical foundations for the case study that will follow. 
 
In chapter V, we will analyze some "alternatives to criminalization" in practice, 
through case studies on best and worst examples of decriminalization. In particular, 
we will conduct a comparative analysis of the most recent decriminalization reforms 
that have been adopted by Italy and Portugal in the field of drug legislation. Drug 
legislation, as we will see, severely impacts on prison overcrowding in Italy and 
Portugal. More in general, it severely impacts on prison overcrowding in Europe and 
the United States. Thus, reforms in this area - though politically hard to enact - are 
very much needed to solve the problem of prison overcrowding at the source. 
 
Finally, in chapter VI, we will make two policy proposals in the field of drug 
legislation, in light of the analysis and case study that will have been conducted in the 
previous chapters. The first policy proposal will be addressed to those legislators in 
Europe and the United States that at the moment still criminalize drug use and 
possession, while the second policy proposal will be specifically addressed to the 
Italian legislator. As we will see, what emerges from the most recent social studies 
and public surveys on the issue of drug is that ctiziens' attitudes are nowadays shifting 
from the acceptance to the refusal of the use of the criminal law in the field of drug, 
particularly for cannabis. Therefore, if the criminal law is to be respectful of the so-
called Kulturnormen, there appears to be a compelling reason to reassess cannabis 
legislation. 
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I. PRISON OVERCROWDING IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE 
 
More than 10.1 million people are held in penal institutions throughout the world, 
according to the latest edition of the World Prison Population List.1 The number of 
inmates detained in correctional facilities has been growing in all five continents over 
the past years.2 As a result, prison overcrowding has become one of the most common 
problems for criminal justice systems across the world. It is a problem that is shared 
by both developed and undeveloped countries. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some of the most recent statistical data on 
prison population growth and prison overcrowding in the United States (with 
particular emphasis on the case of California) and Europe (with particular emphasis 
on the case of Italy). California and Italy have been chosen as the focus of our 
analysis because they have two of the most overcrowded prison systems in the United 
States and in Europe. Thus, they provide examples of how, even in modern developed 
democracies, prison overcrowding may represent an extremely serious concern. 
 
1. Prison overcrowding in the United States - The case of California  
 
The United States maintains the world’s largest incarcerated population, at more than 
2.2 million, and the world’s highest per capita incarceration rate, at 716 inmates per 
100.000 residents.3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  R. WALMSLEY, World Prison Population List (9th ed.), available at www.prisonstudies.org 
(Accessed 30 September 2013 - the information is the latest available in early May 2011). The World 
Prison Population List gives details of the number of prisoners held in 218 independent countries and 
dependent territories. It shows the differences in the level of imprisonment across the world and makes 
possible an estimate of the world prison population total. 
2 Id at 1. Updated information on countries included in previous editions of the World Prison 
Population List shows that prison populations have risen in 78% of countries (in 71% of countries in 
Africa, 82% in the Americas, 80% in Asia, 74% in Europe and 80% in Oceania). 
3 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, World Prison Brief - United States, available at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=190 (Accessed 30 October 
2013). As to the total incarcerated population, data refer to the 2012 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
which reported a total incarcerated population of 2,239,751 at yearend 2011, i.e. 1,504,150 inmates in 
state or federal prisons at 31 December 2011 plus 735,601 inmates in local jails at 30 June 2011. As to 
the per capita incarceration rate, data are based on an estimated national population of 312.72 million at 
end of 2011 (U.S. Census Bureau). 
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Source: UN Human Development Report 2007/2008 
 
Prison population growth has been an ever-increasing problem in the United States 
since the early 1970s.4 In the nearly five decades between 1925 and 1972 the number 
of state prisoners5 had increased by 105%,6 at a steady rate that closely tracked 
growth rates in the general population.7 In the four decade since, however, the number 
grew by 705%.8 This was an unprecedented expansion of the criminal justice system. 
The change was fueled by stiffer sentencing and release laws, combined with harsher 
decisions by courts and parole boards, which sent more offenders to prison and kept 
them there for longer terms.9 In 2008, the Public Safety Performance Project of the 
Pew Center reported that the overall incarcerated population had reached an all-time 
high of 2.319.258,10 with 1 in 100 adults living behind bars.11  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 C. I. BARRETT, Does the Prison Rape Elimination Act Adequately Address the Problems Posed by 
Prison Overcrowding? If Not, What Will?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV., 2005, 391. 
5 The great majority of convicted inmates in the United States serve their sentences in state institutions: 
state prisons confine approximately 90% of all inmates. S. Y. CHUNG, Prison Overcrowding: 
Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, 68 FORDHAM L. REV., 2000, 2354. 
6 P. A. LANGAN-J. V. FUNDIS-L. A. GREENFELD, Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal 
Institutions, Yearend 1925-86, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (1988), at 15. 
7 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Public Safety Performance Project - Prison Count 2010, 2010, available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_detail.aspx?id=57653. 
8 P. A. LANGAN-J. V. FUNDIS-L. A. GREENFELD, Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal 
Institutions, Yearend 1925-86, supra note 6. 
9 A. BLUMSTEIN-A. J. BECK, Reentry as a Transient State Between Liberty and Recomittment, in J. 
TRAVIS-C. VISHER (eds.), Prisoner Reentry and Crime in America, Cambridge, 2005, at 50–79. 
10 PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, One in 100: Behind Bars In America 2008, Pew Center on 
the States, The Pew Charitable Trusts (28 February 2008), available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_detail.aspx?id=35904. 
11 Id. at 5. In 2009, after nearly four decades of uninterrupted growth, the first slight annual drop in the 
state prison population was reported by the Pew Center.  See Public Safety Performance Project, Prison 
Count 2010, supra note 15 at 1. The year 2010, moreover, saw the first slight decline in the combined 
(i.e. state and federal) prison population. See P. GUERINO-P. M. HARRISON-W. J. SABOL, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2010 (2011), U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
	   6	  
Even of more concern than the increase in imprisonment rates themselves are the 
conditions of confinement that have prevailed in the United States as a result of it. In 
fact, the inability of state and federal governments to construct detention facilities 
commensurate with the increasing prison population, mainly due to the phenomenal 
costs of new prisons,12 has resulted in severe "prison overcrowding".13 While this 
term may appear redundant, it is most commentators' word of choice:14 not only 
prisons in the United States are "crowded", they are "overcrowded".  
 
It is important to note that, despite the magnitude of the problem, no uniform 
definition of "prison overcrowding" has yet been developed in the United States. 
Federal courts have defined prison overcrowding in a variety of different ways. They 
have used this term to refer to conditions that "shock[] the general conscience",15 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Statistics, available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2230. While the Pew Center 
survey showed an overall decline, it revealed great variation among jurisdictions: the prison population 
declined in 26 states, while increasing in 24 states.  Such variation shed light on the role that state 
policy plays in determining the size and cost of the prison system. Id. at 3.  Admissions began to 
decline and releases started to rise for a variety of reasons, but an important contributing factor was that 
some states began to realize that they could effectively reduce their prison populations, and save public 
funds, without sacrificing public safety.  Reforms enacted by several states diverting low-level 
offenders, probation and parole violators from prison, strengthening community supervision and re-
entry program, and accelerating the release of low-risk inmates who completed risk reduction programs 
are among the causes that led to the decline in the prison population. (California is a good example in 
this regard. One of the primary reasons for California’s past prison growth has been its high rate of 
parole revocations. Over the past two years, the state has sought to cut the number of low-risk parolees 
returning to prison for technical violations, by expanding use of intermediate sanctions to hold 
violators accountable without a costly return to prison. See ibidem.) After nearly four decades of 
uninterrupted growth, an annual drop in the state and combined prison population is certainly worthy of 
note, no matter the scale and the variety of factors contributing to the decline. On the one side, of 
course it is possible that the decline is simply seasonal and may adjust upward in the next years. On the 
other side, there are also reasons to believe that the decline could be the beginning of a sustained 
downward, though small in numbers, trend.  The decline in the combined population was confirmed in 
yearend 2011 (which registered an additional slight decline in the combined prison population of 0.9%, 
see E. A. CARSON-W. J. SABOL, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2011 (2012), U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov) and yearend 2012 
(which registered an additional slight decline of 1.7% from yearend 2011, see E. A. CARSON-D. 
GOLINELLI, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2012 (2013), U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov). California had the greatest population 
decline in yearend 2012, with 15,035 fewer prisoners than in 2011 in part due to the state’s Public 
Safety Realignment policy. California accounted for 51% of the decrease in the total state prison 
population (E. A. CARSON-D. GOLINELLI, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2012 
(2013), at 1).  Nevertheless, with only 5% of the world total population, the United States still has 
almost a 25% of the world prison population.  The United States will likely continue to lead the world 
in incarceration for the near foreseeable future (PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Prison Count 2010, supra 
note 7 at 6). 
12 P. M. ROSENBLATT, The Dilemma of Overcrowding in the Nation's Prisons: What Are Constitutional 
Conditions and What Can Be Done?, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS., 1991, 490. 
13 C. I. BARRETT, supra note 4 at 391. 
14 P. M. ROSENBLATT, The Dilemma of Overcrowding, supra note 12 at 491. 
15 CHAVIS V. ROWE, 643 F.2d 1281, 1291 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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offend the "contemporary standards of human decency",16 or simply involve the 
accommodation of inmates "beyond design capacity".17 If this third definition, as we 
will see in chapter II, has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Rhodes v. 
Chapman as a ground for constitutional violations, definitions of overcrowding that 
refer to the "contemporary standards of human decency" remain essential to the 
constitutional analysis. Correctional authorities have provided different definitions as 
well. Three parameters are usually taken into consideration:18 design capacity (i.e. the 
number of inmates that planners or architects intended for a facility), operational 
capacity (i.e. the number of inmates that can be accommodated based on a facility’s 
staff, existing programs, and services) and rated capacity (i.e. the number of beds or 
inmates assigned by a rating official to institutions within a jurisdiction). The "highest 
capacity" of a correctional facility19 is measured as the maximum number of beds 
reported across the three capacity measures, and is the threshold generally used to 
define when prison overcrowding occurs. Data based on the available parameters of 
prison overcrowding testify to an alarming situation. As of December 31, 2010, there 
were 21 state systems that were operating at or above their "highest capacity", with 7 
states at least 25% over their highest capacity, led by California and Alabama (at 
196%), Illinois (at 144%) and Massachusetts (at 139%).20 The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons operated at 36% above its reported capacity21. These data, when compared to 
previous years' data, confirm that overcrowding has become a chronic condition in 
most prisons in the United States.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 CAMPBELL V. CAUTHRON, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980). 
17 RHODES V. CHAPMAN, 452 U.S. 337, 347-48 (1981). See S. Y. CHUNG, Prison Overcrowding: 
Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, supra note 5 at 2368. 
18 P. GUERINO-P. M. HARRISON-W. J. SABOL, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2010 
(2011), supra note 11, Table 23 at 34 and definition of terms. 
19 The "highest capacity" is the capacity level required to maintain basic custody, security, custodial 
operations and limited programming, see S. S. MESSNER-R. ROSENFELD, Strengthening Institutions and 
Rethinking the American Dream, in R. D. CRUTCHFIELD-C. E. KUBRIN-G. S. BRIDGES (eds.), Crime 
Readings (3rd ed.), 2008, 427. According to the authors, the focus of corrections has shifted away from 
a concern with administering levels of punishment that individuals deserve, or a concern with 
rehabilitating these offenders, to a preoccupation with more efficient "risk management of dangerous 
population". Ibidem. 
20P. GUERINO-P. M. HARRISON-W. J. SABOL, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2010 
(2011), supra note 11. Twenty-six state systems were operating at or below their highest capacity: 
Mississippi was operating at 46% of its highest capacity, followed by New Mexico (53%) and Utah 
and Wyoming (each at 79%). Ibidem. 
21 Ibidem. 
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34 P R I S O N E R S  I N  2010
APPENDIX TABLE 23
Reported state and federal prison capacities, December 31, 2010
Region and jurisdiction
Type of capacity measure Custody population as a percent of—
Rated Operational Design Highest capacitya Lowest capacitya
Federal 126,863 … … 136% 136%
Northeast
Connecticutb … … … …% …%
Maine 2,339 2,133 2,339 84 92
Massachusetts … … 8,029 139 139
New Hampshire … 2,281 1,945 115 134
New Jersey … 22,503 16,152 96 134
New York 57,505 58,546 56,590 96 100
Pennsylvania 43,837 43,837 43,837 107 107
Rhode Islandc 4,283 4,273 4,028 74 78
Vermont 1,613 1,613 1,322 94 115
Midwest
Illinois 33,700 33,700 29,791 144% 163%
Indiana … 29,574 … 83 83
Iowa … … 7,209 131 131
Kansas 9,054 … … 100 100
Michiganc 45,281 44,420 … 102 104
Minnesota … 9,099 … 103 103
Missouric … 31,423 … 97 97
Nebraskac … 3,969 3,175 116 145
North Dakotac 1,044 991 1,044 136 143
Ohio 38,389 … … 127 127
South Dakotac … 3,523 … 96 96
Wisconsinc … … 17,596 125 125
South
Alabamac … … 13,403 196% 196%
Arkansas 14,025 14,025 13,461 101 105
Delawarec 6,378 5,210 4,161 100 153
Florida … 105,814 … 96 96
Georgiae 58,763 54,137 … 93 100
Kentucky 13,902 13,902 14,237 87 89
Louisianae 19,008 20,333 … 108 115
Maryland … 23,016 … 99 99
Mississippie … 24,236 … 46 46
North Carolina … 41,705 35,756 97 113
Oklahomac,e 25,352 25,352 25,352 95 95
South Carolina … 24,319 … 95 95
Tennessee 20,946 20,498 … 71 73
Texasd 163,381 159,396 163,381 86 89
Virginiac 32,921 … … 92 92
West Virginia 4,304 5,114 4,304 99 118
West
Alaska 3,058 3,206 … 122% 128%
Arizonac 37,089 43,011 37,089 81 94
California … 149,624 84,181 110 196
Coloradoc … 15,032 13,065 121 140
Hawaii … 3,327 2,291 101 147
Idahoc,e 7,028 6,677 7,028 103 108
Montanad … 1,679 … 97 97
Nevada / / / / /
New Mexicoe 6,139 7,123 6,128 53 61
Oregon / / / / /
Utah … 6,661 6,901 79 82
Washington 16,420 17,801 17,801 96 104
Wyoming 2,381 2,381 2,221 79 84
...Data not available. 
/Not reported.
aPopulation counts are based on the number of inmates held in facilities operated by the jurisdiction. Excludes inmates held in local jails, in other 
states, or in private facilities.
bConnecticut no longer reports capacity because of a law passed in 1995.
cCapacity de!nition di"ers from BJS de!nition, see NPS Jurisdiction Notes.
dExcludes capacity of county facilities and inmates housed in them.
eIncludes capacity of private and contract facilities and inmates housed in them.
Source: BJS, National Prisoner Statistics Program.
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dExcludes capacity of county facilities and inmates housed in them.
eIncludes capacity of private and contract facilities and inmates housed in them.
Source: BJS, National Prisoner Statistics Program.
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APPENDIX TABLE 23
Reported state and federal prison capacities, December 31, 2010
Region and jurisdiction
Type of capacity measure Custody population as a percent of—
Rated Operational Design Highest capacitya Lowest capacitya
Federal 126,863 … … 136% 136%
Northeast
Connecticutb … … … …% …%
Maine 2,339 2,133 2,339 84 92
Massachusetts … … 8,029 139 139
New Hampshire … 2,281 1,945 115 134
New Jersey … 22,503 16,152 96 134
New York 57,505 58,546 56,590 96 100
Pennsylvania 43,837 43,837 43,837 107 107
Rhode Islandc 4,283 4,273 4,028 74 78
Vermont 1,613 1,613 1,322 94 115
Midwest
Illinois 33,700 33,700 29,791 144% 163%
Indiana … 29,574 … 83 83
Iowa … … 7,209 131 131
Kansas 9,054 … … 100 100
Michiganc 45,281 44,420 … 102 104
Minnesota … 9,099 … 103 103
Missouric … 31,423 … 97 97
Nebraskac … 3,969 3,175 116 145
North Dakotac 1,044 991 1,044 136 143
Ohio 38,389 … … 127 127
South Dakotac … 3,523 … 96 96
Wisconsinc … … 17,596 125 125
South
Alabamac … … 13,403 196% 196%
Arkansas 14,025 14,025 13,461 101 105
Delawarec 6,378 5,210 4,161 100 153
Florida … 105,814 … 96 96
Georgiae 58,763 54,137 … 93 100
Kentucky 13,902 13,902 14,237 87 89
Louisianae 19,008 20,333 … 108 1 5
Maryland … 23,016 … 99 99
Mississippie … 24,236 … 46 46
North Carolina … 41,705 35,756 97 113
Oklahomac,e 25,352 25,352 25,352 95 95
South Carolina … 24,319 … 95 95
Tennessee 20,946 20,498 … 71 73
Texasd 163,381 159,396 163,381 86 89
Virginiac 32,921 … … 92 92
West Virginia 4,304 5,114 4,304 99 118
West
Al ska 3,058 3,206 … 122% 128%
Arizonac 37,089 43,011 37,089 81 94
California … 149,624 84,181 110 196
Coloradoc … 15,032 13,065 121 140
Hawaii … 3,327 2,291 101 147
Idahoc,e 7,028 6,677 7,028 103 108
Montanad … 1,679 … 97 97
Nevada / / / / /
New Mexicoe 6,139 7,123 6,128 53 61
Oregon / / / / /
Utah … 6,661 6,901 79 82
Washington 16,420 17,801 17,801 96 104
Wyoming 2,381 2,381 2,221 79 84
...Data not available. 
/Not reported.
aPopulation counts are based on the number of inmates held in facilities operated by the jurisdiction. Excludes inmates held in local jails, in other 
states, or in private facilities.
bConnecticut no longer reports capacity because of a law passed in 1995.
cCapacity de!nition di"ers from BJS de!nition, see NPS Jurisdiction Notes.
dExcludes capacity of county facilities and inmates housed in them.
eIncludes capacity of private and contract facilities and inmates housed in them.
Source: BJS, National Prisoner Statistics Program.  
 
Notably, approximately one-quarter of people detained in U.S. prisons or jails have 
been convicted of a drug offense. Overall, the United States incarcerates more people 
for drug offenses than any other country. With an estimated 6.8 million Americans 
struggling with drug abuse or dependence, the growth of the prison population 
continues to be driven largely by incarceration for drug offenses.22 On 31 December 
2011, there were 197,050 sentenced prisoners under federal jurisdiction. Of these, 
94,600 were serving time for drug offenses, 14,900 for violent offenses, 10,700 for 
property offenses, and 69,000 for "public order" offenses (of which 22,100 were 
sentenced for immigration offenses, 29,800 for weapons offenses, and 17.100 for 
"other").23 On the same date, there were 1,341,804 sentenced prisoners under state 
ju is iction. Of these, 225,242 were serving time for drug offenses, 710,875 for 
viole t offens , 245,3 1 for property offenses, 141,803 for "public order" offenses 
(which include weapons, drunk driving, court offenses, commercialized vice, morals 
and decency offenses, liquor law violations, and other public-order offenses), and 
18,534 for "other/unspecified".24  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, Substance Abuse Treatment and Public Safety, Washington, DC, 2008, 
p. 1, available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08_01_REP_DrugTx_AC-PS.pdf.  
23 E. A. CARSON-WILLIAM J. SABOL, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2011 (2012), 
supra note 11 p. 9-10. 
24 E. A. CARSON-D. GOLINELLI, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2012 (2013), supra 
note 11 p. 11. For more statistics see: 
http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Prisons_and_Drugs#sthash.ddzPFJc9.dpuf 
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!e percentage of Hispanic inmates sentenced for violent 
o"enses (58%) exceeded that of non-Hispanic black (56%) and 
non-Hispanic white (49%) inmates (table 10).2 !e number 
of black inmates imprisoned for violent crimes (284,631) 
surpassed that of white (228,782) or Hispanic (162,489) 
inmates. Among black inmates sentenced for violent crimes, 
the leading cause of incarceration was robbery (19% of the 
total black prison population), followed by murder and 
nonnegligent manslaughter (13%). Black and Hispanic inmates 
were incarcerated at similar percentages for violent o"enses, 
with 13% of the Hispanic prison population held for murder 
and nonnegligent manslaughter, 13% for robbery, and 14% for 
2For distribution of prisoners by race categories, see Prisoners in 2011,  
NCJ 239808, BJS Web, December 2012.
aggravated or simple assault. Among white inmates convicted 
of violent crimes, the leading cause for incarceration was rape 
or sexual assault (17% or 79,282 prisoners). When combined 
with rape or sexual assault convictions, the overall number of 
white inmates imprisoned for rape or sexual assault exceeded 
the number of black and Hispanic inmates sentenced for rape 
or sexual assault combined (75,838). !e number of white 
inmates sentenced for property crime (108,560) was larger 
than the number of black (78,197) and Hispanic (38,264) 
inmates sentenced for property crime, while more black 
inmates were sentenced for drug o"enses than inmates of other 
races or Hispanic origin.
TABLE 10 
Estimated number of sentenced prisoners under state jurisdiction, by o!ense, sex, race, and Hispanic origin, December 31, 2011
O"ense All inmatesa Male Female Whiteb Blackb Hispanic
Total 1,341,804 1,250,214 91,590 465,180 509,677 282,353
Violent 710,875 678,786 33,695 228,782 284,631 162,489
Murderc 163,762 154,359 9,821 45,369 65,568 37,956
Manslaughter 21,051 18,544 2,587 8,107 7,408 3,456
Rape/sexual assault 165,656 163,863 2,032 79,282 39,975 35,863
Robbery 181,415 173,640 8,177 38,312 99,096 36,694
Aggravated or simple assault 138,574 131,100 7,816 42,375 56,281 38,252
Other violent 40,416 37,281 3,262 15,336 16,304 10,270
Property 245,351 220,753 25,486 108,560 78,197 38,264
Burglary 128,823 122,837 6,298 53,547 46,795 22,038
Larceny-theft 42,029 35,195 7,046 19,617 12,679 5,679
Motor vehicle theft 14,703 13,782 963 6,596 3,330 4,132
Fraud 30,333 22,000 8,559 14,738 8,256 2,628
Other property 29,463 26,940 2,621 14,063 7,137 3,786
Drugd 225,242 203,081 22,971 67,271 91,775 47,479
Public ordere 141,803 134,203 7,954 54,834 50,489 32,275
Other/unspeci#edf 18,534 13,391 1,484 5,733 4,585 1,846
Note: Counts are based on state prisoners with a sentence of more than 1 year under the jurisdiction of state correctional o!cials. Detail may not sum to total due to rounding 
and missing o"ense data.
aIncludes American Indians, Alaska Natives, Asians, Native Hawaiians, other Paci#c Islanders, and persons identifying two or more races.
bExcludes persons of Hispanic or Latino origin and persons of two or more races.
cIncludes nonnegligent manslaughter.
dIncludes tra!cking, possession, and other drug o"enses.
eIncludes weapons, drunk driving, and court o"enses; commercialized vice, morals, and decency o"enses; and liquor law violations and other public-order o"enses.
fIncludes juvenile o"enses and other unspeci#ed o"ense categories.
Sources: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Prisoner Statistics Program and National Corrections Reporting Program, 2011.  
 
California, as we have anticipated, provides one of the most striking examples of 
prison population growth and prison overcrowding in the United States. From 1982 to 
2000, California's prison population increased by 500%. As a result, in 2005 the per 
capita incarceration rate of the state of California reached the alarming level of 616 
per 100,000 adults. There are many explanations for California's prison population 
growth. One of the most important factors was certainly the tough "war on drugs" 
declared by Nixon in 1971, that severely impacted on prison facilities all across the 
United States.25 Mandatory minimum guidelines and longer prison sentences meant 
that more people were sent to prison and spent longer time there. Moreover, 
unemployment led many citizens to commit property-related crimes, although, 
ironically, California has a relatively low rate of property crime occurrence compared 
to other states. Last, but not least, during this period the citizens of California passed 
the so-called three strikes law, stipulating a life sentence for those people who are 
convicted of three felonies. Today, California has a considerable lead over all other 
states in issuing life sentences.26 To accommodate the population growth, the state of 
California built 23 new prisons from 1982 to 2000. By way of comparison, during the 
112-year-long period between 1852 and 1964, the state of California had constructed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  See FRONTLINE, Thirty Years of America's Drug War - A Chronology, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (Accessed 30 October 2013). 
26 K. WATTLEY, Insight into California’s Life Sentences, in Federal Sentencing Reporter - Realigning 
California Corrections, vol. 25, No. 4, (April 2013), p. 271-275.  
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only 12 prisons. Nevertheless, prison overcrowding reached appalling levels. While 
the United States, according to the latest data of the International Center for Prison 
Studies, has an overall rate of prison overcrowding that is just under 100% capacity, 
placing it below the top 100 worst-ranking countries worldwide, if California were a 
country of its own it would rank in the top 50 most overcrowded countries 
worldwide.27  
 
In 2011, California's grossly overcrowded prisons were subject to severe evaluation 
by the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Brown v. Plata. This 
decision, as we will see in chapter II, acknowledged that California's prisons had 
operated at around 200% of design capacity for at least 11 years, depriving prisoners 
of adequate medical care. Therefore, it affirmed a decision by a three-judge panel of 
the Eastern and Northern Districts of California that had ordered California to reduce 
its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity within two years. 
 
2. Prison overcrowding in Europe - The case of Italy  
 
Prisons across Europe, similarly to prisons across the United States, are facing an 
overcrowding crisis. 28  This is a manifestation of at least three trends: tougher 
penalties, particularly for drug-related offenses, a slow criminal justice system, with a 
high number of people in pre-trial detention and a lack of resources to build new 
facilities, further exacerbated by the recent economic downfall.29  
 
This crisis is particularly acute in Italy. On the one side, Italy's per capita 
incarceration rate is not particularly alarming when compared with data from Europe 
and the rest of the world. In fact, according to the report published by ISTAT in 2012, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See infra note 43. 
28 This trend was identified, among others, in the study conducted in 2005 by British expert Roy 
Walmsley, which covered 25 countries of Central and Eastern Europe. See R. WALMSLEY, Prison in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Heuni paper n. 22, Helsinki, 2005 (claiming that overcrowding, when 
calculated according to the official capacity of the prison system, seems to have become significantly 
worse since 1994). Id at 8. 
29 For a very recent analysis of the prison systems in Europe see V. RUGGIERO-M.RYAN (eds.), 
Punishment in Europe: A Critical Anatomy of Penal Systems, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. The book 
explores twelve different Western and Eastern European countries, identifiying the national 
particularities but also the commonalities and cross talk between penal systems. In particualr, for an 
analysis of the Italian prison system, see P. GONNELLA, Italy, Between Amnesties and Emergencies, 
Ibidem, p. 226-244. 
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Italy maintained in 2010 a per capita incarceration rate of 112.6 inmates per 100.000 
residents, which is below both the European average (127.7) and the world average 
(156.0).30 The United States, as we have seen, has a much more alarming per capita 
incarceration rate: it has the world’s highest per capita incarceration rate, at 716 
inmates per 100.000 residents. Figures from the 2012 ISTAT report and the 2010 
Council of Europe SPACE I report on per capita incarceration rate are provided 
below. 
     
!
!   |  ! 
 
Dieci milioni di detenuti nel mondo 
 
??????? e ??? ??????? ????? ???? ????????????zione Penitenziaria del Ministero della Giustizia hanno 
???????????????????? ????????????????????????????a dei dati sulla situazione dei detenuti nelle carceri. 
????????i ha permesso di approfondire il mondo dei detenuti: quanti e chi sono gli abitanti delle 
carceri, la loro posizione giuridica e perché sono in carcere, la loro aspettativa di permanenza, le 
attività mirate alla loro reintegrazione sociale. Questo report è dedicato in particolare ai dati 
consolidati del 2011 sulla situazione dei detenuti adulti nelle carceri italiane1. 
A livello mondiale, dagli ultimi dati comparabili disponibili (2010) emerge che la popolazione 
carceraria ha raggiunto circa 10 milioni di persone nel mondo, con una prevalenza di detenuti 
condannati (Tavole 1 e 2): gli Stati Uniti hanno la popolazione carceraria più numerosa con più di 
??????????????????????????????????????paese con la più bassa presenza al mondo negli istituti detentivi 
(165 detenuti)2. !
Il tasso medio mondiale di detenzione per 100.000 abitanti è di 156 (Figura 1), ma più della metà 
dei Paesi (54%) hanno tassi di detenzione per 100.000 abitanti inferiori a 150. I tassi di detenzione 
variano considerevolmente fra differenti regioni del mondo come fra regioni dello stesso 
continente.  
Il tasso medio europeo di d???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
più contenuto 112,6. Il nostro Paese, a fronte di un tasso di detenuti basso, ha tuttavia un tasso 
elevato di sovraffollamento: si colloca, infatti, al secondo posto (Figura 2), a causa sia dei detenuti 
in attesa di giudizio, che rappresentano il 43,1% nel 2010 contro una media europea del 27,1%, 
sia al minor utilizzo delle misure alternative al carcere (30,5 soggetti in misura alternativa per 
100.000 abitanti contro i 199,2 per 100.000 abitanti della media europea). Il tasso dei detenuti in 
attesa di giudizio è particolarmente elevato anche per Andorra 55,6%, Olanda 48,6%, Turchia 
46,6%, Cipro 44,6%, Svizzera 41%, Lussemburgo 39,7%, Albania 39,6%, Irlanda del Nord 38,3%. 
"
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Nella statistica report sono stati descritti i principali indicatori disponibili inerenti i detenuti. Disegnare un quadro ancora più completo sarebbe 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????i nelle carceri, grazie alla raccolta di nuovi dati, inerenti ad esempio 
le condizioni degli istituti penitenziari, le attività svolte in carcere, le relazioni tra i detenuti e la famiglia e in generale le reti sociali e parentali. 
2 Per maggiori informazioni, si veda World Prison Brief 2010, International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief, King's College London ? 
School of Law, London. Altri riferimenti per i confronti internazionali sono: Programme de La Haye, Journal Officiel C 53 du 3.3.2005, p. 11, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/; Communication de la Commission COM/2006/437 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/; European Sourcebook of Crime and 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/; Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/introduction; http://www.kcl.ac.uk/index.aspx; 
http://esc-eurocrim.org/; http://www.coe.int/prison; http://www.cpt.coe.int/en. 
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Countries with more than 100 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants (highest prison 
population rates) - Source: 2010 Council of Europe SPACE I report, p. 51. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  ISTAT, I Detenuti Nelle Carceri Italiane - Anno 2011, 2012, available at 
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/77789 (accessed 30 september 2013), p. 2. 
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On the other side, however, Italy has a severe level of prison overcrowding. As of 31 
December 2009, 64,791 people were incarcerated despite an official prison capacity 
of 44,073 people. This means an overcrowding level of 147%.31 As a result, on 
January 2010 Italy declared, for the first time in history, the state of "national 
emergency" because of prison overcrowding,32 which was later reiterated twice. Some 
legislative measures (the so-called Piano-carceri) were adopted in an effort to reduce 
prison overcrowding.33 The strategy adopted since January 2010 is essentially based 
on 4 areas of intervention: the first and the second areas aim at increasing prison 
capacity through construction of new facilities (which is in itself a remarkable step, 
since several decades have passes with no prison construction programs in Italy); the 
third area relates to legislative measures; and the forth area relates to an increase in 
the number of correctional authorities.34 This strategy yielded some (very) slight 
results in the years that have followed its adoption. As of 31 December 2011, 66,897 
people were detained in correctional facilities across Italy, despite an official prison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See data on Italian prison population and prison capacity for the second semester of 2009. Data are 
recorded by the Dipartimento dell'Amministrazione Penitenziarria and are available at 
http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14.wp. 
32  The decree, which was issued by Silvio Berlusconi, is available at 
www.ristretti.it/...carceri/decreto_emergenza_13_gennaio_2010. 
33 See Piano carceri: Quattro Pilastri per Affrontare l'Emergenza, available at www.governo.it. 
34 For a detailed analysis, in Italian, of the three main legislative measures that have been adopted since 
2010 (i.e. L. 26 November 2010 n. 199, L. 17 February 2012 n. 9 and L. 9 August 2013, n. 94), see, in 
relation to L. 26 November 2010 n. 199 (so-called "legge svuota carceri", that, among other things, 
essentially extended the possibility of home detention to people sentenced to no more than 12 month 
inprisonment): L. DEGLI INNOCENTI-F. FALDI, Le Nuove Disposizioni in Materia di Detenzione presso 
il Domicilio, in Cass. pen., 2011, 2816 ff.; F. DELLA CASA, Approvata la Legge c.d. Svuotacarceri: Un 
Altro "Pannicello Caldo" per l'Ingravescente Piaga del Sovraffollamento Carcerario?, in Dir. pen. 
proc., 2011, 5 ff; S. TURCHETTI, Legge Svuotacarceri e Esecuzione della Pena Presso il Domicilio: 
Ancora una Variante sul Tema della Detenzione Domiciliare? in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 2010, 1787 ff.; 
F. FIORENTIN, Commento alla L. 26 Novembre 2010 n. 199, in Guida al dir., 2011, 52-67; C. FIORIO, 
Detenzione Domiciliare Obbbligatoria e Sovraffollamento Carcerario, in Giur. mer., 2011, 1204 ff.; in 
relation to L. 17 February 2012 n. 9 (that, among other things, furhter extended the applicability of 
home detention, now available for the execution of sentences not longer than 18 months, and that 
developed other measures to reduce the so-called "sliding doors" phenomenon) see: L. PISTORELLI 
(ed.), Relazione a Cura dell'Ufficio del Massimario  della Corte di Cassazione, Rel. n. III/4/2012, 
available at http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/materia/-/-/-/1310-
legge_17_febbraio_2012__n__9__di_conversione__con_modificazioni__del_decreto_legge_n__211_d
el_2011__cd_____svuota_carceri_______disposizioni_rilevanti_per_il_settore_penale/; and, in 
relation to L. 9 August 2013, n. 94, (which, among other tihngs, for the first time amended the 
conditions for the use of pre-trial detention, which impacts heavily on prisons overdrowding in Italy 
since half of detainees are in prison waiting for trial), see: A. DELLA BELLA, Convertito in Legge il 
Decreto Carceri 78/2003: Un Primo Timido Passo per sconfiggere il sovraffollamento, available at 
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/materia/-/-/-/2471-
convertito_in_legge_il____decreto_carceri____78_2013___un_primo_timido_passo_per_sconfiggere_
il_sovraffollamento/. 
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capacity of 45,700 people. This means an overcrowding rate of 146.4%, as it is shown 
from the detailed table provided below, from the 2012 ISTAT report.35 
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In 2012 and 2013 the slow downward trend in prison overcrowding was confirmed. 
There was a decrease in the total incarcerated population as well as an increase in 
prison capacity, through the construction of new prison facilities. As of 31 December 
2012, in fact, 65,701 people were detained in correctional facilities across Italy, 
despite an official prison capacity of 47,040 people. This means that as of 31 
December 2012 there was an overcrowding level of 139.6%. As of 30 September 
2013, 64.758 people were detained in correctional facilities across Italy despite an 
official prison capacity of 47.615, which means an overcrowding level of 136.0%.36 
The slow decrease in prison overcrowding that has occurred since 2010 is the result of 
several factors. Some legislative measures, as we have seen, have been taken by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 ISTAT, I Detenuti Nelle Carceri Italiane - Anno 2011, supra note 30, p.1. 
36 2012-2013 statistics are from the Dipartimento dell'Amministrazione Penitenziarria, Ufficio per lo 
Sviluppo e la Gestione del Sistema Informativo Automatizzato, Sezione Statistica, and are available at 
http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14.wp 
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Italian governmen, also in light of decisions adopted against Italy by the European 
Court of Human Rights that will be later anlayzed37.  
These measures though, despite a good start, are not likely to solve the problem at the 
source. Several scholars have argued that they must be integrated with more 
systematic reforms, such as the ones that will be proposed later in this thesis in the 
field of drug legislation.38 
Putting data on prison overcrowding in Italy within the European context yields the 
following, alarming results: according to the 2010 Council of Europe SPACE I report 
by Marcelo Aebi and Natalia Del Grande, in September 2010 Italy had the second 
most overcrowded prison system in Europe (153.2%), behind Serbia (172.3%) only.39  
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Countries with prison population overcrowding (more than 100 prisoners per 100 
places) - Source: 2010 Council of Europe SPACE I report, p.51 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See infra chapter VI. 
38 See, in Italian, F. PALAZZO, Riforma del Sistema Sanzionatorio e Discrezionalità Penale, in Dir. pen. 
proc., 2013. According to the author, long term strategies must be added to measures aimed at 
increasing prison capacity. These long term strategies should address the causes of prison 
overcrowding in light of the composition of the prison population: "muovendo dall'ovvia 
considerazione che le categorie che più l'alimentano fino all'abnormità sono quelle: dei detenuti non 
definitivi, dei detenuti stranieri, dei detenuti socialmente marginali provenienti in stragrande 
maggioranza dalla delinquenza degli stupefacenti". Id. at 101. See also F. CANCELLARO, 
Sovraffollamento Carcerario: Una Sentenza Pilota Condanna l'Italia per la Sistematica Violazione 
dell'Art. 3 CEDU, in Ius 17, 3, 2012, at 73. 
39 M. AEBI-N. DEL GRANDE, Council of Europe Penal Statistics, 2010 SPACE I Report, available at 
http://www3.unil.ch/wpmu/space/space-i/situation-on-1st-september-2010/ (Accessed 30 November 
2013). 
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This decreased to 147.0% in 2011, placing Italy behind Serbia and Greece only. 
Figures form the 2011 Council of Europe SPACE I report by Marcelo Aebi and 
Natalia Del Grande, which refer to the situation as of September 2011 and are the 
most current comparable data, are provided below.40 
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Countries with prison population overcrowding (more than 100 prisoners per 100 
places) - Source: 2011 Council of Europe SPACE I report, p.58 
 
Putting data on prison overcrowding in Italy within the global context, as well, is 
quite shocking. Italy is currently among the top 100 most overcrowded countries 
worldwide, ranking 63 as to the latest available data of the International Center for 
Prison Studies, which report a 135.9% occupancy rate as of 31 August 2013.41 As it 
appears from the table provided below, the United States has an overall rate of prison 
overcrowding that is just under 100% capacity, placing it below the top 100 worst-
ranking countries worldwide.42 However, it is important to note that, as we underlined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 M. AEBI-N. DEL GRANDE, Council of Europe Penal Statistics, 2011 SPACE I Report, available at 
http://www3.unil.ch/wpmu/space/space-i/space-i-2011-main-indicators/. 
41  See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, Prison Occupancy Rate, available at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_occupancy. 
42 See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, World Prison Brief - United States, available at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=190. The United States, 
overall, has a rate of prison overcrowding that is just under 99% capacity, according to the latest data 
of the International Center for Prison Studies. This puts the United States at number 114 in the list of 
the most overcrowded prison system worldwide. See 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_occupancy 
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in the previous chapter, if California were a country of its own it would rank in the 
top 50 most overcrowded countries worldwide. 43 
                  
 
Notably, around 40% inmates are detained in Italian prisons because of drug offences. 
As of December 2011, according to the 2012 ISTAT report, 41% i.e. 27,459 people 
were detained in Italy for drug offences. The various property crimes were second on 
the list, with 25.8% i.e. 17.285 people detained for robbery and 19.6% i.e. 13,109 
people detained for theft.44 Below we provide a detailed list of the offences mostly 
represented in Italian prisons as of is December 2011, from the ISTAT report. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 C. GRODEN, The Ten Worst Countries for Prison Overcrowding, in The Time Newsfeed, 5 August 
2013, available at http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/08/05/the-10-worst-countries-for-prison-
overcrowding/. 
44 ISTAT, I Detenuti Nelle Carceri Italiane - Anno 2011, supra note 30, p. 9. According to the report: 
"I reati più frequenti commessi dai detenuti presenti sono la violazione della normativa sugli 
stupefacenti (41%), la rapina (25,8%), il furto (19,6%), la ricettazione (17,2%), le lesioni personali 
(15,6%), la violazione della legge sul possesso delle armi (15,1%), gli omicidi volontari (13,8%). 
Seguono la resistenza a pubblico ufficiale (11,2%) e le estorsioni (11,1%), la violenza privata e la 
minaccia (10,5%), i reati di associazione a delinquere di stampo mafioso (9,7%), i reati contro 
l'amministrazione della giustizia (9,5%), la falsità in atti e persone (5,9%), la violenza sessuale (5,4%). 
Per quanto riguarda la violazione di cui al Testo Unico sugli stupefacenti, è opportuno ricordare che la 
maggior parte di essi consegue all'imputazione di cui all'art 73 (produzione, traffico e detenzione 
illecita di sostanze stupefacenti). A questo tipo di violazioni risulta per lo più associato il fenomeno 
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(a) La somma degli indici percentuali è maggiore di 100, poiché a un singolo detenuto possono essere attribuiti più tipi di reato.  
In 2013, Italy's grossly overcrowded prisons were subject to severe evaluation by the 
European Court of Human Rights, in the landmark case of Torreggiani and Others v. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
della tossicodipendenza in carcere, in quanto l'uso di sostanze stupefacenti risulta correlato 
positivamente con la commissione di reati di produzione, traffico e detenzione illecita di sostanze 
stupefacenti (art. 73 della legge n. 309 del 1990)". Obviously, property crimes, rather than drugs 
crimes, are first on the list if one considers the aggregated values (i.e. theft plus robbery plus purchase 
of stolen goods, for a total of 33.647 detainees). For 2008-2012 data see the statistics from the Ministry 
of Justice, available at 
http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14_1.wp?facetNode_1=0_2&facetNode_5=0_2_10&facetNo
de_4=1_5_28&facetNode_3=1_5_29&facetNode_2=3_1_6&previsiousPage=mg_1_14&contentId=SS
T613925. According to these statistics, as of 31 December 2012 39.4% people were detained in Italian 
prisons because of drug offenses.  
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Italy. This decision, as we will see in chapter II, acknowledged that Italian prisons 
reported an overcrowding rate of 148% on 13 April 2012. Despite the Court showed 
appreciation for the efforts carried out by the Italian government since 2010, which 
had resulted in a 3% points reduction in prison overcrowding in the period 2010-
2012, it ordered Italy to put in place, within one year, more incisive measures to 
provide redress for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights resulting 
from prison overcrowding. Thus, with severely overcrowded prisons and under court 
order, Italy is the California of Europe when it comes to conditions of confinement.45 
 
II. HOW HIGHEST COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH PRISON 
OVERCROWDING IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE 
1. Shared problems, but different in magnitude: the reasons behind it 
 
One point that emerges form the statistical data that have been provided in the 
previous chapter is that the severity of prison overcrowding is much more alarming in 
the United States, with California's prisons operating at around 200% of design 
capacity for at least 11 years, than in Europe, with Italian prisons operating at around 
150% prison capacity. If, on the one hand, California and Italy share the same 
problem, on the other hand, the gravity of the problem seems to be quite different on 
the two sides of the Atlantic.  
 
What, if anything, will prevent Italian prisons to become as overcrowded as 
California's prisons in the next years? In Europe, the answer is found in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), that through strict 
interpretation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)46 has provided inmates effective protection and 
redress for violations of their rights. The ECtHR, with its increasingly active role in 
the field of conditions of confinement, has preserved - and will likely continue to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 I borrow this expression from Palash Ghosh, who used it in its article of 18 June 2013 available at 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2013/06/with-overcrowded-prisons-and-
under-court-orders-italy-is-the-california-of-the-europe.html 
46EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 222. 
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preserve in the next years - the right to be free from "torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment",47 i.e. the European equivalent of the American right to be free from "cruel 
and unusual punishment".48 
 
In the United States, inmates seeking to challenge their conditions of confinement 
face several obstacles. Not only must they satisfy the strict exhaustion requirements 
set forth by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1966,49 but they bear the burden to 
prove compelling objective and subjective elements, established by the Supreme 
Court in its jurisprudence on conditions of confinement.50 As to the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1966, some preliminary clarifications may be of help. In recent years, 
the Eighth Amendmend's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" is 
interpreted by courts in the United States as imposing constitutional limits on both 
criminal punishment and conditions of confinement.51 This has not always been the 
case. Prior to the 1960s, in fact, most courts declined jurisdiction over complaints 
filed by prison inmates regarding their conditions of confinement.52 The Eighth 
Amendment was invoked by courts primarily to check legislative abuse in the 
determination of punishment,53 and the courts were reluctant to interfere with the 
correctional facilities administration.54 Starting from the 1960s, however, some courts 
departed from this "hands-off" judicial doctrine.55 They allowed prisoners to obtain 
relief for their inadequate conditions of confinement by filing a petition for a "writ of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47Id., at art 3: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment". 
48 The 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted". 
49 PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 132-66 
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.). 
50 See infra chapter II. section 2. 
51  M. GUTTERMAN, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Conditions of 
Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV., 1995, 376. 
52 D. J. GOTTLIEB, The Legacy of Wolfish and Chapman: Some Thoughts About "Big Prison Case" 
Litigation in the 1980s, in I. P. ROBBINS (ed.), Prisoners and the Law, 1999, at 4. 
53 E. G. WOODBURY, Note - Prison Overcrowding and Rhodes v. Chapman: Double-Celling by What 
Standard?, 23 B.C. L. REV., 1982, 717.  
54 The lack of involvement by the courts was mainly due to the separation of powers doctrine, the 
demand for federalism, fear of undermining prisons' disciplinary system and judicial inexpertise. See S. 
Y. CHUNG, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, supra note 
5 at 2358. 
55 The erosion of the “hands-off” doctrine was supported by Robinson v. California, where the 
Supreme Court applied the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment 
directly to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend VIII (“Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); E. 
G. WOODBURY, supra note 53 at 719-22.  
	   20	  
habeas corpus".56 Thus, courts started issuing orders to reduce prison population, 
especially when overcrowding jeopardized the health and safety of the inmates. As a 
consequence, 35 jurisdictions were operating under court orders or consent decrees to 
reduce prison overcrowding as of April 1989.57 The reaction of Congress to the 
explosion of prison conditions litigation and judicial activism came in 1996, with the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act.58 First, the PLRA established a very strict exhaustion 
requirement: before prisoners could challenge their condition of confinement in 
federal court, they had to exhaust any available administrative remedies, by pursuing 
to completion whatever inmate grievance and appeal procedures their prison 
custodians provided.59 Secondly, the PLRA was designed to curb the discretion of the 
courts: it provided that courts could not grant or approve any prospective relief unless 
1) they had found that such relief was narrowly drawn, 2) it extended no further than 
necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, and 3) it was the least intrusive 
means.60 As a result of this legislation, it is nowadays very hard for inmates in the 
United States to bring challenges to their conditions of confinement to federal courts. 
And for those few cases that successfully navigate the PLRA and make it into the 
federal courts, the threshold that has to be met to establish a constitutional violation, 
in light of the two-prong test of the Supreme Court that will be analyzed in the next 
section, is rather high. 
In Europe, instead, an approach to prison overcrowding that gives substantial weight 
to the space provided to inmates in their cells has developed in the most recent 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Although, similarly to the 
United States, all domestic remedies have to be exhausted by European inmates 
before they can seek redress for violation of their rights in front of the European Court 
of Human Rights, the approach recently adopted by the ECtHR provides inmates a 
more meaningful protection of their rights in case of severe prison overcrowding. 
 
This chapter argues for the adoption by litigators and the courts in the United States of 
an approach similar to the one developed by the ECtHR, and it encourages a more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 I. P. ROBBINS, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial Intervention 
in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1980, 214. 
57 C. E. ANDERSON, Uncle Sam Gets Serious: A Report From the Front Line, A.B.A. J., 1990, 63. 
58 PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, supra note 49.  
59 Ibidem. 
60 Ibidem. 
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widespread use of this approach by litigators and the courts in Europe. First, we will 
conduct a study of the U.S case law on prison overcrowding, with particular regard to 
the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence and the jurisprudence of U.S. circuit courts. 
Then, we will analyze the approach to prison overcrowding that has been developed 
in the most recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Finally, we will argue for a more 
widespread in the evaluation of conditions of confinement both in Europe and in the 
United States of what we identify as the "minimum living space" approach, in light of 
the lessons that can be learnt from (the poor records of) Italy and (the successful 
human rights mechanisms of) Europe. 
 
2. The United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on prison overcrowding 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court is the highest federal court in the United States. It has 
ultimate (and largely discretionary) appellate jurisdiction over all federal courts and 
state court cases involving issues of federal law, in addition to original jurisdiction 
over a small range of cases.61 In the legal system of the United States, the Supreme 
Court is the final interpreter of federal constitutional law. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered prison overcrowding as a ground for 
constitutional violations in its jurisprudence on conditions of confinement, under the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment". Differently from 
the ECtHR, that has been increasingly active in the field of conditions of confinement 
in recent years,62 the Supreme Court has so far established only very few clear points 
in the field of conditions of confinement. In particular, it has only established that for 
conditions of confinement to amount to "cruel and unusual punishment" a two-prong 
test must be met, which includes an objective and a subjective element.  
The objective element of the test was established in Rhodes v. Chapman,63 where the 
Supreme Court for the first time reviewed the application of the Eighth Amendment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The U.S. Constitution specifies that the Supreme Court may exercise original jurisdiction in cases 
affecting ambassadors and other diplomats, and in cases in which a state is a party. In all other cases, 
however, the Court has only appellate jurisdiction. It considers cases based on its original jurisdiction 
very rarely; almost all cases are brought to the Supreme Court on appeal. In practice, the only original 
jurisdiction cases heard by the Court are disputes between two or more states. 
62 See infra chapter II. section 3. 
63 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981). 
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to an overcrowding claim. The Court's findings in Rhodes were limited to the facts of 
the case,64 which challenged the practice of "double-celling"65. The Court failed to 
articulate a specific standard for lower courts to follow when interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment in relation to conditions of confinement.66 Nevertheless, the Court did 
make clear that, in order to establish a constitutional violation, the complainant must 
prove that the alleged deprivation is serious. In particular, the alleged deprivation 
must "involve[s] unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" 67  in light of the 
"contemporary standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society".68 
On the one side, the Court held that neither double-celling nor prison crowding in 
excess of design capacity violated the Constitution in and of themselves.69 On the 
other side, through the reference to the "contemporary standards of decency", the 
Court characterized the objective element of the test as an adaptable and evolving 
standard. This is a very important point in relation to the appropriateness for U.S. 
circuit courts to look at the standards developed by the European Court of Human 
Rights, as part of the "contemporary standards of decency" analysis. 
In the following years, Wilson v. Seiter70 and Farmer v. Brennan71 clarified the 
subjective element of the test. In Wilson, the plaintiff's complaint alleged generally 
poor prison conditions including overcrowding, excessive noise, inadequate heating 
and cooling, improper ventilation, unsanitary facilities and housing with mentally and 
physically ill inmates.72 The Court held that, in cases challenging conditions of 
confinement that are not formally imposed as a sentence, the standard for wantonness 
is one of "deliberate indifference": the complainant must prove that the prison official 
had knowledge of and disregarded "an excessive risk to health and safety".73 As a 
preliminary matter, the Court stated that confinement conditions are unconstitutional 
only if they produce "the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Id. at 349 n.14. 
65 Double-celling consists of housing two prisoners in a cell designed to accommodate only one inmate. 
Each prison cell in the instant case measured approximately 63 square feet. Id. at 340-41. 
66 Id. at 347. See S. Y. CHUNG, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment 
Violations, supra note 5 at 2359. 
67 Rhodes at 346 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)) 
68 Id. at 348 n. 13. 
69 Id. at 347-48. 
70 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). 
71 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). 
72 Wilson v. Seiter, supra note 70, at 296. 
73 Id. at 299-304. 
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food, warmth, or exercise; for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with 
a failure to issue blankets."74  
Some considerations are to be made on the Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
conditions of confinement, with specific regard to constitutional challenges based on 
prison overcrowding.  
In the absence of a clear Supreme Court standard, circuit courts in the United States75 
have so far adopted three approaches to determine whether conditions of confinement, 
and in this context prison overcrowding, amount to "cruel and unusual punishment": 
1) a totality-of-the-circumstances, 2) a core-conditions and 3) a per se approach.76  
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach considers a broad range of conditions, 
including conditions that may cause psychological harm.77 In deciding whether the 
challenged prison conditions fall below constitutional norms, courts that adopt such 
approach78 examine not only the availability of basic necessities, such as food, 
clothing, safety, and shelter, but also other factors such as overcrowding, adequacy of 
staff supervision, and availability of recreational opportunities.79 The core conditions 
approach, instead, examines specifically the deprivation of food, clothing, safety, 
shelter, sanitation and medical care. Courts that adopt such approach80 generally do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Id. at 304. 
75 The American judicial system comprises several court systems, broadly divided into the federal and 
state courts. District Courts and Circuit Courts are part of the federal court system, of which the U.S. 
Supreme Court is the ultimate authority. District courts are lower courts and have the responsibility for 
holding trials, while circuit courts are appellate courts that do not hold trials but only hear appeals for 
cases decided by the lower court. The district court system is spread over 94 different geographical 
areas while the circuit court has 13 administrative regions covering the United States. 
76S. Y. CHUNG, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, supra 
note 5. 
77 Id. at 2365. 
78  The Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals, for example, adopted the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach. As to the Second Circuit, see Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804, 805 (2d Cir. 
1984). As to the Third Circuit, see Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990), and Nami v. Fauver, 
82 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1996), where the Third Circuit held the conditions unconstitutional in light of the 
cumulative impact of double celling inmates in a 80 square feet cell and "the length of confinement, the 
amount of time prisoners must spend in their cells each day, sanitation, lighting, bedding, ventilation, 
noise, education and rehabilitation programs, opportunities for activities outside the cells, and the 
repair and functioning of basic physical facilities such as plumbing, ventilation, and showers" Id at 67. 
79 S. Y. CHUNG, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, supra 
note 5 at 2366. 
80 The Eighth, Ninth and DC Circuit Courts of Appeals, for example, adopted the core-conditions 
approach. As to the Eighth Circuit see Cody v. Hillard, 830 F.2d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 1987). As to the 
Ninth Circuit see Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 1981) and Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 
F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982). As to the DC Circuit see Occoquan v. Barry 844 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
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not consider overcrowding as a core condition.81 As a result, under this approach a 
court cannot find an Eighth Amendment violation on the basis of prison 
overpopulation alone, unless it leads to a deprivation of a core condition.82 This 
approach focuses on factors that cause acute physical pain for prisoners, not 
encompassing conditions that may produce severe psychological pain.83 The per se 
approach, finally, considers prison overcrowding itself to be a violation of the 
Constitution. Although courts taking this approach have not provided a clear 
definition of "overcrowding", its meaning has ranged from conditions that "shock[] 
the general conscience" to those that offend "contemporary standards of human 
decency" to simply the "accommodation of inmates beyond design capacity".84  
It is important to note that, if Rhodes explicitly rejected the idea that prisons that 
operate above design capacity lead to an immediate finding of "cruel and unusual 
punishment", i.e. rejected the per se approach where it defines overcrowding as 
housing inmates in excess of design capacity, it did not affect a per se approach that 
defines overcrowding by the minimum personal space.85  
Also, it has been argued that Wilson v. Seiter and Farmer v. Brennan narrowed the 
totality-of-the-conditions approach requiring the deprivation of a specific human need 
for a finding of unconstitutionality.86 It is worth noting, however, that the list of 
human needs that has been set in these decisions is not exhaustive. To the contrary, by 
using the term "such as"87 the Court left extensive flexibility to lower courts. 
Ultimately, there is a strong argument that "living space" is a single, identifiable 
human need, as it has been acknowledged, among others, by the Forth Circuit court in 
its 1992 decision in McCrae v. Oldham. 88 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 1981); See also P. M. ROSENBLATT, The 
Dilemma of Overcrowding, supra note 12 at 500. 
82 See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1246-47 n.3 (“The Rhodes' rationale suggests that the Court would 
require evidence of specific conditions amounting to one of the enumerated deprivations.”); D. J. 
GOTTLIEB, The Legacy of Wolfish and Chapman, supra note 52, at 18. 
83 S. Y. CHUNG, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, supra 
note 5 at 2368. 
84 Supra chapter I. section 1. 
85 See S. Y. CHUNG, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, 
supra note 5 at 2370 (claiming that "a constitutional challenge based on the size of the cell may still 
apply"). 
86 Id., at 2361. 
87 Wilson v. Seiter, supra note 70, at 304. 
88 McCrae v. Oldham, 976 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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In conclusion, with the exception of requiring a strict objective element (i.e. 
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in light of the contemporary standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society") and a strict subjective element 
(i.e. "deliberate indifference"), no other clear points have so far been established by 
the Supreme Court in its jurisprudence on conditions of confinement, and thus prison 
overcrowding. Therefore, no obstacle is currently present, at the Supreme Court level, 
to prevent the development - among circuit courts in the United States - of what we 
identify as the "minimum living space" approach, which has been adopted in the most 
recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on prison 
overcrowding.89  
 
2.1 Brown v. Plata  
 
The most recent and most important decision by the Supreme Court on prison 
overcrowding was issued in the 2011 landmark case of Brown v. Plata.90 This 
decision came after almost 20 years without a Supreme Court ruling in the field of 
conditions of confinement.  
The case of Brown v. Plata reached the Supreme Court after 20 years of protracted 
litigation in the lower courts, attesting to the fact that the PLRA continues to present 
formidable obstacles for inmates seeking to challenge their conditions of confinement. 
As acknowledged by the Supreme Court itself, the degree of overcrowding in 
California's prisons was "exceptional".91 The State's prisons had operated at around 
200% of design capacity for at least 11 years, grossly depriving prisoners of adequate 
medical care.92 Amici curiae from several public health associations emphasized that 
California prisons did not meet the nationally recognized minimum standards for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See infra chapter II. section 3. 
90 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917 (2011). This Supreme Court decision affirmed a decision by a 
three judge panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern and Northern Districts of 
California which had ordered California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity 
within two years. The case on appeal as Brown v. Plata in the Supreme Court was a class action that 
combined one case most recently captioned Coleman v. Brown (docket no. 2:90-cv-00520-LKK-JFM 
(Eastern D. Cal.) and another most recently known as Plata v. Brown (docket no. 3:01-cv-01351-TEH 
(Northern D. Cal.). 
91 Brown v. Plata at 1923. The three-judge court's order reported that the "extent of overcrowding in the 
California prison system, approximately 190% of systemwide design capacity, is 'extraordinary' and 
'almost unheard of'. The problem is 'widespread' and 'not restricted to just a few institutions. It’s 
occurred throughout the system'". Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, CIV S-90-0520LKKJFMP, 2009 WL 
2430820 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) at 55. 
92 Plata at 1918. 
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required medical care in prisons, and created public health problems that reached 
beyond the prison walls.93Thus, in a landmark five to four opinion by Justice 
Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that crowding was the primary cause of the Eighth 
Amendment violations and that a prison population cap at 137.5% of design capacity 
was necessary to remedy to the constitutional violation.94 
Following this decision, California adopted the so-called "realignment plan": many 
newly convicted offenders who under prior rules would have come into the state 
system are now instead serving their time in county jails. Parole violators are also 
being channeled to jails rather than prisons and their numbers, altogether, have 
dropped significantly. As a result, California’s state prison population is currently 
more than a quarter smaller than the 2007 peak. As of November 2012, the state 
housed about 125.000 prisoners, which put the total population at about 147% of rated 
prison capacity; an additional 8.600 prisoners were housed out-of-state.95 The Plata 
order (if not amended) requires still more prison population reduction: an additional 
decrease of nearly 15.000 (over 23.000 if the out-of- state prisoners are brought back 
home, as the California Governor Jerry Brown has declared they will be)96. In a press 
conference with state legislators held on 9 September 2013, California's Governor 
Jerry Brown announced that, while he plans to reduce California’s prison 
overcrowding to 137.5 % of capacity by adding thousands of beds and transferring 
inmates to private prisons, lawmakers need more time to comply with the federal 
ruling. Brown said the December 31, 2013 deadline to drastically reduce the state 
prison population was too soon.97 
Of course, Brown v. Plata did not mark the beginning of the end of mass incarceration 
in the United States, nor of the abusive conditions that proliferate in prisons and jails. 
Unlike the landmark prisoners’ rights cases of the 1960s and 1970s, this decision is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Brief of amici curiae American Public Health Association, American Nurses Association, American 
Association of Public Health Physicians, Academy of Correctional Health Professionals, and Society o 
Correctional Physicians in support of Appellees, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011), at 7. 
94Plata at 1923. 
95 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Weekly Report of Population as 
of midnight October 24, 2012 (Oct. 29, 2012), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/of- 
fender_information_services_branch/WeeklyWed/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad121024.pdf. 
96  CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, The Future of California 
Corrections: A Blueprint to Save Billions of Dollars, End Federal Court Oversight, and Improve the 
Prison System 5 (23 April 2012) available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/ 
plan/complete.pdf (Accessed 6 July 2012). 
97 See http://rt.com/usa/california-governor-prison-time-overcrowding-639/ 
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unlikely to spur many successful "copycat lawsuits" to impose prison population 
caps.98 Moreover, it will be important to monitor the "very real possibility that Plata 
could succeed at chopping the head off of unconstitutional conditions of prison 
confinement in California, only to cause fifty-eight counties to develop 
unconstitutional conditions of jail confinement."99 Nevertheless, this decision raised 
public consciousness on the problems of mass incarceration and prison overcrowding 
in the United States. Hopefully, this decision will revitalize the courts as a major 
forum to challenge abusive prison and jail conditions, in line with the argument put 
forward in this thesis. 
 
3. The European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on prison overcrowding 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is Europe's court of last resort. It is in 
charge of the interpretation and the enforcement of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). As of today, the ECtHR is the 
only supranational human rights body that issues binding decisions for States at an 
international level. In light of its quasi-constitutional character (its ultimate authority 
makes it comparable to the Supreme Court), its influential role and its evolutionary 
approach, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR should be given particular attention by 
courts in the United States. In fact, the idea of using human rights law in prison 
reform is not as far fetched as it might have seemed a few years ago.100 Interest in the 
issue can be seen at every level, from Supreme Court Justices, to circuit courts,101 
public interest law groups and individual practitioners102. Justice Kennedy's opinion 
in Lawrence v. Texas,103 for example, referred to some decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights to confirm that "[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has 
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries."104 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98  M. GOTTSCHALK, Prison Overcrowding and Brown v. Plata (June 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/89575/prison-overcrowding-brown-plata-supreme-court california. 
99 M. SCHLANGER, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARVARD 
CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW, 2012, 168. 
100 A. BRONSTEIN-J. GAINSBOROUGH, The International Context of US Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. 
REV., 2003-2004,  815. 
101 See e.g. Laureau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981). 
102A. BRONSTEIN-J. GAINSBOROUGH, supra note 100. 
103 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) is a decision by the United States Supreme Court that 
struck down the sodomy law in Texas and, by extension, invalidated sodomy laws in thirteen other 
states, making same-sex sexual activity legal in every U.S. state and territory. 
104 Id. at 2483. 
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Over the last decade, the ECtHR has been increasingly active in the field of 
conditions of confinement. The Court has consistently stressed that, for conditions of 
confinement (and thus for prison overcrowding) to amount to a violation of Article 3 
of the ECHR, which prohibits "torture and inhuman or degrading treatment", ill-
treatment must attain a "minimum level of severity", i.e. the suffering and humiliation 
of the detainee must go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation 
connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. 105  More 
importantly, what emerges from the most recent ECtHR case-law, particularly from 
2009 onwards, is that the Court has shifted from the adoption of an all-of-the-
circumstances approach to prison overcrowding to the setting of a clear limit under 
which prison overcrowding amounts, in itself, to inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Remarkably, this new approach confirms inmates' absolute right to a personal living 
space of 3 square meters. 106  Some recent decisions against Italy are particularly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Although measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element, in 
accordance with Article 3 of the Convention the State must ensure that a person is detained under 
conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity and that the manner and method of 
the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level 
of suffering inherent in detention (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI). 
106 The ECtHR, even before 2009, had frequently found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention 
(prohibition of "torture and inhuman or degrading treatment") on account of "lack of personal space 
afforded to detainees". See for example Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064/05, §§ 61 et seq., 1 June 2006; 
Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, §§ 104 et seq., EUR. CT. H.R. 2005-X (extracts); Labzov v. Russia, 
no. 62208/00, §§ 44 et seq., 16 June 2005; Novoselov v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R no. 66460/01, §§ 41 et 
seq., 2 June 2005; Mayzit v. Russia, no. 63378/00, §§ 39 et seq., 20 January 2005; Kalashnikov v. 
Russia, no. 47095/99, §§ 97 et seq., EUR. CT. H.R 2002-VI; Peers v. Greece, EUR. CT. H.R no. 
28524/95, §§ 69 et seq., EUR. CT. H.R 2001-III); Melnik v Ukraine EUR. CT. H.R (28 March 2006); and 
Lind v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (6 December 2007), Application n. 25664/05. What we will note in our 
further analysis, however, is that there is an important difference in the reasoning of cases before and 
after the 2009 decision in Sulejmanovic. The case of Lind v. Russia, for example, is one of the most 
cited by the ECtHR after 2009 to support its finding that having less than 3 square meters of personal 
space justifies, of itself, a violation of Article 3. In that case, however, the reasoning of the Court was 
still based on an all-of-the-circumstances approach and the Court had not set a minimum baseline as to 
personal living space. The applicant was held in two different cells. He was initially afforded "less than 
3 square meters" of personal space and subsequently had only "2.1 square meters" of personal space. 
The applicant, despite suffering from a chronic kidney disease, was confined to his cell day and night, 
save for one hour of daily outdoor exercise. The Court, in its holding, noted that "by keeping the 
applicant in overcrowded cells and by refusing him medical assistance appropriate to his condition, the 
domestic authorities subjected him to inhuman and degrading treatment". Thus, at this point in time, 
the Court was still evaluating conditions of confinement based on an "all-of-the-circumstances" 
approach and without having set a clear minimum baseline as to personal living space. The same can 
be said for another case that is often cited by the ECtHR, from 2009 onward, to support that having less 
than 3 square meters of personal space justifies, of itself, a finding of a violation of Article 3. It is the 
case of Andrey Frolov v. Russia, no. 205/02, §47-49, 29 March 2007. There, despite the applicant was 
afforded less than 0.7 square meters of personal space and was confined in this cell for more than four 
years, the decision reads as follow: "the Court finds that the fact that the applicant was obliged to live, 
sleep and use the toilet in the same cell with so many other inmates for more than four years was itself 
sufficient to cause distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering 
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significant in this regard and will be analyzed below: they are the 2009 judgment in 
Sulejmanovic v. Italy and the 2013 Chamber judgment in Torreggiani v. Italy.  
 
3.1. Sulejmanovic v. Italy  
 
In its 2009 decision in the case of Sulejmanovic v. Italy,107 the ECtHR held, by five 
votes to two, that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR regarding the 
applicant’s conditions of detention in Italy. This was the first time Italy was found in 
violation of Article 3 due to prison overcrowding. Let us briefly summarize the facts 
of the case. During his detention in Rebibbia Prison, Mr. Sulejmanovic was put in a 
number of different cells, each measuring 16.20 square meters. He claimed that from 
30 November 2002 to April 2003 he had shared his cell with five other inmates, each 
having an average personal space of 2.70 square meters, and, from April to October 
2003, with four other inmates, each thus having an average personal space of 3.40 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
inherent in detention, and arouse in him feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating 
and debasing him". In essence, no clear reference to the minimum living space of 3 square meters 
appears in the ECtHR case law before 2009. From 2009 onward, instead, we can see an abstraction 
from the single case at issue and the creation of a general rule on the minimum living space. For an 
analysis, in Italian, of the trend toward considering a personal space inferior to 3 square meters as a 
violation "in re ipsa" of Article 3 ECHR see A. COLELLA, La Giurisprudenza di Strasburgo 2008-
2010: il Divieto di Tortura e Trattamenti Inumani o Degradanti (art. 3 CEDU), in Dir. pen. cont. - Riv. 
trim., 2011, at 237 ff.; ID., La Giurisprudenza di Strasburgo 2011: il Divieto di Tortura e Trattamenti 
Inumani o Degradanti (art. 3 CEDU), in Dir. pen. cont. - Riv. trim., 2012, at 223 ff. There, the author 
claims that: "L’esiguità dello spazio personale a disposizione di ciascun detenuto veniva, fino a un 
recente passato, quasi sempre valutata unitamente ad altri indici di violazione dell’art. 3 Cedu (quali le 
precarie condizioni igieniche, il rischio concreto di diffusione di malattie, ecc.), sul presupposto che la 
stessa non fosse, di per sé, sufficiente a determinare il superamento della soglia minima di gravità. 
Alcune importanti pronunce rese dalla Corte nel corso del 2009 preludono, tuttavia, al progressivo 
superamento di tale impostazione: in particolare, nella sentenza Sulejmanovic c. Italia, i giudici di 
Strasburgo hanno riscontrato una violazione dell’art. 3 Cedu per il solo fatto che il ricorrente (detenuto 
nel carcere di Rebibbia) avesse a disposizione uno spazio personale di soli 2,70 metri quadri". See also 
ID., La Giurisprudenza di Strasburgo 2011: il Divieto di Tortura e Trattamenti Inumani o Degradanti 
(art. 3 CEDU), in Dir. pen. cont. - Riv. trim., 2012, at 223 ff. There, the author notes that in the recent 
years the ECtHR is more and more open to finding a violation of Art. 3 ECHR based on lack of 
personal space alone in case of severe prison overcrowding. 
107 Sulejmanovic v. Italy, EUR. CT. H.R. (16 July 2009), Application n. 22635/03. This decision is 
available, in French only, at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22sulejmanovic%20v%20It
aly%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-93564%22]}. The press release is available, in English, at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-2802468-
3069791#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-2802468-3069791%22]}. For some valuable comments, in 
Italian, to the decision adopted by the ECHR in Sulejmanovic see M.BORTOLATO, Sovraffollamentto 
Carcerario e Trattamenti Disumani o Degradanti, in Quest. giust., 2009, 111 ff.; L. EUSEBI, Ripensare 
le Modalità delle Risposte ai Reati Traendo Spunto da C. Eur. Dir. Uomo 19.6.2009, Sulejmanovic c. 
Italie, in Cass. pen., 2009, 4938; N. PLASTINA, L'Italia Condannata  dalla corte Europea dei Diritti 
dell'Uomo per Insufficienza Temporanea dello Spazio Individuale Asseganto a un Detenuto del 
Carcere di Rebibbia nel 2003, ma Assolta per la Gestione, in quel Contesto, della Sovrappopolazione 
Carceraria, in Cass. Pen., 2009, 4928 ff. 
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square meters. Also, he alleged that he had spent more than eighteen hours per day in 
the cell. The ECtHR highlighted that having approximately 2.70 square meters of 
personal space was much inferior to the standards recommended by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, which had set 7 square meters per prisoner as a minimum desirable 
guideline for a detention cell. While the Court took into consideration the various 
factors of the detention, it found that the "flagrantly insufficient amount of personal 
space" available to Mr Sulejmanovic from 30 November 2002 to April 2003 had in 
itself constituted inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3.108 After 
being transferred in May 2003, Mr Sulejmanovic’s situation had improved: up until 
his release, he had been afforded personal space of 3.24, 4.05 and 5.40 square meters 
respectively. The Court noted that while the prison overcrowding in Rebibbia was 
extremely regrettable, it had not reached alarming proportions, in an all-of-the-
circumstances evaluation. Mr. Sulejmanovic had not complained of heating or 
hygiene problems and had not specified any actual consequences of his detention for 
his state of health. Therefore, no violation was found by after he had been 
transferred.109  
 
What emerges from a comparison between Sulejmanovic and the previous ECtHR 
decisions on prison overcrowding110 is that Sulejmanovic is the first case where 
explicit reference is made to the minimum threshold of 3 square meters. In this 
decision, in fact, the Court not only established that there had been a violation of 
Article 3 in the case at issue, due to the "flagrantly insufficient amount of personal 
space" available to the applicant, but, more importantly, made a clear distinction 
between its previous cases where inmates were granted less than 3 square meters - 
which in itself amounts to a violation of Article 3 - and cases where inmates were 
granted a greater personal living space - which could amount to a violation of Article 
3 only in connection with other generally poor detention conditions.111 In essence, the 
ECtHR in Sulejmanovic, distinguishing its previous case-law in two broader 
categories, indirectly gave a specific indication of the "minimum living space" that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Id at 11. 
109 Id. at 12. 
110 See supra note 106. 
111 Sulejmanovic v. Italy, supra note 107, at 10. 
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inmates must be granted in order not to infringe, merely due to lack of personal space, 
on their rights under Article 3 of the ECHR.112 
 
The approach adopted in Sulejmanovic was confirmed in the following years. The 
2011 decision in Mandic and Jovic113 is, among others, an example.114 This case 
concerned the conditions in Ljubljana Prison, Slovenia. During their detention there, 
the applicants were held for several months in cells in which the personal space 
available to them was 2.70 square meters. Applicants had to spend most of their time 
in the cell. The Court held that the distress and hardship endured by the applicants had 
"exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention" and had therefore 
amounted to degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3. 115  Similarly to 
Sulejmanovic, the Court recalled, on the one side, its previous cases where applicants 
had at their disposal less than 3 square meters of personal space, and noted that in 
those cases it had found that the overcrowding was so severe as to justify of itself a 
finding of a violation of Article 3.116 On the other side, the Court noted that in other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 The Court, in relation to the former set of cases, particularly mentioned Aleksandr Makarov v. 
Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (12 March 2009) Application n. 15217/07, § 93 (that adopted an all-of-the-
circumstances approach with no reference to 3 square meters as a minimum threshold); Lind v. Russia, 
EUR. CT. H.R. (6 December 2007), Application no. 25664/05 (where the Court considered both 
overcrowding and the poor physical conditions of the detainee, who suffered from a serious kidney 
problem, for its holding of violation of Article 3); Kantyrev v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (21 June 2007), 
Application n. 37213/02, §§ 50-51, (where the Court based its holding on generally unsatisfactory 
conditions of detentions); Andreï Frolov v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (29 Mars 2007), Application n. 
205/02, §§ 47-49 (that made no mention of the minimum threshold of 3 square meters); Labzov v. 
Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (16 June 2005), Application n. 62208/00, § 44 (where the Court considers the 
extreme lack of space to be the focal point for its analysis but gave no general minimum threshold); 
and Mayzit v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (20 January 2005), Application n. 63378/00, § 40 (where the 
Court, once again, put particular emphasis on the problem of overcrowding and the length of stay in the 
cell but gave no general minimum threshold). What these decisions have in common with 
Sulejmanovic is that they all dealt with cases where applicants were afforded, at least for a certain 
amount of time, a personal living space inferior to 3 square meters. What differentiates Sulejmanovic 
from all these previous cases, however, is that only in Sulejmanovic the ECtHR gave, grouping these 
sets of cases in two broader categories, a specific indication of the "minimum living space". 
113 Mandic and Jovic v. Slovenia, EUR. CT. H.R. (20 October 2011), Application n. 774/10 and n. 
5985/10, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
107139#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-107139%22]} 
114 Mandic and Jovic v. Slovenia, supra note 113. For 2011 similar decisions see, among others, 
Petrenko v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (29 March 2011), Application n. 30112/04; Vladimir Sokolov v. 
Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (5 April 2011), Application n. 31242/05; and Akbar v. Romania, EUR. CT. H.R. 
(5 May 2011), Application n. 28686/04. For 2012 similar decisions see, among others, Dmitriy 
Sazonov v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (1 March 2012), Application n. 30268/03 and Borisov v. Russia, 
EUR. CT. H.R. (13 March 2012), Application n. 12543/09. 
115 Mandic and Jovic v. Slovenia, supra note 113 at 24. 
116 The Court particularly mentioned Sulejmanovic v. Italy, supra note 107 (where the applicant had 
2.7 square meters personal space) and all other cases it had already mentioned on this point in its 
decision in Sulejmanovic, i.e. Lind v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (6 December 2007), Application no. 
25664/05 (where the applicant was initially afforded less than 3 square meters of personal space and 
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cases where the overcrowding was not so severe as to raise in itself an issue under 
Article 3, other aspects of physical conditions of detention had been relevant for its 
assessment. Such elements included, in particular, the availability of ventilation, 
access to natural light or air, adequacy of heating arrangements, compliance with 
basic sanitary requirements and the possibility of using the toilet in private. Thus, 
even in cases where a larger prison cell was at issue - measuring in the range of 3 to 4 
square meters per inmate - the Court had found a violation of Article 3 since the space 
factor was coupled with the established lack of ventilation and lighting117 or the lack 
of basic privacy in the prisoner's everyday life.118 
 
3.2. Torreggiani and others v. Italy 
 
In its landmark 2013 decision in the case of Torreggiani and Others v. Italy,119 the 
ECtHR held, unanimously (with the concurring vote of the Italian judge), that there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subsequently had only 2.1 square meters of personal space); Kantyrev v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (21 
June 2007), Application n. 37213/02, §§ 50-51 (where inmates had only 1-1,6 square meters of 
personal space); Andreï Frolov v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (29 Mars 2007), Application n. 205/02, §§ 
47-49 (where inmates had to take turns to rest and had less than 0.7 square meters of personal space); 
and Labzov v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (16 June 2005), Application n. 62208/00, § 44 (where the 
applican was afforded less than 1 square meter). 
117 The Court mentioned, for example, Babushkin v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (18 October 2007), 
Application n. 67253/01, § 44,); and Ostrovar v. Moldova, EUR. CT. H.R. (13 September 2005), 
Application n. 35207/03, § 89. 
118 The Court mentioned, for example, Belevitskiy v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R.  (1 March 2007), 
Application n. 72967/01, §§ 73-79; and Novoselov v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (2 June 2005), Application 
n. 66460/01, §§ 32 and 40-43. 
119 Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, EUR. CT. H.R. (13 January 2013), Application n. 43517/09. The 
decision is available, in French and Italian only, at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22torreggiani%20v.%20ital
y%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22ite
mid%22:[%22001-115937%22]}. The press release is available, in English, at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4212710-
5000451#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-4212710-5000451%22]}. For some interesting comments, in 
Italian, to this decision and its consequences for the Italian domestic system, see F. VIGANÒ, Sentenza 
Pilota della Corte EDU sul sovraffollamento delle Carceri Italiane. Il nostro Paese Chiamato 
all'Adozione di Rimedi Strutturali entro il Termine di un Anno, in Dir. pen. cont. 9 January 2013, 
available at http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/materia/-/-/-/1990-
sentenza_pilota_della_corte_edu_sul_sovraffollamento_delle_carceri_italiane__il_nostro_paese_chiam
ato_all_adozione_di_rimedi_strutturali_entro_il_termine_di_un_anno/. There, the author reiterates, in 
line with other scholars, that is now undisputed that the ECtHR will find a violation of Art. 3 in case of 
conditions of confinement that grant less than 3 square meters per inmate. For a detailed analysis of 
this decision and the duty (which is a direct consequence of this decision) to create effective domestic 
legal remedies in Italy to address human rights violations in conditions of confinement, see also: F. 
CANCELLARO, Sovraffollamento Carcerario: Una Sentenza Pilota Condanna l'Italia per la Sistematica 
Violazione dell'Art. 3 CEDU, in Ius 17, 3, 2012, p. 65-83; M. DOVA, Torreggiani c. Italia: Un Barlume 
di Speranza nella Cronaca del Collasso Annunciato del Sistema Sanzionatorio, in 
Riv.  it.  dir.  proc.  pen.,  2013,  p.  927-966; F. FIORENTIN, Sullo Stato della Tutela dei Diritti 
Fondamentali all'interno delle Carceri Italiane, Note in Attesa di un Intervento Riformatore in Linea 
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had been a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR due to prison overcrowding. Mr. 
Torreggiani and the other six applicants were granted, during their detention in the 
Milano-Busto Arsizio and Piacenza prisons, a personal space of 3 square meters, 
having shared a 9 square meters cell with two other prisoners. The shortage of space 
to which the applicants had been subjected, moreover, had been exacerbated by other 
poor conditions such as lack of hot water over long periods and inadequate natural 
light and ventilation. Thus, the ECtHR found that there had been a violation of Article 
3 of the ECHR through an all-of-the-circumstances evaluation. However, in line with 
other decisions following Sulejmanovic, the ECtHR also reiterated that, despite the 
limited amount of personal space in prison may not, generally, be considered in itself 
a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, in cases of severe overcrowding, i.e. when 
detainees are granted a personal space inferior to 3 square meters, this amounts, in 
itself, to a violation of Article 3.120  
 
The significance of this decision, rather that in the holding itself, lies in the fact that 
the court adopted this holding in the framework of the so-called "pilot judgment". The 
"pilot judgment" has been developed by the Court as a technique of identifying the 
structural problems underlying repetitive cases in front of the Court against certain 
states and imposing an obligation on those states to address the underlying 
problems.121 It is the most creative tool that the Court has developed in the first fifty 
years of its existence.122 In a "pilot judgment", the Court’s task is not only to decide 
whether a violation of the ECHR occurred in the specific case at issue but also to 
identify the systemic problem behind it and to give the government clear indications 
of the type of remedial measures needed to resolve it. Then, it is for the state, subject 
to the supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, to choose 
how to meet its obligation under Article 46 of the ECHR (i.e. binding force and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
con la Prospettiva Delineata dalla Corte EDU con la Sentenza Torreggiani e al. c. Italia, in Dir. pen. 
cont., 25 febbraio 2013, available at www.penalecontemporaneo.it (accessed 20 september 2013).  
120 Torreggiani, supra note 119, at 17-18. 
121 The very work and survival of the Court has been put at risk since the beginnig of the 21st century. 
The number of applications has been rising so sharply – partly due to the accession of a large number 
of new state parties to the ECHR – that the Court started to deal creatively with large-scale violations 
of human rights by way of so-called "pilot judgments". 
122 A. BUYSE, The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: Possibilities and 
Challenges, in Nomiko Vima, 2009, p. 1. For a thorough analysis of the pilot judgment procedure see 
also D. HAIDER, The Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, Leiden, 2013. 
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execution of judgments).123 A key feature of the "pilot judgment" procedure is the 
possibility of adjourning, or "freezing", related cases for a period of time on the 
condition that the government act promptly to adopt the national measures required to 
satisfy the judgment. The Court can, however, resume examining adjourned cases 
whenever the interests of justice so require. The first case where a "pilot judgment" 
was issued was the 2004 Grand Chamber judgment in Broniowski v. Poland.124 The 
"pilot judgment" procedure is now formally regulated by Article 61 of the Procedural 
Rules of the Court, which entered into force on 31 March 2011.125 
 
The crucial point of Torreggiani is that the ECtHR held that the domestic remedies 
provided by the Italian legal system to redress violations of the ECHR resulting from 
prison overcrowding are, at the moment, "not effective". In particular, the procedure 
available to inmates to lament violations of their rights in prisons, i.e. the procedure in 
front of the so-called "magistrato di sorveglianza" according to art. 35 and art. 69 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Art. 46 of the ECHR provides that: "1. The High Contracting parties undertake to abide by the final 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 2. The final judgment of the Court shall be 
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its exeution".  
124 Broniowski v. Poland, EUR. CT. H.R. (22 June 2004), Application no. 31443/96, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61828#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
61828%22]}. The case had its origins in one of the legacies of World War II, when the Polish state was 
moved westwards. Large parts of the east of Poland were incorporated into the Soviet Union, in what 
today are the states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. The Polish inhabitants of those areas were 
forced to move westwards and under so-called "Republican Agreements" between the Polish 
authorities and the Soviet republics, Poland undertook to compensate the more than one million 
displaced persons. This was mostly done by giving them land in the newly acquired western parts of 
Poland. However, a group of around 100,000 people did not receive any compensation. Since they 
came from the territories beyond Poland’s new eastern border, the Bug River, their claims for 
compensation were called the Bug River claims. Broniowski was the heir of one of those people. 
Although, as a lawful heir, he had a right to compensation, he did not receive it. Polish Court’s, 
including the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court found the state’s actions and regulatory 
framework, which heavily reduced the possiblity to receive any compensation, contrary to the 
constitution. These judicial findings did not improve Broniowski’s situation. Therefore, he brought his 
case to Strasbourg, where the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. Also, the Grand Chamber decided to specifically 
acknowledge that the applicant’s case was part of a wider problem. The Chamber held that the 
violation "originated in a widespread problem which resulted from a malfunctioning of Polish 
legislation and administrative practice and which has affected and remains capable of affecting a large 
number of persons” (Id. at p. 67) and concluded that the state had to take general measures which 
would deal with the whole group of affected Bug River claimants. Thus, not only the individual case, 
but also the broader problem had to be tackled. 
125  Article 61 of the Procedural Rules of the ECtHR is available at 
http://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&ved=0CGoQFjAJ&url=http
%3A%2F%2Fwww.strasbourgconsortium.org%2Fcontent%2Fblurb%2Ffiles%2FArticle_61_Pilot_jud
gment_procedure.pdf&ei=IHB5UriaI8SU0QWSwIH4DQ&usg=AFQjCNH-
ufN8zVs8f1ec8IACUdpZK0_ARg&bvm=bv.55980276,d.d2k 
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ordinamento pernitenziario,126 is not a remedy effectively able to "prevent" and "bring 
about a rapid end to" the violation of the right not to be subjected to inhuman and 
degrading treatment. In fact, as the Court noted, even those decisions by "magistrati di 
sorveglianza" that found a violation of Article 3 ECHR ended up being, in practice, 
mere declaratory judgments, that had no immediate effect on correctional 
authorities.127 The Court observed that, where an applicant is being held in conditions 
contrary to Article 3, the most appropriate form of redress is to rapidly end the 
violation, through improvement of his conditions of confinement. Where the person 
concerned is no longer being held in conditions undermining his dignity, he must be 
afforded the opportunity to claim compensation for the violence to which he had been 
subjected. Thus, it is important to implement both "preventive" and "compensatory" 
remedies. The lack of any effective domestic remedy for violation of Article 3 in 
Italy, with regard to both "preventive" and "compensatory" measures (being decisions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 According to art. 35 ordinamento pernitenziario (Diritto di Reclamo):"I detenuti e gli internati 
possono rivolgere istanze o reclami orali o scritti, anche in busta chiusa: 1) al direttore dell'istituto, 
nonché agli ispettori, al direttore generale per gli istituti di prevenzione e di pena e al Ministro per la 
grazia e giustizia; 2) al magistrato di sorveglianza; 3) alle autorità giudiziarie e sanitarie in visita 
all'istituto; 4) al presidente della giunta regionale; 5) al capo dello stato. According to art. 69 
ordinamento penitenziario (Funzioni e provvedimenti del magistrato di sorveglianza): 1. Il magistrato 
di sorveglianza vigila sulla organizzazione degli istituti di prevenzione e di pena e prospetta al ministro 
le esigenze dei vari servizi, con particolare riguardo alla attuazione del trattamento rieducativo. 2. 
Esercita, altresì, la vigilanza diretta ad assicurare che l'esecuzione della custodia degli imputati sia 
attuata in conformità delle leggi e dei regolamenti. 3. Sovrintende all'esecuzione delle misure di 
sicurezza personali. 4. Provvede al riesame della pericolosità ai sensi del primo e secondo comma dell' 
articolo 208 del codice penale , nonché all'applicazione, esecuzione, trasformazione o revoca, anche 
anticipata, delle misure di sicurezza. Provvede altresì, con decreto motivato, in occasione dei 
provvedimenti anzidetti, alla eventuale revoca della dichiarazione di delinquenza abituale, 
professionale o per tendenza di cui agli articoli 102, 103, 104, 105 e 108 del codice penale. 5. Approva, 
con decreto, il programma di trattamento di cui al terzo comma dell'articolo 13, ovvero, se ravvisa in 
esso elementi che costituiscono violazione dei diritti del condannato o dell'internato, lo restituisce, con 
osservazioni, al fine di una nuova formulazione. Approva, con decreto, il provvedimento di 
ammissione al lavoro all'esterno. Impartisce, inoltre, nel corso del trattamento, disposizioni dirette ad 
eliminare eventuali violazioni dei diritti dei condannati e degli internati. 6. Decide con ordinanza 
impugnabile soltanto per cassazione, secondo la procedura di cui all'articolo 14-ter, sui reclami dei 
detenuti e degli internati concernenti l'osservanza delle norme riguardanti: a) l'attribuzione della 
qualifica lavorativa, la mercede e la remunerazione nonché lo svolgimento delle attività di tirocinio e di 
lavoro e le assicurazioni sociali; b) le condizioni di esercizio del potere disciplinare, la costituzione e la 
competenza dell'organo disciplinare, la contestazione degli addebiti e la facoltà di discolpa. 7. 
Provvede, con decreto motivato, sui permessi, sulle licenze ai detenuti semiliberi ed agli internati, e 
sulle modifiche relative all'affidamento in prova al servizio sociale e alla detenzione domiciliare. 8. 
Provvede con ordinanza sulla riduzione di pena per la liberazione anticipata e sulla remissione del 
debito, nonché sui ricoveri previsti dall'articolo 148 del codice penale. 9. Esprime motivato parere sulle 
proposte e le istanze di grazia concernenti i detenuti. 10. Svolge, inoltre, tutte le altre funzioni 
attribuitegli dalla legge. 
127 This was indeed the case in Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, where one of the applicants, 
nothwithstanding a finding of violation of Art. 3 by the magistrato di sorveglianza of Piacenza, was 
moved to a more spatious cell by correctional authorities only much later, when he had already filed an 
application to the ECtHR.   
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on monetary compensation the exception rather than the rule), 128  had two 
implications. First, it was the reason why the Court considered the application of 
Torreggiani admissible: from a procedural point of view, in fact, there is a duty for 
individuals to first exhaust all domestic, "accessible" and "effective" remedies before 
applying to the ECtHR. This was satisfied through the application to the "magistrato 
di sorveglianza".129 Secondly, it was the reason why the ECtHR condemned Italy to 
implement a better system for the protection of inmates' rights through the so-called 
pilot judgment procedure, having considered that the available procedure is not an 
"effective" remedy in general terms. Thus, in Torreggiani the ECtHR not only 
decided that a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR had occurred in the case at issue, 
but also solemnly called on the Italian authorities to "put in place, within one year, a 
remedy or combination of remedies providing redress in respect of violations of the 
Convention resulting from overcrowding in prison".130  
 
The judgment of the Court in Torreggiani became final on 28 May 2013, when a 5-
judge panel of the Court rejected the appeal to the Grand Chamber filed by the Italian 
government. Therefore, similarly to California, Italy will now have until 28 May 2014 
to adopt "effective" domestic remedies for the problem of prison overcrowding, under 
the supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. As it was 
noted in the decision, it was not for the Court to dictate how Italy should operate in its 
choice of penal policy or how to organize its prison systems; these raised complex 
legal and practical issues which, in principle, went beyond the Court’s judicial remit. 
Nevertheless, the Court wished to stress in this context the Recommendations of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe inviting States to encourage 
prosecutors and judges to make use of alternative measures to detention wherever 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 The only case of a magistrato di sorveglianza awarding moral damages for violation of Art. 3, as 
the ECtHR notes, is a decision of 9 June 2011 from the magistrato di sorveglianza of Lecce. Other 
decisions on the reject claims of moral damages arguing on lack of competence to award such 
damages. See decision 24 December 2011 from Udine and 18 April 2012 from Vercelli, available at 
www.penalecontemporaneo.it. 
129 According to Art. 35 § 1 ECHR – Admissibility criteria "The Court may only deal with the matter 
after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of 
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was 
taken". In its jurisprudence, the Court specified that applicants are only required to exhaust domestic 
remedies that are "available" and "effective". A remedy is considered "available" if it can be pursued 
by the applicant without difficulties or impediments. A remedy is considered "effective" if it exist 
within the domestic legal system and offer a reasonable prospect of success. See the Practical Guide to 
the Admissibility Criteria issued by the ECHR available at www.echr.coe.int.  
130 Torreggiani, supra note 119, at 27. 
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possible, and to devise their penal policies with a view to reducing recourse to 
imprisonment, in order to tackle the problem of the growth in the prison population 
(Rec(99)22 and Rec(2006)13).  
 
Since Torreggiani, the hundreds of applications to the ECtHR that have been filed by 
other inmates in Italy after Sulejmanovic have been "freezed".131 However, the 
deadline of 28 May 2014, which will "defreeze" this temporary situation, is 
approaching. It is, thus, of paramount importance that the remedies required by the 
Court are adopted in the coming months. Reasons of justice, together with the non-
neglectable problem (particularly acute in this period of economic crisis of Italy) of 
avoiding the monetary implications of a (very likely) finding of violation of Article 3 
for each of the applications put on hold, so require. As we have seen from the 
statistical data provided in chapter I, and as will better analyze in chapter V, despite 
the difficulty of finding a political agreement in this area, the only decriminalization 
reforms that would truly have an impact on prison overcrowding in Italy are probably 
those in the field of drug legislation.132 
 
4. The right to the "minimum living space" in prison 
 
The ECtHR, in Sulejmanovic and the following decisions that have been analyzed in 
the previous chapter, has developed what we call the "minimum living space" 
approach to prison overcrowding. This approach 1) considers per se unacceptable a 
personal living space inferior to 3 square meters per inmate and 2) shifts the burden to 
the complainant to prove other actual damages (e.g. poor hygienic conditions, lack of 
light etc.) in case the space is between the threshold of 3 square meters and the CPT 
recommended minima of 4 square meters (for shared accommodations) or 7 square 
meters (for single detention cells). In fact, the European Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), which is the 
anti-torture committee of the Council of Europe, recommends a minimum of 4 square 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 A key feature of the pilot procedure, as we have see, is the possibility of adjourning, or “freezing,” 
related cases for a period of time on the condition that the Government act promptly to adopt the 
national measures required to satisfy the judgment. The ECtHR informed that there were 730 
applications already pending in front of the Court before Torreggiani, and that 2,500 more applications 
were received after Torreggiani from inmates detained in Italian prisons.  
132 See infra chapter V and VI. 
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meters of floor space per prisoner in shared accommodations and 7 square meters of 
floor space in single occupancy cells. 133  
 
We argue that this approach has established, at an international level, prisoners' right 
to a "minimum living space" of 3 square meters. There is now a de iure presumption 
of violation of Art. 3 of the ECHR, among the 47 Council of Europe Member States, 
for conditions of confinement that grant inmates a personal space inferior to 3 square 
meters.134 We strongly support, as to Europe, a more widespread use of the "minimum 
living space" approach by litigators and the courts and, as to the United States, the 
adoption of a similar approach by litigators and the courts. This approach, which 
recognizes inmates the absolute right to a "minimum living space" of 3 square meters 
(approximately 30 square feet), seems to be the only feasible way - at the moment - to 
protect prisoners' rights in case of severe prison overcrowding. 
 
As to Europe, final judgments of the ECtHR are binding for the State to which they 
are addressed and must be directly applied by its national courts. Thus, Italy has 
currently a duty to adopt effective domestic remedies for the problem of prison 
overcrowding and will violate the ECHR in case it continues to grant inmates in their 
cells a personal space inferior to 3 square meters. Moreover, decisions adopted 
through pilot judgment procedures such as Torreggiani, which set general criteria as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 CPT recommendations are often mentioned in ECtHR decisions. As to collective cells, see, for 
example, Ananyev and Others v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (10 January 2012), Applications n. 42525/07 
and 60800/08, §§ 144 and 145 at 44, where the Court noted that "the General Reports published by the 
CPT do not appear to contain an explicit indication as to what amount of living space per inmate 
should be considered the minimum standard for a multi-occupancy prison cell. It transpires, however, 
from the individual country reports on the CPTs visits and the recommendations following on those 
reports that the desirable standard for the domestic authorities, and the objective they should attain, 
should be the provision of 4 square meters of living space per person in pre-trial detention facilities". 
See, also, Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, supra note 119 at 20, where the ECtHR pointed out that "the 
standard recommended by the CPT in terms of living space in collective cells is 4 square meters per 
person". As to single occupancy cells, see, for example, Kalashnikov v. Russia, EUR. CT. H.R. (15 July 
2002) Application n. 47095/99, at 19, and Sulejmanovic v. Italy, supra note 107 at 8. See, also, the 
2011 CPT General Report, at 8, available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/docsannual.htm (Accessed 30 
October 2013). 
 
134 See, in Italian, P. PUSTORINO, Sub art.3 CEDU, in S. BARTOLE-P. DE SENA-V. ZAGREBELSKY, 
Commentario Breve alla Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell'Uomo, Milano, 2012, 82. There, the 
author underlines that there is an "automatic" finding of violation of Art. 3 ECtHR in case of personal 
space inferior to 3 square meters. Also, F. CANCELLARO, Sovraffollamento Carcerario: Una Sentenza 
Pilota Condanna l'Italia per la Sistematica Violazione dell'Art. 3 CEDU, supra note 38. There, the 
author claims that it now consolidated in the ECtHR case law that "può costituire violazione dell'art. 3 
anche la sola circostanza che il ricorrente sia stato confinato in uno spazio detentivo pari o inferiore a 3 
metri quadrati. Id. at 71. 
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to the minimum living space in prison, have effects that extend beyond the single case 
at issue. They should be followed by all Council of Europe Member States and not 
only by the specific state to which they are addressed, in order to grant a 
homogeneous application of the European Convention of Human Rights throughout 
Europe.135 In essence, in light of the uncontroversial jurisprudence of the ECtHR from 
Sulejmanovic onwards, inmates in Europe already enjoy a right to a "minimum living 
space" of 3 square meters. Moreover, they may successfully lament lack of personal 
space in conjunction with other poor conditions of detention in case the space 
available to them is between 3 square meters and the CPT recommended minima. 
 
As to the United States, the "minimum living space" approach we propose offers a 
new way to assess the constitutionality of conditions of confinement. It entitles 
inmates to a different level of scrutiny based on the amount of space available to them 
in their cells: 1) conditions of confinement that grant inmates a space inferior to the 
"minimum living space" should be considered per se unconstitutional; 2) conditions 
of confinement that grant inmates a space comprised between the minimum living 
space and the standards recommended by accredited bodies should be presumed 
unconstitutional and 3) conditions of confinement that grant inmates a space greater 
than the standards recommended by accredited bodies, such as the ABA, ACA and 
APHA, should be presumed constitutional. In essence, the "minimum living space" 
approach combines a per se analysis (i.e. a per se constitutional ban) for prisons' 
conditions that grant inmates a space inferior to the "minimum living space", and a 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis (with a shift from a presumption of 
unconstitutionality to a presumption of constitutionality) for personal living spaces 
superior to the threshold. As we have seen, some courts in the United States seem to 
be open to the possibility of looking at international human rights standards, such as 
the ones developed by the ECtHR, in their analysis of the "contemporary standards of 
decency" under the Eighth Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 For a detailed analysis of the pilot judgment procedure and its effect on domestic legal orders see M. 
FYRNYS, Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment Procedure of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 12 German Law Journal, 2011, at 1231-1260, available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1359. The author claims that the 
very fact that pilot judgments are focused on the identification of systematic malfunctioning of the 
domestic legal order and on the indication of appropriate general remedial measures normatively 
extends the binding effect of the Court’s judgments and changes their legal nature, accentuating the 
Court’s constitutional function.  
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punishment". This openness should be further developed, and creative litigators are 
encouraged to take the lead. Ultimately, the "minimum living space" approach 
provides both the benefits of a bright-line rule, for those cases that are inherently 
"cruel and unusual" (and, nevertheless, increasingly common in the United States), 
and some form of protection, combined with flexibility, for those cases that still fall 
below the recommended minima. Hopefully, litigators and the courts that will adopt 
this approach will grant inmates a more meaningful protection of their constitutional 
rights. In this perspective, Plata was a right step in the right direction. It reminded the 
courts of their essential role in protecting the dignity of some of the most vulnerable 
among us - those behind bars. 
 
III. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF PRISON OVERCROWDING AT THE 
SOURCE: CRITERIA FOR CRIMINALIZATION 
 
In chapter II, we tried to address the problem of prison overcrowding in its most 
dramatic concretizations, analyzing the latest jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights and identifying a clear limit under which litigators and the courts 
should not hesitate to challenge conditions of confinement based on lack of personal 
space. Chapter III, IV and V of this thesis, instead, will try to address the problem of 
prison overcrowding at the source. We will look at what criminalization principles 
should guide the legislator in its criminalization decisions and what specific areas of 
the law should be reassessed, through decriminalization reforms, to generate a 
significant impact on the problem of prison overcrowding. 
 
In this chapter, in particular, we will summarize the "criteria for criminalization" that 
have been identified by criminal law scholars in recent years and that should be 
followed by legislators in the enactment of criminal offences. As we will see, 
although criminal law scholars often quote the principle that criminal law should only 
be used as a "means of last resort", the areas touched by criminal law have expanded 
significantly in the recent years. In particular, most systems of criminal justice today 
add to their traditional "post-crime" focus, which aims at providing an authoritative 
response to public wrongs, an "anticipatory" perspective, whose goal is to prevent 
those wrongs for which people are censured. With the view of avoiding overly 
extensive and intrusive criminal law, we will argue that any criminalization decision, 
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and in particular those justified by a preventive rationale, must be taken in 
conjunction with appropriate restraining principles, that will be identified. Our work 
has the purpose of providing some clear guidelines for the legislator to limit the 
dramatic expansion of the criminal law that has occurred in Europe and the United 
States over the last decades, and that had led to a sharp rise in incarceration rates and 
prison overcrowding.  
 
1. Criminalization and overcriminalization 
 
"Criminalization", i.e. the resort to criminal law as a means to regulate social 
problems, is an increasingly significant feature of modern western democracies. The 
numbers speak for themselves. 
 
As to Europe, in Great Britain, where the Ministry of Justice committed to scrutinize 
all legislation containing criminal offences and publish annual figures, it was shown 
that more than 3,000 new criminal offences were enacted during Tony Blair's nine-
year government - one for almost every day the government was in power.136 This 
trend was then confirmed by the creation of 712 new criminal offences in the period 
may 2009-may 2010, 172 in the period may 2010-may 2011 and 292 in the period 
may 2011-may 2012. 137  Hungary provides another very clear example of the 
criminalization trend. The new anti-vagrancy statutes that came into force in April 
2012 - the toughest in Europe at the moment - now mean that homeless people 
sleeping on the street in Budapest can face severe police fines or even the possibility 
of jail time.138 Although statistics on the enactment of new criminal offences are 
unavailable in several European countries and although even criminal law professors 
find it impracticable to provide exact data on the number of criminal offences present 
in their national criminal codes, there is a consensus among legal scholars that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 THE DAILY MAIL, 3,000 new criminal offenses created since Tony Blair came to power, 16 August 
2006, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-400939/3-000-new-criminal-offenses-
created-Tony-Blair-came-power.html#axzz2KgjNSeJp. 
 
137  OFFICIAL STATISTIC PRODUCED BY THE UK MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/statistics/criminal-justice/new-criminal-offenses. 
 
138 BBC, Hungary outlaws homeless in move condemned by charities, 1 December 2011, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15982882. 
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areas touched by criminal law have increased substantially in Europe over the last 
years.  
 
This trend, moreover, is shared by states on the other side of the Atlantic. The state 
and the federal justice system of the United States, in fact, also dramatically expanded 
their authority and reach over the last years.139 Texas lawmakers, for example, have 
recently created over 1,700 new criminal offenses, including 11 felonies alone 
relating to harvesting and handling oysters.140  And there are today an estimated 4,500 
criminal offences in federal statutes, spread out through some 27,000 pages of the 
United States Code.141 Also, it has long been noted by criminal law scholars that there 
is a pattern in the United States for a statute establishing an administrative agency to 
provide that any willful violation of the rules adopted by the agency constitutes a 
federal felony. As a direct result, one estimate in the 1990s placed the number of 
federal regulations punishable by criminal penalties at over 300,000.142 Certainly, part 
of the expansion of the substantive criminal law that has occurred over the last 
decades is due to the need to provide an effective response to new forms of threat. 
However, a substantial part of this is also due to readiness of the legislators to reach 
for the criminal law whenever social problems emerge, as an instinctive, seemingly 
costless response.143 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 William Stuntz maintains that "anyone who studies contemporary state or federal codes is likely to 
be struck by their scope, by the sheer amount of conduct they render punishable". See W. STUNTZ, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV., 2001, 515. 
 
140 M. LEVIN, Time to Rethink What’s a Crime: So‐Called Crimes Are Here, There, and Everywhere, 
Texas Public Policy Institute, 2010. 
 
141 J. BAKER, Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, in Legal Memorandum, n 26 (The 
Heritage Foundation, 2008). 
 
142 J. C. COFFEE, Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models. And What Can 
Be Done about It, 101, Yale Law Journal, 1992, 1881. 
 
143 See P. ROSENZWEIG, Overcriminalization: An Agenda for Change, in Am. U. Law. Review, 54, 
2005, 809-80; N. PERSAK, Criminalizing Harmful Conduct: The Harm Principle, its Limits and 
Continental Counterpart 5, 2007, 27, claiming that "To propose a new incrimination is, namely, the 
cheapest, quickest, most memorable and media-inviting act the Member of Parliament can do – the 
most efficient for a legislator (securing re-election) and the least truly efficient, i.e. problem-solving"; 
D. J. BAKER, The Right not to be Criminalized: Demarcating Criminal Law's Authority, 2011, 6-7. 
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The increased use of the criminal law to regulate social conduct is part of a broader 
phenomenon that criminal law scholars define "overcriminalization".144 This term 
indicates the use of the criminal justice system without adequate justifications. It 
relates to both 1) the enactment of new criminal offences and 2) the use of excessive 
punishment. As to the first aspect, overcriminalization occurs with the creation of far-
fetched offenses, some of them so deficient in harmful wrongdoing and beyond any 
legitimate rationale for state action as to flunk what Erik Luna calls the “laugh 
test”: 145  examples are, under UK law, the crimes of selling grey squirrels, 
impersonating a traffic warden or failing to nominate a neighbor to turn off a noisy 
burglar alarm,146 or, under US law, Maine's prohibition of catching lobsters with 
something other than "a conventional trap". 147  As to the second aspect, 
overcriminalization occurs with the use of punishment irrespective of theoretical 
justification or proportionality, as it is often the case with risk-based possession 
offences (such as UK mandatory minimum of 5 years imprisonment for mere 
possession of a prohibited gun)148 or anti-recidivist statutes (California’s three strikes 
scheme being the most infamous example, with defendants receiving sentences of 
twenty-five years to life for stealing a slice of pizza).149 
 
Overcriminalization, and in particular the creation of criminal offences without 
adequate justification, is problematic because it authorizes the most privatory and 
condemnatory forms of state power against its citizens. It makes possible the arrest, 
interrogation, prosecution and punishment by the state, which may result in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
144 E. LUNA, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. Law Review, 2005, 712. Some other 
scholars use the term "criminal law inflation". See, e.g., N. JAREBORG, Criminalization as Last Resort 
(Ultima Ratio), 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L., 2005, 524. 
 
145 E. LUNA, Overextending the Criminal Law, 25 CATO POL’Y RPT. 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v25n6/luna.pdf (Feb. 14, 2005), p.1. 
 
146 THE DAILY MAIL, supra note 136. 
 
147 E. LUNA, supra note 144 at 715. 
 
148 A. ASHWORTH, The Unfairness of Risk-Based Possession Offenses, in Crim Law and Philos, 2011, 
at 257. 
 
149  L.A. TIMES, ”Pizza Thief“ Walks the Line, 10 February 2010, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/10/local/la-me-pizzathief10-2010feb10. See CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 667(e)(2)(A) (requiring an indeterminate life sentence, with a mandatory minimum of at least twenty-
five years, where the defendant has been convicted of any felony and has two or more prior serious or 
violent felony convictions). 
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deprivation of the offender's liberty for a prolonged time.150 As we have seen, the 
widespread use of the criminal justice system has led to a massive increase in the 
number of inmates all throughout the world.151 In this regard, the United States stands 
out from peer nations. Although English imprisonment rate has itself almost doubled, 
the United States’ rate is almost 5 times higher than that of England and Wales.152 
With roughly 5% of the world’s population, the US currently confines about 25% of 
the world’s prison inmates.153 As a result, prison overcrowding has become so severe 
that in 2011 a landmark decision of the Supreme Court154 ordered a reduction of 
California's prison population by more than 30,000 inmates.  Despite the difference in 
magnitude, prison overcrowding is a growing concern for most European states as 
well, as it is documented by the abundant case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights on the violations of the right to be free from "torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment". 155  To use Professor Kadish's words, until these problems of 
overcriminalization are systematically examined and effectively dealt with, some of 
the most besetting problems of criminal law administration are bound to continue.156 
 
2. Criteria for criminalization 
 
At a time when governments seem to be creating more and more criminal offences, 
criminalization has become the subject of vibrant debate among legal scholars. In 
particular, criminalization has been considered in its descriptive and normative 
aspects. The descriptive aspect addresses either the existing offenses in a given legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
150 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Preventive Orders: A Problem of Undercriminalization, in R.A DUFF et 
al., The Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 59, 81 2010. 
 
151 See supra chapter I. 
 
152 N. LACEY, American Imprisonment in Comparative Perspective, in Daedalus, vol. 139 (Issue 3-
Summer 2010), 108. 
 
153 B. PETTIT -B. WESTERN, The Challenge of Mass Incarceration in America, in Daedalus, vol. 139, 
Issue 3, Summer 2010, 6. 
 
154 Brown v. Plata, in which the United States Supreme Court held that California’s prison system, that 
operated at 200% of capacity, was unconstitutional for violation of the 8th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution (“cruel and unusual punishment”). See supra chapter II section 2.1. 
 
155 Art. 3, European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
156 S. A. KADISH, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, in Am Crim Law Q, 1968, vol. 7, p. 18. 
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system or the way in which they were formed politically, historically or otherwise.157 
The normative aspect, instead, involves a value judgment. It relates to the questions: 
what types of behavior should be criminalized and what types should not? What are 
the principles to which criminalization decisions should conform?158  
 
This chapter will focus on the normative aspect of criminalization. It will not address 
specific types of conduct; rather, it will analyze general criteria for criminalization as 
they have been developed in the recent academic debate. In an effort to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of this topic, we will analyze the most recent contribution to 
the debate from both civil law and common law academics.159 Traditionally, Anglo-
American theorists have been less likely to defend general principles to limit the reach 
of the criminal sanction than their European counterparts.160 However, common law 
and civil law scholars have become increasingly interested in better understanding the 
achievements of their respective doctrines in recent years. Sinergies have become 
crucial. And it is nowadays acknowledged that a mutual understanding of the 
criminalization principles that have been identified by criminal law scholars in 
different jurisdictions can inform the development of a more sophisticated account of 
the nature and justification of the criminal law.  
 
2.1. Most significant criteria in the European-continental literature 
 
The European-continental literature has developed different conceptual categories 
from the one developed in the Anglo-American world to justify and limit the use of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
157 See e.g. N. LACEY-L. ZEDNER, Legal Constructions of Crime, in M. MAGUIRE-R. MORGAN-R. 
REINER (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 5 ed., OUP, 2012, 159 164-73 (explaining 
criminalization in historical perspective). 
 
158 See e.g. A. ASHWORTH, Criminalization, in Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford, 2009, VI ed., 22-
43 (identifying general principles that ought to be considered when deciding whether or not to make 
conduct criminal).  
 
159 For a thorough recent comparison, in Italian, of the principles that justify and limit the use of the 
criminal law in common law and civil law countries, see G. FIANDACA-G. FRANCOLINI (eds.), Sulla 
Legittimazione del Diritto Penale. Culture Europeo-Continentale e Anglo-Americana a Confronto, 
Torino, 2008. 
 
160 See D. HUSAK, Applying Ultima Ratio: A Skeptical Assessment, 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law, 2, 2005, p. 535, claiming that "Why Anglo-American theorists are less likely to defend principles 
to limit the reach of the criminal sanction than their European counterparts presents a fascinating 
question in comparative criminal theory I lack the competence to explore". 
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the criminal law in the regulation of social conduct. Italian criminal law scholars, in 
particular, have focused on the concept of "legal goods" (beni giuridici) rather than 
the concept of "harm" (danno).161 This is where the main difference between the two 
systems of law can be found, being the related "offensivity principle" (principio di 
offensività)162 the "most original and characteristic element of the constitutional 
approach to criminal law developed by Italian scholars".163  
 
The concept of legal goods was first articulated by German legal scholar Birnbaum in 
the 19th century.164 Birnbaum referred to legal goods (Rechtsgüter) in order to justify 
the use of criminal sanction for forms of conduct that did not impact on "individual 
rights" (Rechte in the German literature, diritti soggettivi in the Italian literature). In 
particular, Birnbaum attacked Feuerbach's view of crime: according to Feuerbach, in 
committing a crime the offender did not just violate "the law," or "a statute, "but the 
rights of her individual victim". Birnbaum pointed out, however, that this view of 
crime was much too narrow, as it could not account for a great many criminal statutes 
which did not concern themselves with violations of individual rights at all, and yet 
were not considered to be any less criminal as a result. In Birnbaum's words, 
Feuerbach's view of crime might work for traditional crimes like murder and theft, but 
it did not have room for such familiar crimes as "unethical and irreligious acts."165  
 
From Birnbaum onward, in Germany and other states that follow the German 
tradition, such as Italy, a crime is to be regarded, instead of a violation of individual 
rights (Rechte), as a "violation of", or a "threat to", "goods (Giiter) protected by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 A. CADOPPI, Presentazione. Principio del Danno (Harm Principle) e Limiti del Diritto Penale, in ID 
(ed.) Laicità, Valori e Diritto Penale. The Moral  Limits of the Criminal Law. In ricordo di Joel 
Feinberg, Milano, 2010, at IX. 
162 This principle has been identified as an "implicit" principle of the Italian Constitution. See G. 
VASSALLI, I Principi Generali del Diritto nell'Esperienza Penalistica, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen. 1991, at 
699 ff; G. FIANDACA, Introduzione ai Principi Generali del Diritto Penale in G. FIANDACA-G. DI 
CHIARA, Una Introduzione al Sistema Penale per una Lettura Constitizionalmente Orientata, Napoli, 
2003, at 9 ff. For a recent, thorough, analysis of the principio di offensività as a limiting principle for 
the legislator, a guiding principle for the interpretation of the law by judges and a tool for analyzing the 
constitutionality of criminal statutes see V. MANES, Il Principio di Offensività nel Diritto Penale. 
Canone di Politica Criminale Criterio Ermeneurtico, Parametro di Ragionevolezza, Torino, 2005. 
163 M. DONINI, Il Principio di Offensività. Dalla Penalistica Italiana ai Programmi Europei, in Dir. 
pen. cont. - Riv. trim., 2013, also available at http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/area/3-3/-/-/2494-
il_principio_di_offensivit____dalla_penalistica_italiana_ai_programmi_europei/  
164 J. M. F. BIRNBAUM, Über das Erfordernis einer Rechtsverletzung zum Begriffe des Verbrechens, 15 
Archiv des Criminalrechts (Neue Folge) (1834). 
165 Id at 178. 
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state".166 These are goods that the states protects in light of the values shared by the 
community where it applies. The concept of Rechtsgut (or bene giuridico) is one of 
the foundational concepts underpinning the German and Italian criminal law 
systems. 167  The concept serves several crucial functions, at various levels of 
generality within the criminal law system. Most fundamentally, it defines the very 
scope of criminal law. By common consensus, the function of the criminal law is 
indeed the "protection of legal goods".168 Anything that does not qualify as a legal 
good falls outside the scope of criminal law, and may not be criminalized. A criminal 
statute, in other words, that does not even seek to protect a legal good is prima facie 
illegitimate. This principle has been invoked in favor of decriminalizing various 
morals offenses, such as homosexual sex and the distribution of pornography.169 In 
essence, it can be summarized in the following, schematic terms: 
 
Italian criminal law scholar Franco Bricola was a critical contributor to the 
development of the theory of Rechtsgüter. In 1973, in his masterpiece "Teoria 
generale del reato", Bricola claimed that the use of the criminal law to protect the so-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 According to Birnbaum, "any violation of or threat to a good that is to be guaranteed by the state 
equally to everyone and that is attributable to the human will", id. at 179. 
167 D. KIENAPPEL, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil 39 (4th ed. 1984). According to the author, the heory of 
the Rechtsgut is "one of the immovable cornerstones of German criminal law doctrine". 
168 See, e.g., ARMIN KAUFMANN, Die Aufgabe des Strafrechts 5 (1983) ("no one in criminal legal 
science seriously doubts that the protection of legal goods is the objective of criminal law"); D. 
KIENAPPEL supra note 167 ("despite some criticism" legal good remains "one of the immovable 
cornerstones of criminal law doctrine, today more than ever"). For Italian criminal law literature, see, 
e.g. the recent contribution by M.DONINI, Danno e Offesa nella c.d. tutela Penale dei Sentimenti. Note 
su Morale e Sicurezza come Beni giuridici, a Margine della Categoria dell'Offense di Joel Feinberg, in 
A. CADOPPI, Laicità, Valori e Diritto Penale. The Moral  Limits of the Criminal Law. In ricordo di Joel 
Feinberg, Milano, 2010. According to the author, "è ancora oggi corretto affermare che compito 
primario del diritto penale è la tutela dei beni giuridici". Id, at 49. It is important to note that there are 
also some criminal law scholars in Italy who recently argued against the idea of the bene giuridico as a 
limit for the legislator in its criminalization decisions. See e.g. M. ROMANO, Principio di Laicità dello 
Stato, Religioni, Norme Penali, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen. 2007, 509. 
169 See H.-H. JESCHECK-T. WEIGEND, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts: Allgemeiner Teil, 5th ed., 1996, at 
104-105; C. ROXIN, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil I, 3rd ed., 1997 at 11-12;  
 
RECHTSGÜTER (TEORIA DEL BENE GIURIDICO & PRINCIPIO DI 
OFFENSIVITA') 
A conduct can be considered a crime only if it is a "violation of", or a "threat to", 
"legal goods", i.e. goods that are protected by the state in light of the shared values of 
the community. 
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called beni giuridici was legitimate only in so far as it was anchored to the 
Constitution. In his view, only those forms of conduct that significantly infringe on 
constitutional values (beni giuridici costituzionalmente orientati) can justify the use 
of criminal sanctions that, through deprivation of personal liberty, infringe on one of 
the most fundamental constitutional rights themselves. He argued that the 
Constitution was both the "limit" and the "justification" for the use of the criminal 
law. 170 This approach based on principled reasoning, i.e. the "constitutional approach 
to criminal law", has become, with Bricola and his scholars,171 one of the most 
significant contributions to the debate on criteria for criminalization from the Italian 
literature.172 We could sketch Bricola's thinking in these very brief terms: 
 
In most recent years, criminal law scholars have noted the following point: if, on the 
one side, the concept of Rechtsgut or bene giuridico was a significant achievement of 
the German and Italian criminal law literature, on the other side, it is a potentially 
dangerous concept, because it may justify the use of the criminal law for any interest 
that is considered legitimate by the state, also religious and moral beliefs. 173 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 F. BRICOLA, Teoria Generale del Reato, in Nov. mo dig. it., vol. XIV, Torino, 1973, 7-93. 
According to the author, "il legislatore oltre a non poter incriminare fatti che si concretano 
nell'esercizio di un diritto costituzionale, salvo che per la tutela di un bene avente un superiore perso 
costituzionale ovvero di un bene che funge da limite previsto dalla norma costituzionale rispetto 
all'esercizio del diritto, non può adottare la sanzione penale per fatti lesivi di valori che, senza essere 
antitetici alla costituzione, non trovano in essa alcun riconoscimento esplicito o implicito. (...) Il 
margine di vincolo è soltanto in negativo: il legislatore cioè non può adottare la sanzione penale se non 
per fatti lesivi di valori costituzionali; tuttavia, anche in presenza di un fatto dotato di tale forza, 
potrebbe usualmente fare ricorso a modelli sanzionatori extrapenali". Id. at 572. 
171 Franco Bricola is widely recognized as the "father" of the so-called "Scuola di Bologna", to which 
several influential criminal law scholars such as Franco Tagliarini, Filippo Sgubbi, Luigi Stortoni, 
Gaetano Insolera, Massimo Pavarini, Stefano Canestrari, Lorenzo Picotti, Massimo Donini, Gabriele 
Fornasari, Alberto Cadoppi, Alessandro Melchionda and Nicola Mazzacuva belong. 
172 M. DONINI. L'eredità di Bricola ed il Costituzionalismo Penale come Metodo.  Radici Nazionali e 
Sviluppi Sovranazionali, in Dir. pen. cont. - Riv. trim., 2/2012, 51-74. The author, summarizing 
Bricola's thinking, stated that: "Per Bricola sono penalmente tutelabili solo i beni giuridici di 
significativa rilevanza costituzionale, almeno implicita, e contro aggressioni di pericolo concreto." Id at 
56. 
173 See, as to the German literature, A. ESER, Bene Giuridico e Vittima del Reato. Prevalenza dell'uno 
sull'altra? Riflessioni sui Rapporti tra Bene Giuridico e Vittima del Reato., in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 
 
BRICOLA'S CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW 
(TEORIA DEL BENE GIURIDICO COSTITUZIONALMENTE ORIENTATO) 
Only those forms of conduct that significantly infringe on constitutional values (beni 
giuridici costituzionalmente orientati) can justify the use of criminal sanctions. 
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Therefore, in light of these difficulties, criminal law scholars have tried to limit the 
breadth of this concept.  
 
On the one side, they have proposed some additional limiting theories. 174  In 
particular, Alessandro Baratta has proposed to link the concept of bene giuridico to 
that of human rights175. Other authors, developing the ideas of German scholars such 
as Hassemer and Amelung,176 have proposed to link this concept to public opinion. 
Alberto Cadoppi, moving from Max Ernst Mayer's theory on the Kulturnormen,177 
has argued that the criminal law should only protect those values that are shared by a 
given society in a given time. More specifically, the Kulturnormen work as a limit to 
criminalization decisions, not as a duty to criminalize: if citizens believe a certain 
conduct should be criminalized, the legislator is free to disregard this view and adopt 
less repressive measures to deal with it, but if citizens believe a certain conduct 
should not be criminalized, the legislator is not free to disregard this view (so-called 
culturally-constitutionally oriented view of the legal good).178 This, because public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1997, 1069. See, as to Italian literature, G. FIANDACA, Introduzione ai Principi Generali del Diritto 
Penale in G. FIANDACA-G. DI CHIARA, Una Introduzione al Sistema Penale per una Lettura 
Constitizionalmente Orientata, Napoli, 2003, 108. 
174 See A. CADOPPI-P. VENEZIANI, Elementi di Diritto Penale. Parte Generale, IV ed., Padova, 2010, 
94 ff. 
175 A. BARATTA, Principi di Diritto Penale Minimo. Per una Teoria dei Diritti Umani come Oggetti e 
Limiti della Legge Penale, in Dei delitti e delle pene,1985, 443 ff. 
176 W. HASSEMER, Theorie und Soziologie des Verbrechens - Ansätze zu einer praxisorientierten 
Rechtsgutslehre, Frankfurt am Main, 1973, 127 ff.; K.  AMELUNG, Rechtsgüterschutz und Schutz der 
Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main, 1972, 287 ff. These authors refined Mayer's thery adding a 
sociological component to it.  
177 See M. E. MAYER, Rechtsnormen und Kulturnormen, Breslau, 1903 (republished Frankfurt am Main 
- Tokyo, 1977), p. 16. See also ID, Der allgemeine Teil des deutschen Strafrechts - Lehrbuch, 2. Aufl., 
Heidelberg, 1923, at 49, where the author claims that "there is no prohibited conduct by the state that 
had not been condemned by the local community in the first place (...) because Kulturnorm (the rule in 
the community) macht (makes) Rechtsnorm (the legal rule). 
178 See A. CADOPPI-P. VENEZIANI, Elementi di diritto penale. Parte generale, supra note 174, 94 ff.; 
also, arguing for the need to take the Kulturnormen more into account in a de lege ferenda perspective, 
see the significant analysis conducted by the author in A. CADOPPI., Il reato omissivo proprio, I, 
Padova, 1988, 677 ff. ("solo se la communis opinio reputa «criminoso» un certo comportamento, tale 
comportamento può essere definito «reato» dal legislatore", Id. at 692). Similarly, with specific regard 
to economic crimes, ID, Il ruolo delle Kulturnormen nella "opzione penale" con particolare riferimento 
agli illeciti economici, in Riv. trim. dir. pen. ec., 1989, 289 ff. There, the author claims that: "se una 
norma penale punisce un comportamento che non è ritenuto «criminoso» dalle Kulturnormen, allora 
una tale norma penale è inaccettabile, e va espunta dal sistema dei delitti e delle pene." Id at 297. In 
line with this view, see G. BETTIOL, Istituzioni di diritto e procedura penale, III ed., Padova, 1980, 32. 
On a different position, and for a critic of Mayer's theory on the coincidence between Kulturnormen 
and legal rules, see N. LEVI, Dolo e coscienza dell’illiceità nel diritto vigente e nel Progetto, in Studi 
economico-giuridici pubblicati a cura della Facoltà di giurisprudenza di Cagliari, Anno XVI, 1928, 
56 ff.; D. PULITANÒ, L’errore di diritto nella teoria del reato, Milano, 1976, 135 ff.; and, more 
recently, see the analysis conducted in F. BASILE, Immigrazione e reati culturalmente motivati. Il 
diritto penale nelle società multiculturali, Milano, 2010, at 98 ff. (available at 
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opinion may be in certain instances too punitive and in need of a rationality screening, 
while the opposite may not be the case. The idea of relating to the Kulturnormen in 
criminal policy decision is particularly significant for our analysis and we will come 
back to the theory of Kulturnormen in the final chapter of this thesis.  
 
On the other side, criminal law scholars both in Italy and in Germany have recently 
developed an interest in the Anglo-American concept of "harm".179 In Italy, Alberto 
Cadoppi deserves the credit for having been among the first criminal law scholars 
who argued for the need of integrating continental doctrines with concepts developed 
in the common law tradition. According to Cadoppi, synergies are crucial for two 
main reasons.180 First of all, if the criminal law is to adopt a truly liberal approach, as 
most criminal law scholars argue today, it is essential to analyze the Anglo-American 
"harm principle": this principle is indeed rooted in the concept of individual liberty 
and thus is at the basis of any liberal model of the criminal law.181 Secondly, the 
increased multiculturalism of modern societies reveals all the shortcomings of using 
only the concept of beni giuridici as a justification and limit for the use of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.dirittoestoria.it/10/monografie/Basile-Localismo-non-neutralita-culturale-Diritto-penale-
immigrazione.htm#_ftnref72). 
179In Germany, the main contributions to the recent debate on the harm principle are by Andrew Von 
Hirsch. See, e.g., R. HEFENDEHL,-A. VON HIRSCH,-W. WOHLERS (eds.) Die Rechtsgutstheorie: 
Legitimationsbasis des Strafrechts oder Dogmatisches Glasperlenspiel?, Baden Baden 2003, and, in 
particular, A. VON HIRSCH, Das Rechtsgutsbegriff und das "Harm Principle", ibidem. In Italy, only 
very few authors dealt with the Anglo-American concept of harm in the past. Among them, E. 
DICIOTTI, La Giustificazione Paternalistica di Norme, in Studi Senesi, 1, 1988, 76-129; ID., Il 
Principio del Danno nel Diritto Penale, in Dir. pen. e proc. 3, 1997, 366 ff; F. ALBEGGIANI, Profili 
Problematici del Consenso dell'Avente Diritto, Milano, 1995, 6 ff.; and, particularly, A. CADOPPI, Il 
Reato Omissivo Proprio. II. Profili Dogmatici Comparatistici e de Lege Ferenda, Padova, 1988, 1103 
ff. and 1279 ff.; ID, Moralità Pubblica e Buon Costume (Delitti contro la) (Diritto Anglo-Americano), 
in Dig. disc. pen., vol. VIII, Torino, 1994, 187 ff.; For more recent contributions to the Italian debate 
see G. FIANDACA-G. DI CHIARA, Una Introduzione al Sistema Penale per una Lettura 
Constitizionalmente Orientata, Napoli, 2003, 107 ff.; M. DONINI, Il Volto Attuale dell'Illecito Penale, 
Milano, 2004, 99 ff.; G. FRANCOLINI, L'Harm Principle del Diritto Angloamericano nella Concezione 
di Joel Feinberg, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 2008, 276 ff.; D. PULITANO', Laicità e Diritto Penale, in 
Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 2006, 68-71; G. FORTI, Per una Discussione sui Limiti Morali del Diritto 
Penale, tra visioni "liberali" e paternalismi giuridici, in E. DOLCINI-C. E. PALIERO (eds.), Studi in 
Onore di Giorgio Marinucci, vol. 1, Milano, 2006, 233 ff. Also, criminal law books adopted in 
university courses have recently started including reference to the Anglo-American principle of harm. 
See A. CADOPPI-P. VENEZIANI, Elementi di Diritto Penale. Parte Generale, III ed., Padova, 2007, 88 
ff.; S. CANESTRARI-L. CORNACCHIA-G. DE SIMONE, Manuale di Diritto Penale. Parte Generale, 
Bologna, 2007, 203 ff.; A. MANNA, Corso di Diritto Penale. Parte Generale, vol. I, Padova, 2007, 56. 
180 A. CADOPPI, Presentazione. Principio del Danno (Harm Principle) e Limiti del Diritto Penale, in ID 
(ed.) Laicità, Valori e Diritto Penale. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. In ricordo di Joel 
Feinberg, Milano, 2010, p. VII-XII. 
181Id., at X.  
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criminal law.182 In a homogeneous society, where there are no wide discrepancies 
between values of the population, the concept of bene giuridico is rather 
uncontroversial and citizens expect the criminal law to intervene for the protection of 
shared moral principles. However, the opposite is true for societies that are 
characterized by the presence of different minority groups, as it is the case for most 
current western democracies. In these societies, it is important to stress the role of 
personal liberty as opposed to the views of the majority of the population, in order to 
avoid the enforcement of moral values which cause no "harm" to other individuals: in 
this perspective, the "harm principle" developed in the Anglo-American literature 
becomes of paramount importance. In an effort to make this principle more accessible 
to criminal law scholars in Italy, a series of seminars on the work of American legal 
philosopher Joel Feinberg were organized in 2009.183 Feinberg, as we will see below, 
is internationally distinguished for his research in moral, social and legal philosophy. 
His major four-volume work, "The Moral Limits of Criminal Law", is internationally 
recognized as the most refined analysis of the "harm principle".  
 
Another fundamental principle that has been developed in the European-continental 
literature, the so-called principio di colpevolezza, will be analyzed in the next section 
together with the culpability principle, being these principles less far apart than the 
principio di offensività and harm principle. 
 
2.2. Most significant criteria in the Anglo-American literature 
 
The Anglo-American world has shown, in the last decades, an increasing interest in 
the principles of criminalization developed in continental Europe184 (and vice versa, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Ibidem. For another recent article on the topic see A. CADOPPI, Liberalismo, Paternalismo e Diritto 
Penale, in G.FIANDACA-G. FRANCOLINI (eds.), Sulla legittimazione del Diritto Penale. Cultura 
Europea-Continentale e Anglo-Americana a confronto, Torino, 2008, 83-124. Particularly, at p. 83, the 
author stresses that the notion of bene giuridico is suffering a "crisis" in modern societies. See also G. 
FIANDACA-E. MUSCO, Perdita di Legittimazione del Diritto Penale?, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 1990, p. 
40.  
183 The seminars, that were held at the University of Parma from November 2007 to May 2008, 
featured several leading Anglo-American and European scholars such as J. Coleman, D. Husak, R. 
Shafer-Landau, H. Malm G. Dworkin, M. Donini, S. Canestrari M. Romano and S. Fiandaca. They 
were dedicated to the memory of Joel Feinberg and Professor A. Cadoppi edited a very valuable book 
that collects all the contributions to these seminars: A. CADOPPI, Laicità, Valori e Diritto Penale. 
The Moral  Limits of the Criminal Law. In ricordo di Joel Feinberg, Giuffrè, Milano, 2010. 
184The Rechtsgut has begun to attract considerable attention among Anglo-American criminal law 
theorists in the last decades. See, e.g., M. D. DUBBER, Theories of Crime and Punishment in German 
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as we have seen). However, it is important, for our purposes, also to conduct a 
separate, detailed analysis of the principles that have been developed by Anglo-
American criminal law scholars. This, because some of the most recent contributions 
to the criminalization debate, in terms of the identification of "workable" criteria for 
criminalization for the legislators, come from the recent Anglo-American literature.  
 
The starting point for any debate on criteria for criminalization in the common law 
tradition is, as we have anticipated, the "harm principle". This principle, which was 
first fully articulated by the English thinker John Stuart Mill in 1859, rejects the use 
of society's power for any purpose other than that of preventing "harm to others". Mill 
gave a simple answer to the question of when the government can interfere with the 
activities of individuals:  
 
 
MILL'S HARM PRINCIPLE 
"The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant".185 This, with the necessary 
qualification that: "this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties".186 
 
 
The harm principle was supported by prominent legal scholars in the Anglo-American 
world, including English legal philosopher Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart and 
American legal philosophers Ronald Dworkin. 187  There has been a remarkable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Criminal Law, in The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 53, No. 3, 2005, pp. 679-707; 
A.VON HIRSCH, Der Rechtsgutsbegriff und das "Harm Principle," 149 Goltdammer's Archiv for 
Strafrecht 2 (2002); A. DUFF, Theories of Criminal Law, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2002), defining Rechtsgut as "a good which the law properly recognizes as being 
necessary for social peace or for individual well-being, and as therefore meriting legal protection". For 
a very interesting exploration of the concept of Rechtsgut from a comparative perspective, see also R. 
HEFENDEHL et al. (eds.), Die Rechtgutstheorie: Legitimationsbasis des Strafrechts oder Dogmatisches 
Glasperlenspiel (2003). 
 
185 J. S. Mill, On Liberty (first published in 1859, reprinted in 1863 Boston: Ticknor and Fields), pp. 
22-23. 
 
186 Ibidem. 
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consensus that whatever other principles might be required for an adequate theory of 
criminalization some form of a "harm to others" is required.188   
 
This principle, as we have anticipated, was thoroughly analyzed by American legal 
philosopher Joel Feinberg. Feinberg assessed the harm principle with specific regard 
to the criminal law, in a book series on four possible criminalization principles: 1) the 
harm principle (il principio del danno), 2) the offense principle (molestia ad altri) 3) 
legal paternalism (paternalismo giuridico) and 4) legal moralism (moralismo 
giuridico).189 Among them, the harm principle was identified by Feinberg as the most 
acceptable criminalization principle in modern society and, ever since, Feinberg's 
writings are considered to be the best defense of this fundamental principle.190 In his 
work, Feinberg identified four sub-categories of conduct for the concept of "harm": 1) 
harm to others, 2) offense to others, 3) harm to self and 4) harmless wrongdoing. 
According to Feinberg, only the first and the second of these sub-categories of "harm" 
provide an adequate justification for the use of the criminal law. In particular, the 
"harm to others" principle states that it is always a good reason in support of penal 
legislation that it would probably be effective in preventing harm to persons other 
than the one prohibited from acting. The "offense to others" principle states that it is 
always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably prevent 
serious offense to persons other than the one prohibited from acting. For Feinberg, the 
"harm to others principle" and the "offense to others principle" are the only "liberty-
limiting principles", which distinguish between those acts which the state may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 See H. L. A. HART, Law, Liberty and Morality, New York, Vintage Books (1963), where legal 
philosopher and professor H.L.A. Hart defends Mill's liberal view of Liberty against Judge Lord 
Devlin's claim that there can be no theoretical limit to the power of the State to legislate against 
immorality. Lord Devlin, as it is well known, strongly argued for the use of the criminal law to 
sanction immorality (e.g. homosexuality). See also R. DWORKIN, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of 
Morals, in Yale Law Journal, 1966, vol. 75, 992. 
 
188 See H. PACKER, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 17 266 (1969) (saying that ever since Mill’s 
essay, the dispute between law and morality has been forged upon the formula of “Harm to Others”). 
Also, see L. FARMER, Criminal Wrongs in Historical Perspective, in R. A. DUFF ET AL. (eds.), The 
Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 2010, p. 214. 
 
189 J. FEINBERG, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others 63 (1984), explaining the 
various meanings of the expression “harm to others”; J. FEINBERG, The Moral Limits of the Criminal 
Law: Offense to Others (1985); J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self 
(1986) and J. FEINBERG, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing (1990). 
 
190 D. HUSAK, Limitations on Criminalization and the General Part of Criminal Law, in S. SHUTE-A. 
SIMESTER (eds.), Criminal Law: Doctrines of the General Part, Cambridge, 2002, p.13-46. 
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legitimately criminalize and those it may not. Conduct may not be sanctioned if it 
merely causes harm to the actor, or if the harm it causes to others is consented to by 
the others. 
 
 
FEINBERG'S LIBERTY LIMITING PRINCIPLES  
Criminalization is legitimate only if: 1) it would probably be effective in preventing 
harm to others ("harms to others" principle) or 2) it would probably prevent serious 
offense to others ("offense to others" principle).  
 
Despite some commentators having pointed out that criminal offences may also be 
justified even in the absence of harm to a specific person, when the harm is done to 
society at large (so-called victimless crimes or crimes against the public order can 
only be justified by this line of argument), the punishment of individuals who harm 
other individuals is commonly acknowledged as the most obviously legitimate task of 
the criminal justice system. Therefore, the harm principle remains pivotal for any 
liberal model of criminalization. Simester and von Hirsch,191 adapting Feinberg, 
recently set out the harm principle in the following schematic form, which can be a 
valuable tool for policy makers and legislators to take into account in their 
criminalization decisions: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
191 A. P. SIMESTER-A. VON HIRSCH, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalization, 
Oxford, 2011, p. 55. 
 
THE HARM PRINCIPLE IN SIMESTER & VON HIRSCH SCHEME 
Step 1: Consider the gravity of the eventual harm, and its likelihood. The greater the 
gravity and likelihood, the stronger is the case for criminalization. 
Step 2: Weigh against the foregoing, the social value of the conduct, and the degree of 
intrusion upon actors’ choices that criminalization would involve. The more valuable 
the conduct is, or the more the prohibition would restrict liberty, the stronger the 
countervailing case would be. 
Step 3: Observe certain side-constraints that would preclude criminalization. The 
prohibition should not, for example, infringe rights of privacy and free expression. 
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2.3. The paradigm of harm plus culpablity 
 
The harm principle only sets a necessary condition for criminalization, not a sufficient 
one.192  Legal scholars from both the Anglo-American and the European-continental 
world agree that another fundamental principle in relation to criminalization is the 
"culpability principle" (principio di colpevolezza). This principle requires a degree of 
blameworthiness in the commission of a crime: it states that a person should not be 
liable to conviction without proof of "fault, in the form of intention, recklessness or 
negligence". Criminal liability without fault, in fact, would be to impose state censure 
undeservedly, failing to respect persons as thinking, planning individuals.193  
 
The culpability principle, despite some obvious differences, is recognized as pivotal 
by criminal law scholars from both the Anglo-American and the European-continental 
world. In Italy, in particular, this principle was thoroughly analyzed, among others, in 
the works of Bricola.194 Today, this principle is interpreted - in Italy and alsewhwere - 
as to include not only a prohibition for criminal liability for acts of others (divieto di 
responsabilità penale per fatto altrui - the minimal core of personal responsibly as it 
is enshrined in article 27, co. 1 of the Italian Constitution) but also a duty to establish 
a subjective link between the individual and all most significant elements of his/her 
conduct, at least in terms of "fault" (responsabilità per fatto proprio colpevole).195  
 
In reality, however, legislators in Europe and the United States often enact provisions 
that include "strict liability offences", i.e. offences that do not require the prosecution 
to prove any fault on the part of the defendant in relation to some elements of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
192 See J. FEINBERG, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others 63, 1984, at 9-10 
(explaining that even when the harm principle is satisfied, other reasons may prevent criminalization). 
Also See B. E. HARCOURT, Criminal Law: the Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 Journal. Crim. Law. 
& Criminology, 1999, vol. 90, 109, 114  (author claims that the harm principle is a necessary yet 
insufficient condition for criminalization). 
 
193 A. ASHWORTH, The Unfairness of Risk-Based Possession Offenses, supra note 148 at 243. 
194 F. BRICOLA, Teoria Generale del Reato, supra note 170 at §8.  
195 See, among others, and for a bibliographic list of the serveral Italian contributions to the debate on 
culpability, CADOPPI-P. VENEZIANI, Elementi di diritto penale. Parte generale, supra note 174, p. 101 
ff..Italian criminal law scholars had long anticipated that, there is a need to establish a subjective link, 
in the form of "intention" or "fault" at a minimum, in relation to all the "most significant elements of 
the conduct". This was later acknowledged by the Italian Constitutional Court in the well-known 
decision n. 364 of 1988. This decision formally acknowledged the meaning and the value of the 
constitutional principle of culpability (principio di colpevolezza).  
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conduct. In the UK, for example, around one-third of all new criminal offences 
enacted in 2005 contained at least one strict liability element.196 This is particularly 
blameworthy, especially when one considers that these were not merely so-called 
"regulatory offences", penalizing failures to comply with financial or industrial 
regulations, but also offences carrying a maximum of life imprisonment. For example, 
sections 5 and 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 now punishes with a maximum of 
life imprisonment the offences of rape and sexual penetration of a child under 13, 
imposing strict liability as age.197 Strict liability offences in relation to sex crimes are 
typical of many other European states. In fact, even some jurisdictions that formally 
reject the constitutionality of strict liability offences, as inconsistent with the principle 
of "nullum crimen, nulla poena sine culpa" (or Schuldprinzip in Germany), impose 
strict liability as to age for some sexual offences where the victim is a minor. It has 
long been the case, for example, of Italy, which has only recently introduced an 
excusing condition for the so-called "inevitable ignorance" as to age for a child under 
14.198  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
196 A. ASHWORTH, Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it, in Modern Law Review, vol. 
74, Issue 1, 2011, p. 1-26 at 7. 
 
197 In a 2005 case, (R v G [2008] UKHL 37 (18 June 2008), a 15-year-old boy was convicted of 
statutory rape under Section 5 of the Sexual Offenses Act 2003. The prosecution accepted the boy's 
claim that he had believed the 12-year-old girl to be 15, but he was nevertheless sentenced to 12 
months detention. This was reduced on appeal to a conditional discharge, but, in a 3-2 decision, the 
House of Lords declined to reverse the conviction. A complaint was filed then in front of the European 
Court of Human Rights (G. v The United Kingdom, App. No. 37334/08, Introduction Date20/07/2008 
Decision Date 30/08/2011) for violation of art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, i.e. the 
right to private life. The complaint was found inadmissible because the Court did not hold that the 
national authorities had exceeded the margin of appreciation available to them by creating a criminal 
offense which is called “rape” and which does not allow for any defence based either on apparent 
consent by the child or on the accused's mistaken belief about the child's age. Nor did the Court hold 
that the authorities exceeded their margin of appreciation by deciding to prosecute the applicant for this 
offense, rather then the lesser offense of sexual activity with a child. 
 
198 § 602-quater and §609-sexies of the Italian Criminal Code, which have been amended by law 1 
October 2012, n.172 (in execution of the Lanzarote Convention) to include as an excusing condition 
the so-called "inevitable ignorance" as to age of the minor. In this direction, see, also, the 2007 decision 
of the Italian Constitutional Court, n. 322, according to which: "La norma censurata (§609-sexies) 
potrebbe ritenersi lesiva del principio di colpevolezza non certo per il mero fatto che essa deroga agli 
ordinari criteri in tema di imputazione dolosa; ma, semmai, unicamente nella parte in cui neghi rilievo 
all'ignoranza o all'errore inevitabile sull'età".  
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Whether strict liability is exceptionally justified in such cases is controversial and will 
be left for debate elsewhere.199 The point here is that there is a consensus among legal 
sholars that there should be a strong presumption against criminalization of strict 
criminal liability offences, because they are contrary to the principle nulla poena sine 
culpa.200 It should be regarded as exceptional and in need of strong justification, 
particularly where the offence is serious. Therefore, policy makers and legislators 
should be guided in their criminalization decision by the following principle:  
 
 
To summarize, although the concept of harm is somehow different from the 
categories of beni giuridici and offensività that have been developed in the European-
continental literature, "harm plus culpability" can certainly be said to be the paradigm 
of criminal liability and criminalization.201  
 
2.4. "Workable" criteria for criminalization 
 
Nowadays, alive to the inevitable vagueness of concepts such as "harm" and 
"culpability", criminal law scholars are making important strides in specifying these 
two principles and developing additional criteria for and against the use of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 See for example, in relation to strict liability sex crimes in the Italian legislation, M. BENINCASA-S. 
MEDIOLI DEVOTO, Ignoranza dell ́età della persona offesa, in A. CADOPPI (ed.) I reati contro la 
Persona. III. Reati contro la libertà sessuale e lo svipuppo psico-fisico de minori, Milano, 2006, 195 ff. 
 
200 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of 
Crime, Procedure and Sanctions, in Crim. Law and Philos 2008, 21 33; also, D. HUSAK, 
Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law Oxford, 2008, p. 73 (claiming that "nearly all 
theorists regard strict liability offenses as problematic and recognize limits on the state’s authority to 
enact them"). 
 
201 A. ASHWORTH-L ZEDNER, Prevention and Criminalization: Justification and Limits, in New Crim. 
Law Review, vol. 15, 2012 p. 542-544. 
 
CULPABILITY PRINCIPLE (PRINCIPIO DI COLPEVOLEZZA) 
Fault (i.e. mens rea) - in the form of intention, recklessness or negligence - is to be 
required in relation to all the elements of the conduct (i.e. actus reus). Only 
exceptional circumstances, which require strong justification, may allow departure 
from this principle. 
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criminal law.202 American legal philosopher Douglas Husak and English criminal law 
professor Andrew Ashworth, in particular, deserve the most credit for having 
defended in the recent period "workable" criteria for criminalization, i.e. criteria 
whose terms may be clearly understood by legislators and policy makers. In light of 
the importance of their contribution, we will hereby undertake an analysis of their 
recent work.  
 
In his monograph, Husak argues that the interest in developing criteria for 
criminalization is a fairly recent phenomenon, and considers the absence of a viable 
account of criminalization as the "most glaring failure of penal theory as it has 
developed on both sides of the Atlantic".203 Thus, he assumes the difficult task of 
defending a "normative theory of criminalization", i.e. a set of principles that limit the 
authority of the state to enact and enforce penal offences. According to his theory, 
which has gained extensive support,204 seven principles should guide the legislator in 
criminalization decisions. Four of them are "internal" principles, since they can be 
derived from within the criminal law itself, and three of them are "external" 
principles, since they emerge from a political view about the conditions under which 
the rights implicated by punishment may be infringed. The internal principles are: 1) 
the nontrivial harm or evil constraint,205 according to which criminal liability may not 
be imposed unless statutes are designed to prohibit a nontrivial harm or evil, or the 
risk of it; 2) the wrongfulness constraint,206 which states that criminal liability may 
not be imposed unless the defendant's conduct is wrongful, thus calling into question 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
202 E.g., D. HUSAK, Overcriminalization, supra note 200; R. A. DUFF ET AL. (eds.), The Boundaries of 
the Criminal Law, 2010; A. SIMESTER AND A. VON HIRSCH, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the 
Principles of Criminalisation, 2010. 
 
203 D. HUSAK, Overcriminalization, supra note 200, p. 58. This point is shared by several other 
commentators: see N LACEY, Contingency and Criminalization, in Frontiers of Criminal Law 1, 2 
(1987) (the author argues that the phenomenon of criminalization is under-analyzed); C. FINKELSTEIN, 
Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, Calif. Law. Rev. 2000, vol. 88, 335, 358 … at 336 (pointing 
out that the question "what is crime?" should have been first in line among the questions to be analysed 
by theoreticians, but only little effort had been invested therein); A. DONOSO M., Book Review: 
Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization. The Limits of the Criminal Law, 3 Crim Law and Philos  99 
(2010) (the author suggests that also philosophers have not said much about the issue of 
criminalization). 
 
204 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Defending the Criminal Law, supra note 200 at 49. 
 
205 D. HUSAK, Overcriminalization, supra note 200 at 66. 
 
206 Ibidem. 
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those offences that do not provide for a culpability requirement; 3) the desert 
constraint,207 which holds that punishment is justified only when, and to the extent 
that, it is deserved, with the result that excusing conditions should place the conduct 
beyond the reach of the criminal law and excessive punishment should not be 
tolerated; and 4) the burden of proof constraint,208 according to which the state must 
provide reason to believe that its criminalization decisions satisfy this normative 
theory of criminalization, explicitly stating the ratio legis. The external principles of 
Husak's theory, instead, form the framework for a test of "intermediate scrutiny" for 
criminal legislation, which is derived from American constitutional law theory. They 
are: 5) the substantial state interest constraint, 209 which states that criminal legislation 
may only be imposed if it fulfills a substantial state interest, i.e. a proper concern of 
the public; 6) the direct advancement constraint,210 according to which criminal 
legislation must directly advance that interest, and may only be enacted if supported 
by empirical evidence; and 7) the minimum necessary extent constraint, 211 which 
states that criminal legislation must be no more extensive than necessary to achieve 
that interest.  The law needs not be necessary to achieve it. All that is required is that 
no alternative that is equally effective be less extensive than the law in question. 
Interestingly, Husak notes that criminal theorists tend to be legal philosophers who 
are unskilled in empirical methodology. Quoting Andrew Ashworth,212 he stresses 
that, as a result, both in the UK and in the US there has never been a thoroughgoing 
examination of whether some form of non-criminal enforcement could be devised to 
deal effectively with given kinds of offences.213 In sum, the set of principles that 
should limit the authority of legislators to enact and enforce criminal offences are the 
following: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
207 Id at 82. 
 
208 Id at 100. 
 
209 Id at 132. 
 
210 Id at 145. 
 
211 Id at 153. 
 
212 A. ASHWORTH, Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford, 2004, 4th ed., 2003, p. 50. 
 
213 D. HUSAK, Overcriminalization, supra note 200 at 154 (claiming that the same observation made by 
Ashworth with regard to the UK applies to the US). 
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HUSAK'S NORMATIVE THEORY OF CRIMINALIZATION  
1) Criminal liability may not be imposed unless the offence is designed to prohibit a 
nontrivial harm or evil, or the risk of it; 
2) Criminal liability may not be imposed unless the defendant's conduct is wrongful; 
3) Punishment is justified only when, and to the extent that, it is deserved; 
4) The state must provide reason to believe that the principles of this normative 
theory of criminalization are satisfied; 
5) Criminal legislation may only be imposed if it fulfills a substantial state interest; 
6) Criminal legislation must directly advance that interest; 
7) Criminal legislation must be no more extensive than necessary to achieve that 
interest. 
 
Husak's main interest is in raising the level and quality of debate about criminal 
legislation, especially among legislators themselves, rather than in forcing any 
particular conclusions about any particular criminal laws or legislative purposes. His 
normative theory of criminalization, based on principled reasoning, is a good antidote 
to the frenzied approach to law-making and the cynical pandering to public fear that 
afflict many politicians today.214 
 
2.5. In particular: crimes of risk prevention 
 
According to both Andrew Ashworth and Douglas Husak, an area of the law that 
requires particular attention and is in need of specific criteria for criminalization is 
that of so-called "crimes of risk prevention".215 This is an area of the law that has 
expanded significantly in the recent years, due to increased emphasis on the state's 
duty to seek to protect its citizens from suffering harms or wrongs.216 Over the years, 
the state has come to have a responsibility not merely to punish, but also to reduce the 
incidence of the kinds of conduct that are criminalized. The historic orientation of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
214 J. GARDNER, Book Review: Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization. The Limits of the Criminal Law, 
Notre Dame Philosophical Review, available at http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23674-overcriminalization-
the-limits-of-the-criminal-law/. 
 
215 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Defending the Criminal Law, supra, note 200 at 40-2 
 
216 R. A. DUFF, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law, Oxford, 2007, 
at 87.  
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criminal justice system towards reactive policing and post-hoc punishment217 started 
being overlaid by a proactive, preventive rationale that seeks to avert harms before 
they occur.218 A prime example of this trend is the introduction, in England and 
Wales, of "Control Orders" under the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act, whose heavy 
restrictions upon the liberty of those suspected of involvement in terrorist activity 
were said to be justified on the grounds of averting possible catastrophic harm.219 
Today, these counter-terrorism preventive measures are common in several other 
jurisdictions, both in Europe and the United States, and they raise many controversial 
issues. 
 
Crimes of risk prevention diverge from the paradigm of "harm plus culpability" that 
characterizes the major criminal offenses, such as murder.220 They represent non-
consummate221 and non-constitutive222 crimes, committed prior to and without anyone 
being wronged or harmed. Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, with the purpose of 
demonstrating the ways in which these crimes diverge from the paradigm of harm 
plus culpability, have recently provide a useful taxonomy. The taxonomy is based on 
English offences, but, as the authors note, similar offences can be found in many other 
jurisdictions. The taxonomy of crimes of risk prevention includes: 
 
A) Inchoate offences. Typically, they are crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and 
solicitation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
217 J. MCCULLOCH-S. PICKERING, Future Threat: Precrime, State Terror, and Dystopia in the 21st 
Century, 81 Crim. Just. Matters, 2010, p. 32. 
 
218 J. HORDER, Harmless Wrongdoing and the Anticipatory Perspective on Criminalisation, in G.R. 
SULLIVAN-I. DENNIS (eds.), Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms, 2012, 
p. 79-102. 
 
219 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Defending the Criminal Law, supra, note 200 at 40. 
 
220 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Prevention and Criminalization, supra note 201 at 544. 
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B) Substantive offences defined in the inchoate mode. Examples are: burglary, which 
penalizes entry with intent to steal and fraud, which penalizes making a false 
representation with intent to cause gain or loss. No loss need have been caused, no 
harm done. 
C) Preparatory and pre-inchoate offences. They penalize conduct at an earlier stage 
than traditional inchoate offenses. Examples are, under the Terrorism Act 2006: 
publishing a statement likely to be understood as an encouragement of terrorism (§1) 
and disseminating terrorist publications with intent to encourage terrorism directly or 
indirectly (§2).223 
D) Crimes of possession. There is growing list of articles whose possession is 
criminalized. Examples are: possession of drugs (allegedly criminalized to suppress 
the drugs trade); possession of explosives and automatic firearms, as well as other 
offensive weapons (allegedly criminalized to protect public safety); possession of 
information likely to be useful to a person preparing an act of terrorism, and 
possession of any article giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the possession is 
for a purpose connected with terrorism (allegedly criminalized to suppress terrorism); 
and possession of indecent images of children (allegedly criminalized to protect 
children from exploitation). 
E) Crimes of membership. They penalize membership in certain organizations, e.g. 
organizations that have among their objectives the promotion or encouragement of 
terrorism.  
F) Crimes of endangerment. They include offences of concrete or explicit 
endangerment, such as endangering the safety of rail passengers and dangerous 
driving, and offenses of abstract or implicit endangerment, such as drunk driving and 
speeding.  
 
What criminal law scholars generally emphasize with regard to crimes of risk 
prevention is that they may end up licensing unrestrained state intervention and may 
result in an overly extensive and intrusive criminal law.224 Thus, there is a need to 
identify specific principles that must form the framework for the justification of, and 
the limitations on, criminal offenses driven primarily by the preventive rationale. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
223 Terrorism Act 2006. 
 
224 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Prevention and Criminalization, supra note 201, at 553. 
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With this view, Douglas Husak has devised a special version of his normative theory 
of criminalization to apply to crimes of risk prevention, arguing that 
overcriminalization arises in this area if the law does not abide by four basic 
requirements. 225  As Husak himself acknowledges, these are sophisticated 
requirements that need further elaboration if they are to provide a working guide to 
the legislator. However, they can be summarized in the following form, simplified by 
Andrew Ashworth to provide clearer guidance to the legislator:226 
 
D. HUSAK'S CRITERIA - CRIMES OF RISK PREVENTION 
1) Substantial risk requirement: an offence is justified only if it is required to reduce 
a substantial risk, in the sense that both the harm to be avoided and the degree of 
risk that it will occur should be not insubstantial; 
2) Prevention requirement: an offence is justified only if it is likely to be effective in 
reducing the likelihood of harm occurring; 
3) Consummate harm requirement: an offence of risk prevention is justified only if 
it would also be justified to criminalize the consummate offence that intentionally 
and directly cause that very state of affairs; 
4) Culpability requirement: an offence is not justified if it criminalizes the mere 
belonging to a category or group deemed dangerous or risky. 
 
Despite the uncontested significance of Husak's contribution, the most successful 
effort to develop "workable" criteria for criminalization in the area of preventive 
measures is probably the one by Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner. The two 
authors, in "Prevention and criminalization: justifications and limits", identify eleven 
"workable" principles for policy makers and legislators.227 These principles, most of 
which are rather self-explanatory, are the following: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
225 D. HUSAK, Overcriminalization, supra note 200, at 159 ff. 
 
226 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Preventive Orders: A Problem of Undercriminalization, in R. A. DUFF 
ET AL. (eds.), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 2010, p. 80. 
 
227 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Prevention and Criminalization, supra note 201 at 547 ss. 
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A. ASHWORTH & L. ZEDNER'S CRITERIA -  
CRIMES OF RISK PREVENTION  
1) It is a necessary condition of criminalization that the harm principle is satisfied, 
and that causing or risking the harm amounts to a wrong. 
2) In determining whether there are sufficient reasons for criminalizing particular 
conduct, the costs and risks of criminalization should be taken into account, as well 
as the harm that is sought to be prevented. In particular, any probable and 
unwarranted erosion of the security of the individual from state interference should 
be avoided. 
3) Criminalization should only be resorted to if it is the least restrictive appropriate 
response. 
4) In principle, preventive offenses may be justifiable on retributive or 
consequentialist grounds. Where the justification is consequentialist, it must be 
subject to the satisfactory resolution of empirical questions about the calculation of 
risk and of normative issues arising from the remoteness of the harm. 
5) The more remote the conduct criminalized is from the harm-to-be-prevented, and 
the less grave that harm, the more compelling the case for higher-level fault 
requirements such as dishonesty, intention, knowledge, or subjective recklessness. 
6) In principle, a person may be held liable for acts he or she has done, simply on the 
basis of what he or she may do at some time in the future, only if the person has 
declared an intent to do those acts in a form that satisfies the requirements of an 
attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation. 
7) In principle, a person may be held liable for the future acts of others only if that 
person has a sufficient normative involvement in those acts (e.g., that he or she has 
encouraged, assisted, or facilitated), or where the acts of the other were foreseeable, 
with respect to which the person has an obligation to prevent a harm that might be 
caused by the other. 
8) All offenses, including those enacted on a preventive rationale, ought to comply 
with rule-of-law values, such as certainty of definition, fair warning, and fair 
labelling, so as to identify the wrong that they penalize, for the purpose of guiding 
conduct and publicly evaluating the wrong done. 
9) All offenses, including those enacted on a preventive rationale, ought to be so 
drafted as to require the court to adjudicate on the particular wrong targeted, and 
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not on some broader or prior conduct. 
10) Concrete or explicit endangerment should only be considered for criminalization 
where a significant risk of serious harm is created by a person's actions, and where 
those actions were unreasonable in the circumstances in the sense that they failed to 
show appropriate concern for the interests of others. 
11) Abstract or implicit endangerment may supply a good reason for an offense that 
specifies a precise limit for conduct of a potentially dangerous nature, but only if it 
focuses criminalization on those instances where there is a significant risk of serious 
harm and minimizes the criminalization of people who actually present no danger. 
 
Ashworth, similarly to Husak, laments the tendency among writings on English 
criminal law to devote little attention to the rightfulness or wrongfulness of 
criminalizing certain conduct.228 Although he considers the prevention of harms and 
wrongs as one of the state's central functions, he embraces a "minimalist approach" to 
criminal law.229 Thus, the eleven principles that he advances through a process of 
analysis and critique are meant to provide limitations on the pursuit of the preventive 
rationale in the criminal law. They are necessary to protect citizens from considerable 
extensions of the criminal law that may occur through the penalization of conduct 
"remote from" and "independent of" the actual causation of harm.230 
 
2.6. Final remarks on criteria for criminalization 
 
This chapter has shown that the areas touched by the criminal law have expanded 
significantly since the beginning of the twenty-first century, primarily as a result of 
the new "preventive" orientation of criminal justice systems both in Europe and in the 
United States. It has demonstrated that it was only in the recent period that 
"workable" criteria for criminalization started being developed by academics, to limit 
the expansion of the criminal law. Thus, in an effort to bridge the gap between the 
theory an the practice of the criminal law, it has summarized the most refined versions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
228 A. ASHWORTH, Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford, 2003, 4 ed., p. 24. 
 
229 A. ASHWORTH, Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford, 2009, 6 ed., p. 31. 
 
230A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, supra note 201 at 562. 
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of these criminalization principles, both in general and with specific regard to crimes 
of risk prevention.  
 
In conclusion, although the objective of effectively constraining the legislator in its 
criminalization decision is far from having been attained, there have been decisive 
steps in that direction in the recent period. This is because "workable" criteria for 
criminalization have started being developed by academics, in an effort to brige the 
gap between the theory and the practice of the criminal law.231 It is important that the 
momentum is not lost, but it is rather given visibility so that additional contributions 
may further improve the quality of the discourse. Also, it is important that legislators 
both in Europe and the United States pay more attention to these recent contributions 
from the criminal law literature. In fact, it is only through a more limited use of the 
criminal law, based on the criminalization principles that have been summarized 
above, that the problem of overcrowding can successfully be tackled: through a more 
rational day-to-day legislative activity. 
 
III. ADDRESSING PRISON OVERCROWDING AT THE SOURCE: 
ALTERNATIVES TO CRIMINALIZATION - IN THEORY 
 
If, on the one side, there is a need for legislators to be more respectful of the criteria 
for criminalization that have been identified in the previous chapter, on the other side, 
there is a need for legislators to seriously assess the appropriateness of criminalization 
in certain areas of the law.  
 
There is a recurring trend, both in the present and in the past, to resort to the criminal 
law to address longstanding social problems such as homelessness, public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
231 The AHRC (Arts and Humanities Research Council) has recently awarded a grant for a four-year 
project on Criminalization to a consortium led by the University of Stirling. The lead researchers are 
Antony Duff (Philosophy, Stirling), Lindsay Farmer (Law, Glasgow), Sandra Marshall (Philosophy, 
Stirling), Massimo Renzo (Law, York) and Victor Tadros (Law, Warwick). See 
http://www.philosophy.stir.ac.uk/criminalization/crim-homepage.php. The AHRC has also awarded a 
grant for a three-year project on Preventive Justice to a consortium led by the University of Oxford. 
The project is directed by Prof Andrew Ashworth and Prof. Lucia Zedner. It aims to re-assess the 
foundations for the range of coercive measures that states now take in the name of crime prevention 
and public protection. 
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drunkenness, drugs, gambling, prostitution, immigration etc. 232  Certainly, 
criminalization is one way to achieve some form of compliance, through the threat of 
criminal punishment. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in some 
cases the use of the criminal law may be unjustified, inappropriate or unnecessary.  
 
This chapter aims at summarizing the possible "alternatives to criminalization" in 
theory and identifying those areas of the law that criminal law scholars consider 
particularly good candidates for decriminalization reforms. In this chapter, our task 
will be the conceptualization of alternatives to criminalization in the regulation of 
social problems. First, we will define "decriminalization" and "legalization", which 
are terms that often lead to misunderstanding in the debate on reforms. Then, we will 
analyze the role of decriminalization within the framework of the Council of Europe. 
Finally, we will delineate the direction in which decriminalization reforms should go, 
identifying both which European legal system could be used as a guide for further 
developments and which major areas of the law should be particularly considered for 
decriminalization measures. This chapter will provide the theoretical foundations for 
the case study that will follow in chapter V. 
 
1. Decriminalization and legalization 
 
As far as the law is concerned, two are the alternatives to the criminalization of a 
certain conduct: "decriminalization" and "legalization".  Confusingly, commentators 
across the European-continental and the Anglo-American world use these terms with 
different meanings, or sometimes they are even used as synonyms. Misunderstanding 
is generated by conflicting interpretations of these terms in a discussion of reforms. 
Therefore, some initial clarifications are required.  
 
We will use the term "decriminalization" as in the definition provided by English 
criminologist Mike Hough, to refer to measures that "retain the offence in question as 
an offence, but avoid criminal prosecution and punishment". 233 Decriminalization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
232 See e.g. Hungary, that in 2011 introduced new anti-vagrancy laws, which now mean that homeless 
people sleeping on the street can face police fines of around £384 or even the possibility of jail time. 
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means that the criminal penalties attributed to the act are no longer in effect. Some 
European commentators tend to refer to decriminalization as "depenalization".234 This 
reflects the fact that penal law and criminal law are synonyms in many European 
systems.  
 
In essence, according to Mike Hough, decriminalization occurs in different European 
and Anglo-American jurisdictions either by: (1) downgrading the legal status of 
offences, so that they are administrative rather than criminal offences, subject to fixed 
penalty fines along the lines of parking tickets, or by (2) retaining the status of 
criminal offence on the books while avoiding the imposition of criminal penalties.235 
The latter approach operates (2a) allowing for administrative sanctions to be imposed 
or (2b) issuing guidance to police or prosecutors to avoid enforcement in specified 
circumstances.236 Decriminalization through the downgrading of criminal offences to 
administrative offences has the advantage of sending a clear message: certain forms 
of conduct are not so heinous as to require criminal punishment. However, it also 
requires a major effort from the legislator. As it is well known, indeed, criminal law 
offences are easy to enact but rather hard to repeal.  
 
We will use the term "legalization", instead, to refer to the "removal of an offence 
from both the administrative and the criminal law". Legalization makes an act 
completely acceptable in the eyes of the law. Tthe act is, therefore, not subject to any 
penalties.  In a certain way, it is a more profound change in the law than 
decriminalization. Typically, however, legalization is coupled with a system of 
governmental regulation and supervision (e.g. legalization of alcohol is generally 
subject to licensing laws and the prohibition to sell to minors, legalization of 
prostitution may be coupled with licensing, taxing and zoning measures, and 
legalization of drug possession for personal use may be subject to a limit in the 
maximum amount allowed for personal use).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 M. HOUGH ET AL (eds.), A Growing Market: The Domestic Cultivation of Cannabis, York, 2003, 
available at www.jrf.org.uk, p. 2. 
234 However, we will use "depenalization" with a different meaning than "decriminalization", as it will 
be better explained in chapter V, section 2.1.  
 
235 Ibidem. 
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2. The framework of the Council of Europe 
 
The topic of decriminalization has long been central within the framework of the 
Council of Europe, which has recognized the importance for states to adopt 
decriminalization measures in order to reduce the problem of prison overcrowding. 
The the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe acknowledges that the 
criminal law is the most intrusive of all social control institutions and must be used 
minimally. Also, it acknowledges that "the efficient management of the prison 
population is contingent on such matters as the overall crime situation, priorities in 
crime control, the range of penalties available on the law books, the severity of the 
sentences imposed, the frequency of use of community sanctions and measures, the 
use of pre-trial detention, the effectiveness and efficiency of criminal justice agencies 
and not least public attitudes towards crime and punishment".237 We hereby provide a 
selection of the most relevant Council of Europe Recommendations in relation to 
decriminaliztion and prison overcrowding. 
 
In 1987 already, Recommendation No. R (87) 18 on "The Simplification of Criminal 
Justice" emphasized the need for European states to increase the use of (and one could 
imply also move toward the adoption of, for Countries, like the UK, that still don't 
have such a system) administrative sanctions to deal with minor offences:238  
 
1) Legal systems which make a distinction between administrative offences and 
criminal offences should take steps to decriminalise offences, particularly mass 
offences in the field of road traffic, tax and costums laws under the condition that they 
are inherently minor.  
2) In dealing with such offences, (...) all states should make use of summary 
procedures or written procedures not calling, in the first place, for the services of a 
judge. 
3) No physical coercive measure - especially detention on remand - should be 
ordered. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation No. (99) 22 on "Prison 
Overcrowding and Prison Population Inflation", p. 1 (emphasis added). 
 
238 COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation No. (87) 18 on “The 
Simplification of Criminal Justice”, Paragraph II a), p. 3. 
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Then, Recommendation No. R (95) 12 on "The Management of Criminal Justice" also 
recalled that crime policies such as "decriminalization, depenalization or diversion, 
mediation and the simplification of criminal procedure" can "contribute to addressing 
the difficulties of increase in the number and the complexity of cases, unwarranted 
delays, budgetary constraints and increased expectations from public and staff".239  
 
More recently, Recommendation No. R (99) 22 concerning "Prison Overcrowding 
and Prison Population Inflation" also generally urged states to consider 
decriminalization measures:240 
 
1) Deprivation of liberty should be regarded as a sanction or measure of last resort 
and should therefore be provided for only, where the seriousness of the offence would 
make any other sanction or measure clearly inadequate (...). 
4) Member states should consider the possibility of decriminalising certain types of 
offence or reclassifying them so that they do not attract penalties entailing the 
deprivation of liberty. 
5) In order to devise a coherent strategy against prison overcrowding and prison 
population inflation a detailed analysis of the main contributing factors should be 
carried out, addressing in particular such matters as the types of offence which carry 
long prison sentences, priorities in crime control, public attitudes and concerns and 
existing sentencing practices. 
 
As it emerges from these Recommendations, decriminalization and the use of an 
administrative system to deal with minor offences are highly favored at the European 
level. This is because of the benefits that decriminalization brings to both the 
functioning of the criminal justice system, which can focus on more serious crimes, 
and the problem of prison overcrowding, through the diversion of low-level offenders 
to less stigmatizing sanctions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
239 COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation No. R (95) 12 on “The 
Management of Criminal Justice“, p. 1. 
 
240 COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation No. R (99), supra note 3 
prima di questa, Appendix, Paragraph I, p. 22. 
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3. The German model: Ordnungswidrigkeiten 
 
In line with the Council of Europe Recommendations, several scholars have argued in 
favor of the adoption, by European states that still have not done so, of a system of 
administrative sanctions similar to the one developed in Germany.241 They have 
argued that both the German administrative system itself, which is clearly distinct 
from the criminal justice system and establishes penalties through a slim and cost-
effective procedure, and the wide range of offences to which it applies should be 
considered as a useful guide for decriminalization reforms across Europe. Let us 
briefly analyze the German model. 
 
German law provides for three degrees of infractions: 1) felonies (Verbrechen), i.e. 
criminal offenses punishable with at least one year of imprisonment; 2) misdemeanors 
(Vergehen), i.e. all other criminal offenses, punishable with either a fine or with 
imprisonment and 3) petty infractions (Ordnungswidrigkeiten), i.e. administrative 
offences. Ordnungswidrigkeiten are not deemed to be criminal - in the sense of 
carrying moral blame or stigma - and only punished with a fine and the temporary 
loss of certain privileges.242 They are determined, often on a strict liability basis, by an 
administrative agency after a rather informal hearing. The agency determines the 
amount of the penalty, primarily based on the seriousness of the violation. Then the 
defendant may appeal the decision, after which there is an expedited trial where an 
ordinary court undertakes an independent review of the facts.243  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
241 See, in particular, A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Prevention and Criminalization, supra note 201 at 
567-570. See also R. S. FRASE-T. WEIGEND, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. Int’l & Comp. Law Review, vol 18, 1995, 317; 
and R. S. FRASE, Comparative Criminal justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the 
French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, in 78 Cal. Law Review, 1990, 567-
73. 
 
242 E.g. driving privileges (see, for example, 13 Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (Petty Infractions 
Act), I Bundesgesetzblatt 1987, 602, §1(1). 
 
243 The Italian system, very similarly, differentiates between delitti (more serious offenses punishable 
with the criminal sanctions of ergastolo, reclusione or multa), contravvenzioni (offenses punishable 
with the criminal sanctions of arresto or ammenda) and illeciti amministrativi (admistrative offenses 
only punishable with administrative sanctions, i.e. fines). French criminal law, similarly to the German 
model, differentiates three types of criminal offense: crimes, which correspond to felonies; délits, 
which come close to the German concept of Verbrechen; and contraventions, which correspond to the 
German concept of administrative offenses (Ordnungswidrigkeiten). For certain types of traffic offense 
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The first comprehensive statute providing for Ordnungswidrigkeiten was passed in 
1952. Then, in the early 60s, German criminal policy focused on the decriminalization 
of a wide range of minor criminal offences. In 1975, the category of minor criminal 
offences (Übertretungen) was abolished altogether, mainly through the downgrading 
of these offences to mere Ordnungswidrigkeiten - as in the case of dangerous animals, 
noise control and environmental regulation - and partly through the complete 
abandonment of punishment - as in the cases of begging and vagrancy.244 A brief 
excursus on how the German system deals with some longstanding social problems 
may be of interest. As to prostitution, in 2002 the German Prostitution Act245 made 
prostitution a legal profession expressively stating that prostitution should not be 
considered immoral anymore. This allowed prostitutes to obtain regular work 
contracts and access the welfare system. Today, prostitution is legal and regulated in 
Germany. Also, as to drug policy, in 1994 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that 
the law prohibiting cannabis was in accordance with the constitution, not infringing 
on the principles of proportionality, of equality and personal freedom, but it asked the 
legislator to proof research results and experiences of foreign countries to consider if 
prohibition is the only solution. More importantly, the Court pointed out that 
prosecution authorities of the Federal Länder should observe the "ban on excessive 
punishment" of the German Constitution and, as a rule, refrain from prosecution in 
case of minor offences involving the personal use of cannabis. Also, in 2000 the 
German Narcotic Act246 was changed to allow for supervised drug-injection rooms. 
And the positive results of a study on the effects of heroin-assisted treatment on 
addicts led to the inclusion of heroin-assisted treatment into the services of the 
mandatory health insurance in 2009.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a system of tariffs applies with fixed amounts of administrative fines imposed by the police. In such 
cases, the defendant may either consent by paying the fine, which in turn finalizes the procedure, or 
appeal to the public prosecutor, which then decides whether to dismiss the case unconditionally or take 
the case to court, with the consequence of ordinary trial procedures. A system of administrative 
sanctions that is separate from the criminal law system, in terms of procedure, is also available in Italy. 
 
244 A. ESER, A Century of German Penal Legislation. Developments and Trends, in A. ESER-J. 
THORMUNDSSON, Old Ways and New Needs in Criminal Legislation, Freiburg, 1989, p. 17 ff. See also 
A. ESER, § 12 annot. 19, in A. SCHOENKE-H. SCHROEDER, StGB, 1988, 23rd ed. 
 
245 Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsvehrhältnisse der Prostituierten (Prostittionsgesetz – ProstG) 20 Dec 
2001, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl.) I, 2001, p. 3983. 
 
246 BtMG (Betäubungsmittelgesetz). 
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As it emerges from this brief overview, some of the longstanding social problems 
around which the continuing decriminalization debate revolves have been regulated, 
in Germany, through complete legalization, a streamlined administrative procedure 
(so-called "decriminalization in the books") or guidelines to prosecutors that mandate 
not to enforce minor offences (so-called "decriminalization in practice"). It is for this 
reason that legal scholars around the world who support a minimal model of the 
criminal law often point to Germany to indicate an exemplary system of law.  
 
4. Possible areas of decriminalization 
 
In an effort to conceptualize some areas of the law where other states might want to 
"borrow" from Germany the narrower scope of the criminal law, we will now turn to 
a brief analysis of "victimless crimes" and "crimes of risk prevention". Although these 
are very broad areas, which overlap to a certain extent (e.g. possession offences 
belong to both categories), they are used here merely with the purpose of identifying 
two major areas where decriminalization reforms would be welcome. In fact, criminal 
law scholars consider the use of criminal sanctions in these areas highly contestable. 
 
4.1 An old challenge: victimless crimes 
 
Victimless crimes have long been at the core of the debate on decriminalization. 247 
They criminalize controversial social problems, lacking a definite victim.  Although 
all authors do not use the term in the same way, the following offenses have been 
included in the victimless crime category: public drunkenness; vagrancy; various 
sexual acts involving consenting adults (fornication, adultery, bigamy, incest, 
sodomy, homosexuality, and prostitution), obscenity, pornography, drug offenses, 
abortion, gambling and juvenile status offenses. Crimes of border crossing are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
247 See, e.g., E. M. SCHUR, Crimes without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy - Abortion, 
Homosexuality, Drug Addiction, Englewood Cliffs, 1965; H. L. PACKER, The Limits of the Criminal 
Sanction, Stanford, 1968; N. MORRIS-G. J. HAWKINS, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control, 
Chicago, 1970. 
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similarly considered victimless crimes: to the extent the harm is done at all, it is to the 
integrity of the state's border and immigration policy.248  
 
The arguments for the repeal or substantial restriction of criminal laws against 
victimless crimes fall into two categories. Some argue that, as a matter of principle, 
society may not legitimately prohibit conduct that harms only the actor.249 This is in 
line with Feinberg's argument that "harm to self" should not be sanctioned by the 
criminal law, as we have seen in the previous chapters.250 Others argue that, even if it 
might be legitimate to punish victimless crimes since they may be considered to harm 
"society at large", there are certain practical reasons why it is unwise to do so.251 
These practical reasons derive from three attributes of victimless crimes. First of all, 
most of them involve no complaining parties other than police officers. Thus, these 
offences are harder to detect and prosecute than crimes with victims, and the police 
are forced to engage in a number of practices (e.g. surveillance and entrapment) that 
are subject to serious abuse. Police misbehaviour in these practices further reduces 
public respect for, and cooperation with, the institutions of criminal justice, 
particularly among social groups already alienated from society, i.e. the poor, ethnic 
minorities, and the young. And this exacerbates the adverse effects of 
overcriminalization on public trust in justice. Secondly, many of them involve the 
exchange of prohibited goods or services that are strongly desired by the participants. 
Thus, criminal penalties tend to limit the supply more than the demand, driving up the 
black-market price and creating monopoly profits for those criminals who remain in 
business (the so-called crime tariff). Thirdly, all seek to prevent individual or social 
harms that are believed to be less serious and/or less likely to occur than the harms 
involved in crimes with victims. This aspect is said to further reduce respect for law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
248 M. HOUGH ET AL (eds.), A Growing Market: The Domestic Cultivation of Cannabis, supra note 233, 
at 8. 
 
249 See, among others, N. MORRIS-G. J. HAWKINS, The Honest Politician's, supra note 247, applying 
Stuart Mill’s principle of harm to others.  
 
250 Supra, chapter III section 2.2. 
 
251 E. M. SCHUR-H. A. BEDAU, Victimless Crimes: Two Sides of a Controversy, Englewood Cliffs, 
1974. 
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on the part of citizens, who believe that these acts are criminalized despite not being 
considered particualrly wrong.  
 
Critics of the victimless crime criterion point out that the concept lacks a clear 
definition, fails to cover some of the offenses to which it has been applied (e.g. the 
consensual nature of the transactions and the fact that they are strongly desired applies 
in only the broadest sense to incest), and applies equally well to other offenses that 
have not been generally proposed for repeal or substantial restriction (e.g. receiving 
stolen property, most traffic law violations and health, safety, environmental, and 
regulatory offenses). In addition, critics argue, the victimless crime concept says very 
little about the difficult choices between alternatives to current criminal laws: partial 
decriminalization through a reduction in penalties, downgrading to administrative 
offences, or complete legalization. Thus, critics argue, the term is only a cover for 
subjective value judgments about the wisdom of specific criminal statutes, and fails to 
provide an objective criminalization standard that could be easily applied and would 
be deserving of broad acceptance.  
 
The point here is that labelling a crime as victimless only begins what is, in most 
cases, a very difficult process of assessing complex empirical facts and fundamental 
value choices.252 In chapter V we will make an effort to go into the details of that 
assessment process in relation to drug legislation. At this stage, it is enough to note 
that several scholars, among whom German Professor Thomas Weigend and 
American Professor Richard Frase, claim that other states may want to borrow from 
Germany the complete decriminalization of most of these victimless offences.253  
 
4.2. A new challenge: crimes of risk prevention 
 
Preventive measures have become part of the debate on decriminalization only since 
the beginning of the twentieth century, as a result of the more demarcated "preventive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252  R. S. FRASE, Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 2002 available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Victimless_Crime.aspx. 
 
253 R. S. FRASE-T. WEIGEND, German Criminal Justice as a Guide, supra note 241. See also R. S. 
FRASE, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide, supra note 241. 
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function" that has come to characterize modern systems of criminal justice since the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11.   
 
As we have seen, according to Ashworth and Zedner's taxonomy, preventive 
measures include the following: inchoate offences, substantive offenses defined in the 
inchoate mode, preparatory and pre-inchoate offences, crimes of possession, crimes of 
membership and crimes of endangerment.254 
 
Ashworth is among those scholars that support the use of a system of administrative 
sanctions in the area of preventive measures, particularly when the risk of harm is 
remote from the conduct in question. He claims that if the limiting principles that he 
identifies were applied conscientiously,255 many of the recent preventive extensions of 
the criminal law, and in particular "membership" and "endangerment" offenses, might 
appear to lie at the very limits of justifiability, such as to call in to question their 
criminalization. He favors the introduction of a system of "prevention through 
regulation" for these offences. As he notes, the key element of the systems of 
administrative offenses adopted in many continental European jurisdictions, such as 
Germany, is that the penalties are set at a low level.256 The purpose of these systems is 
to subject minor infractions to a lower-level system of sanctions that is efficient 
enough to ensure no resulting loss of preventive efficacy. 
 
Thus, according to Ashworth, there should be, in principle, an initial decision about 
whether the conduct constitutes a serious wrong that merits criminalization, with 
public censure and punishment to follow, or whether the conduct is a minor wrong 
that can properly be dealt with in this non-stigmatic way by a relatively low 
penalty.257 If the conduct falls into the former category, consideration should be given 
to defining and criminalizing the behavior, in accordance with a proper normative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
254 See supra chapter III, section 2.5. 
 
255 Ibidem. 
 
256 R. A. DUFF, Crimes, Regulatory Offenses and Criminal Trials, in H. MULLLER-DIETZ ET AL. (eds.), 
Festschrift fur Heike Jung, 2007, p. 87.  
 
257 R. A. DUFF, Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law, in R. A. DUFF ET AL. (eds.), The 
Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 2010, p. 104. 
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theory of criminalization and with all the safeguards of a fair criminal procedure. If 
the conduct falls into the latter category, then a system such as Germany's 
Ordnungswidrigkeiten should be applied. This system should provide that: a) the 
decision to impose a sanction may be taken by administrators or regulators, i.e. 
personnel less highly trained; b) the financial penalty would not require formal court 
proceedings unless the citizen wishes to contest liability, in which case a relatively 
informal hearing, without the full range of criminal safeguards, would take place; and 
c) sanctions should be financial and set at a modest level. In cases of non-payment of 
administrative fines, coercive detention should be kept as the very last resort measure. 
Such regulatory system would need to comply with the European Convention of 
Human Rights, but one way of ensuring that would be to provide for an avenue of 
appeal to a criminal court with full Convention safeguards: a defendant should be 
offered a fixed penalty or administrative fine, but given the opportunity to opt for 
court proceedings if he/she contests the charge.258  
 
To conclude, as Ashworth notes, the aim of prevention should chiefly be pursued 
through the use of administrative sanctions and educational, family, housing and town 
planning policies. In particular, this can be achieved through i) social crime 
prevention (e.g. by organising activities to take young people away from crime) and 
ii) situational crime prevention (by making the commission of crime more difficult - 
through target hardening and opportunity reduction - and observable - through design 
of buildings, urban planning, surveillance mechanisms and security cameras).259  
 
5. Final remarks on alternatives to criminalization 
 
This chapter has shown that there is a recurring trend, both in the present and in the 
past, to resort to the criminal law to address longstanding social problems such as 
homelessness, public drunkenness, drugs, gambling, prostitution, immigration etc. 
Yet, in some cases the use of the criminal law may be inappropriate in light of the 
criminalization principles that have been developed by scholars in the European-
continental and the Anglo-American literature.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 A. ASHWORTH-L. ZEDNER, Prevention and Criminalization, supra note 201 at 568. 
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Alternatives to criminalization, i.e. "decriminalization" and "legalization" reforms, 
should seriously be considered by legislators, especially in relation to so-called 
"victimless crimes" and "crimes of risk prevention". These areas have been identified 
by criminal law scholars as particularly critical and in need of reassessment.  
 
Also, we believe that community's views about decriminalization/legalization reforms 
in the areas of "victimless crimes" and "crimes of risk prevention" should be solicited. 
In fact, no defect in the criminal law is likely to erode confidence among citizens 
more rapidly than the perception that the wrong acts are punished or unpunished.260 
As it has been emphasized by criminal law scholars, "society will lose faith in the 
penal law if it is perceived as criminalizing conduct unjustly".261 
 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO CRIMINALIZATION - IN PRACTICE: DRUG 
LEGISLATION 
 
This chapter aims at analyzing some "alternatives to criminalization" in practice. In 
particular, we will conduct a comparative study of the most recent decriminalization 
reforms that have been adopted by Italy and Portugal in the field of drug legislation. 
 
We decided to focus our analysis on drug legislation for several reasons. First of all, 
because drug legislation, as we have seen in chapter I, severely impacts on prison 
overcrowding both in Europe and in the United states. Reforms in this area - though 
politically difficult - are very much needed to solve the problem of prison 
overcrowding at the source. Secondly, because one of the most controversial forms of 
conduct criminalized in the field of drug legislation in Europe and the United States, 
i.e. drug use and possession, lies at the intersection of the two major areas of the law 
that have just been identified as in need of serious reassessment, i.e. "victimless 
crimes" and "crimes of risk prevention". Finally, and perhaps even more importantly, 
because what emerges from the most recent social surveys conducted in the United 	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261 See P. ROBINSON-J. DARLEY, Justice, Liability And Blame: Community Views And The Criminal 
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States and in Europe in the field of drug regulation is that public attitudes are less and 
less favorable to the use of the criminal law to address drug use, particularly for 
cannabis. Therefore, if the criminal law is to be in line with the so-called 
Kulturnormen, there seems to be a compelling reason to reassess cannabis legislation. 
 
1. The drug phenomenon in Europe: most recent statistical data 
 
This section will offer an overview of the drug phenomenon in Europe, to lay down 
the contextual framework for the case study that will follow. In particular, it will 
provide some statistical data on drug use among the European population, with 
specific regard to cannabis use, and drug law enforcement in Europe. This overview 
will be primarily based on the data of the ECMDDA - European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction, which is the central agency of the European Union for 
coordinating drug policy data.  
 
On a preliminary note, it may be useful to stress that the EMCDDA's purpose in 
collecting data on the drug phenomenon in Europe has never been to offer an ultimate 
judgment on the best policy style for European countries. Rather, its role is a 
scientific one: information is collected and analyzed and the results are presented. It is 
then up to individual Member States to draw their own conclusions from the data that 
are made available.  
 
The first issue to be dealt in the analysis of the statistical data offered by the 
EMCDDA, with a view to develop evidence-based policy proposals, is the extreme 
difficulty of cross-national comparative research conducted on the scale achieved by 
the EMCDDA. 262  Galtung summarizes the problems associated with research 
depending on the collation of data from many different countries as trying to create a 
universal social science, "a social science transcending geography and history with all 
that implies of structural and cultural diversity".263 There are many difficulties with 
creating this "universal social science" that are relevant to comparative, statistical-
based, studies in the drug policy field. Hakim highlights the difficulties in drawing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 C. CHATWIN, Drug Policy Harmonization and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 
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263 J. GALTUNG, Theory Formation in Social Research: a Plea for Pluralism, in E. OYEN (ed.) 
Comparative Methodology, London, 1990 p. 107. 
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reliable conclusions from studies where there may be hidden agendas subscribed to by 
the institution undertaking the research, where there are cultural differences in styles 
of work (although these can also exist at a national level), or where scholars from 
different countries involved in the research may come from different disciplinary 
perspectives.264 All these problems are encountered in the drugs field. Flynn has 
raised a further obstacle to the interpretation of statistics gathered by the EU: 
"Measuring the comparative success of drug policies is, of course problematic. There 
are no universally accepted criteria for success, for example, by which competing 
drug policies can be assessed".265  
 
The EMCDDA is working towards overcoming these obstacles. In the historical 
tables of data, as the years go by, greater numbers of member states have consistently 
provided information. Additionally, the EMCDDA has worked towards instituting 
standard age categories and standard definitions for terms such as "drug-related 
death". Increasing numbers of countries are adopting these standard definitions, 
although not all have done so as yet. Over the coming years, practices of data 
collection should continue to become even more standardized.  
 
Also, some interesting suggestions are coming from the stakeholders. The European 
Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies (ENCOD) highlighted in 2001 some 
important factors that could improve the quality of statistical data for the development 
of sound evidence-based drug policy proposals. The ENCOD made the point that, in 
order to be evaluated, policies first of all need to state a clear objective. Once the 
objective of the policy is agreed upon, indicators to evaluate the success of the policy 
can be developed. For example, the effectiveness of a drugs policy aimed at attaining 
a drug free society can be measured by prevalence of drugs use amongst the 
population. But for policies that accept drugs as a part of life and intend to reduce the 
harm related to them, prevalence of drugs use as such is of less importance. It is more 
relevant to measure the effectiveness of those policies through a combination of 
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statistical measures. Thus, according to the ENCOD guidelines,266 statistics should 
include measures on 1) the proportion of "problematic use" among the totality of use 
and 2) the "price/quality ratio" of substances, together with more sociological 
measures such as 3) the "integration of drug users in society" and 4) the "participation 
of citizens in the design and implementation of drug policies". In line with this 
proposal, we also argue for a more significant involvement of European citizens in the 
design and implementation of drug policies. Community's views should be solicited 
and gathered in order to add a significant factor for the analysis of the success/lack of 
success of drug policies in Europe. If not, the risk is that policies that do not 
correspond to the attitudes of society toward certain drugs will lead to very limited 
compliance, based not on "normative" but only on "instrumental" acceptance267. 
 
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the statistics collected by the EMCDDA are 
a useful starting point in exposing some facts on drug use and drug law enforcement. 
 
1.1. Drug use among the European population 
 
According to the 2012 EMCDDA report268 around a quarter of Europe’s 15- to 64-
year-old population has used an illicit drug at some point in their life ("lifetime 	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POLICIES-IN.html (accessed 01 September 2013). 
267 For an analysis of "normative" and "instrumental" compliance see P. CAMPANA-M. HOUGH-
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so. The perceived legitimacy of the authority has a greater impact on the individual decision as to 
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punishment it presents. People will voluntarily comply with the rules even if this goes against their 
own pure self-interest if the law and the state are regarded as legitimate. Instead of focusing on the 
individual structure of incentives, the normative approach looks at the internalised norms and values of 
a given individual. Ibidem. 
268 EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION (HEREINAFTER EMCDDA), 
Annual Report - The State of the Drugs Problem in Europe, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2012, p. 15.  
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prevalence"). More importantly, the great majority of people report having used 
cannabis (80.5 million), with much lower estimates for "lifetime use" of other drugs: 
15.5 million for cocaine, 13 million for amphetamines and 11.5 million for ecstasy. 
Also, cannabis is by far the most widespread drug in relation to the other two 
indicators of drug diffusion, i.e. "last year use" and "last month use". Considerable 
differences exist between countries with regard to cannabis use among the general 
population (15- to 64-year-old), with national "lifetime prevalence" figures varying 
from 1.6% (Romania) to 32.5% (Denmark). For the purpose of our study, it is worth 
noting that the highest "lifetime prevalence" countries following Denmark are Spain 
and France (32.1 %), Italy (32.0 %) and the United Kingdom (30.7 %).269 Moreover, 
as to "last year use" of cannabis, which is probably a better indicator of frequency of 
use, Italy (14.3 %) Spain (10.6 %) the Czech Republic (10.4 %) and France (8.4 %) 
are the countries with the highest rate. Finally, as to "last month use" of cannabis", 
Spain (7.6 %) Italy (6.9 %) France (4.6 %) and the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands (4.2 %) appear as highest-prevalence countries. Generally, according to 
the EMCDDA report, cannabis use in Europe increased during the 1990s and early 
2000s. Today, the EMCDDA claims that Europe may be moving into a new phase, as 
data from general population surveys and a new round of data from the ESPAD 
school survey points to relatively stable trends in cannabis use in many countries. In 
any case, as the report emphasizes, levels of cannabis use in Europe continue to 
remain high by historical standards.270 
 
One important fact that emerges from the 2012 EMCDDA report271 is that cannabis 
use is largely concentrated among young people (15–34), with the highest prevalence 
of "last year use" generally being reported among 15- to 24-year-olds. Population 
survey data suggest that, on average, 32.5% of young European adults (15–34) have 
used cannabis at some time, while 12.4 % have used the drug in the last year and 6.6 
% have used it in the last month. A comparison with figures from Australia, Canada 
and the U.S. on "lifetime" and "last year use" of cannabis among young adults shows 
that extra-European averages are all above the European averages, which are 32.5 % 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Id. at 41. For data on all the European Member States see the "General population surveys" in the 
2012 EMCDDA Statistical Bulletin, available at 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats12#display:/stats12/gpstab1b 
270 EMCDDA, Annual Report, supra note 268, at 39.  
271Id at 41. 
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and 12.4 % respectively. For example, in Canada (2010) "lifetime prevalence" of 
cannabis use among young adults was 50.4% and "last year prevalence" 21.1%. In the 
United States, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) (2010) estimated a "lifetime prevalence" of cannabis use of 52.1% (16–
34, recalculated by the EMCDDA) and a "last year prevalence" of 24.5%, while in 
Australia (2010) the figures are 43.3% and 19.3% for young adults.  
 
Also, according to the 2013 EMCDDA report, 272 school students’ cannabis use 
increased between 1995 and 2003, dropped slightly in 2007 and since then has 
remained stable. During this period, a noticeable trend has been a reduction in 
cannabis use in many of the countries that reported high levels of prevalence in early 
surveys. Over the same period, levels of cannabis use among school students 
increased in many of the countries in central and Eastern Europe, showing a degree of 
convergence across Europe as a whole. In the six countries that reported national 
school surveys undertaken after the ESPAD study (2011/12), prevalence of cannabis 
use among students remains stable or is slightly decreasing. Longer-term trends 
among young adults are broadly in line with those for students, with gradual increases 
in use among lower-prevalence countries, alongside decreases among higher-
prevalence countries.  
 
Finally, only a significant minority of cannabis users consumes the substance 
intensively.273 Daily or almost daily cannabis use is defined by the EMCDDA as use 
on 20 or more days in the month preceding survey. Data from 22 countries suggest 
that around 1% of adults report using the drug in this way. Over two-thirds of these 
are aged between 15 and 34 years, and in this age group, over three-quarters are male. 
In Italy, which as we have seen is the country with the highest "last year use" of 
cannabis and the second highest "last month use" of cannabis, 63.9% of last month 
users reported having used cannabis 1 to 3 days in the month preceding survey, 16.7% 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 EMCDDA, Annual Report - The State of the Drugs Problem in Europe, Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2013, p. 30. 
273 Id at 31. 
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reported having used it 10 to 19 days and 19.4 reported having used it on 20 or more 
days in the month preceding survey.274 
 
1.2. Drug law enforcement in Europe 
 
As to data on drug law enforcement in Europe, the first fact that emerges from the 
2013 EMCDDA annual statistics is that the majority of reports of drug law offences 
in Europe relates to drug use or possession for use; overall in Europe, these totaled 
more than a million in 2011, a 15% increase compared to 2006. More importantly, as 
the figures below show, more than three-quarters of these offences involve 
cannabis.275  
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Sentencing practices shed some light on the 
implementation and actual outcomes for drug use or 
personal possession o!ences in Europe. In 2009, an 
EMCDDA data collection indicated that many countries 
give "nes, warnings or community work orders for 
possession of drugs for personal use, although some 
central and eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia, were more likely to 
use suspended prison sentences.
I Supply of drugs: variations in penalties
Illegal drug supply is always a crime in Europe, but the 
maximum possible penalties vary considerably. In so e 
countries, a supply o!ence may be subject to a single 
wide penalty range (up to life in prison). Other countries 
di!erentiate between minor and major supply o!ences, 
determined by factors such as the quantity of drugs 
found, with corresponding maximum penalties. Another 
approach, found in 14 of the 30 countries considered 
here, is to vary penalties according to the drug involved 
(Figure 4.2).    FIGURE 4.2
Reports of drug upply o!ences have increased by one-
quarter since 2006, reaching more than 225 000 cases 
in 2011. As for possession o!ences, cannabis accounted 
for the majority of reported supply o!ences. Cocaine, 
he oin and amphet mines, however, accounted for a larg r 
share of o!ences for supply than for personal possession 
(Figure 4.3).   FIGURE 4.3
I  Possession of drugs for personal use:  moving away from prison sentences
In most European countries, the possession of drugs 
for personal use (and sometimes drug use) is a criminal 
o!ence punishable by a prison sentence. In some 
countries, however, it can only be punished by non-
criminal sanctions such as "nes or suspension of driving 
licence. An additional factor is the drug involved. In 
two-thirds of European countries, national laws prescribe 
the same penalty for a personal possession o!ence, 
regardless of the substance. For the remaining countries, 
the possible penalty varies according to the substance. 
Overall, from around 2000, there has been a general tren  
across Europe to reduce the possibility of imprisonment for 
possession of drugs for personal use. Some countries have 
changed their legislation to remove prison penalties (for 
example Portugal, Slovenia, Bulgaria and, most recently, 
Croatia), while others have issued national directives to 
police or prosecutors to use sanctions other than prison. 
$e approach taken in Portugal has received considerable 
international attention. $e measures introduced in 2001 
reduced the emphasis on punishment and direct drug 
users to a network of ‘commissions for dissuasio  of drug 
addiction’, managed by the ministry of health. 
In most European countries, the majority of reports of 
dr g law o!ences r late to rug use or possessi n for use; 
overall in Europe, these totalled more than a million in 
2011, a 15% increase compared to 2006. More than thre -
quarters of these o!ences involve cannabis (Figure 4.1). 
Reported o!ences related to drug use or possession for use in Europe, trends and breakdown by drug (main drugs)
FIGURE 4.1
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Reflecting its high prevalence of use, cannabis is also by far the most seized drug in 
Europe. Figures from the 2013 EMCDDA annual report are available below, 276 
showing seizures of cannabis in the amounts of 41% for herbal cannabis, 36% for 
cannabis resin and 3% for cannabis plants, for a total of 80% of overall drug seizures. 
Cocaine ranks second overall, with about double the number of seizures reported for 
either amphetamines or heroin. The number of ecstasy seizures is lower, and declined 
considerably in recent years. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 See EMCDDA, Table GPS-10: Frequency of use of cannabis amongst users in the last 30 days in 
national general population surveys. Year of survey: 2012, available at 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats13#display:/stats13/gpstab10a. 
275 EMCDDA, Annual Report, supra note 272 at 60.  
276 Id at 16. 
	   85	  
 
16
European Drug Report 2013: Trends and developments
of all cannabis seizures (Figure 1.3). "is re#ects, in part, 
the growing availability of domestically produced herbal 
cannabis in many countries. "e quantity of cannabis resin 
seized, however, although falling in recent years, is still 
much higher than the quantity of herbal cannabis reported 
(483 tonnes versus 92 tonnes in 2011). 
European trends in cannabis seizures have to be 
understood in the context that data from a limited number 
of countries are disproportionately important (Figure 1.4). 
Spain, for example, with its close proximity to Morocco, and 
substantial internal market, reported around two-thirds of 
the quantity of resin seized in Europe in 2011. In respect to 
herbal cannabis, Greece and Italy both reported recent large 
increases in quantities seized. Since 2007, Turkey has been 
the country seizing the largest quantities of herbal cannabis.
being intended for consumption in other countries, both in 
Europe and in the Middle East. 
Re#ecting its high prevalence of use, cannabis is by far 
the most seized drug in Europe (Figure 1.1). Cocaine ranks 
second overall, with about double the number of seizures 
reported for either amphetamines or heroin. "e number of 
ecstasy seizures is lower, and has declined considerably in 
recent years. FIGURE1
I Cannabis: changes in supply 
Two distinct cannabis products are commonly found on 
the European drugs market: herbal cannabis (‘marijuana’) 
and cannabis resin (‘hashish’). "e annual consumption 
of these products can be roughly estimated at around 
2 500 tonnes. 
Herbal cannabis found in Europe is both cultivated 
domestically and tra$cked from neighbouring countries, 
although some reports mention herb originating in 
other regions including Africa. Most cannabis resin is 
imported by sea or by air from Morocco. At European level, 
interceptions of resin are on average larger in size than 
those of herb. INFOGRAFIKA   FIGURE 1.2
Over the past ten years, the number of herbal seizures has 
overtaken that of resin, and now represents more than half 
FIGURE 1.1
Number of reported seizures by country (left), and proportion of seizures for the main drugs (right), 2011
Seizures (000s)   <1   1–10   11–100   >100   No data
NB: Numbers of seizures (in thousands) for the ten countries with highest values.
Cannabis resin 36%
Cocaine and crack 10%
Methamphetamine 1%Ecstasy 1%
Amphetamine 4%
Heroin 4%
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Cannabis plants 3%
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2. Drug policies in Europe 
 
The debate on drug policy reforms in Europe is often represented as a polarized 
choice betwe n t o options, "prohibitio " and "legalization". The reality, however, is 
that in the field of drug regulation a multipli ity of policy options exists, which is in 
no way redu ibl  to a simple dichotomy between these two extremes. This section 
will offer an overview of current drug policies in Europe. In particular, it will clarify 
which policy options are generally available in the field of drug regulation and it will 
analyze the most recent trends in legal approaches to use and possession of drugs for 
personal use in Europe. Thus, it will provide the background against which the policy 
opti ns adopted by It ly and Po tugal will be evaluated, in the case studies that will 
follow. 
 
2.1. Criminalization, legalization, decriminalization, depenalization 
 
The multiplicity of policy options in the field of drug regulation can be divided into 
four broad categories, which we will analyze in line with the definitions that have 
been provided in chapter IV: they are "criminalization", "legalization", 
"decriminalization" and "depenalization". 
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On the one side of the spectrum, "criminalization" generally refers to the use of the 
criminal law to sanction both the production (manufacture and distribution) and the 
consumption (use and possession for personal use) of drugs. The criminalization 
framework, as we will see in the next section of this paper, continues to predominate 
in the EU for most drug offences.  Sweden, with its aim of a drug-free society and its 
strategy of targeting users as much as dealers, provides an example of a relatively 
restrictive criminalization policy.277  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, "legalization" generally refers to the removal of 
drug-related offences from both the administrative and the criminal law. Prior to the 
20th century, most European countries had legalized regimes for drugs, because 
neither the supply nor the demand sides of the drug market were criminalized and 
drugs could be legally manufactured and sold to consumers. Then, several 
criminalization policies were adopted in Europe, in the wake of the so-called U.S. 
"war on drugs". To date, no European country has implemented a policy of complete 
drug legalization. This is also because a legalized regime would allegedly not be in 
line with the United Nation Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961278 and the 
United Nation Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988,279 which have been ratified by several European States. The 1988 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 For a detailed analysis of the Swedish drug control policy see C. CHATWIN, Drug Policy 
Harmonization and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 89-104.   
278 The United Nations 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics (as amended by the 1972 Protocol) lays 
the foundations of the current UN approach of control of drugs through prohibition. It was concerned 
mainly with drug cultivation, production and trafficking, though Article 28(3) imposes a duty on 
countries to prevent the use of cannabis and other drugs (or at least misuse). Section 36 requires 
signatory countries to ensure that, subject to constitutional limitations in individual countries, the 
‘cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, 
distribution, purchase, sale, delivery (...) shall be punishable offenses (...) and that serious offenses 
shall be liable to adequate punishment, particularly by imprisonment’. Significantly, the 1961 
Convention did not require that the offenses should be punishable under the criminal law. Although the 
1961 Convention explicitly refers to possession, it has often been assumed from the context and from 
the overall tone of the document that regulation of supply rather than demand was its main target. It 
was not explicit about criminal sanctions except for serious offenses, though it provided for alternatives 
to conviction and punishment where the offenders were "abusers of drugs".  
279 The United Nations 1988 Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances is tougher than the 1961 Convention, and it is framed to tackle both supply 
and demand. It is more binding than the 1961 Convention, obliging signatories to share intelligence 
and co-operate with one another against international drug trafficking and to make efforts to eradicate 
narcotic plants grown on their territory and to eliminate demand for illicit drugs (Article 14, para. 1). It 
is also explicit that offenses should be punishable under criminal law. Article 3 para. 1 requires that 
criminal offenses should be established under domestic law to cover "production, (...), "sale" (...) and 
more in general possession with intent to supply for a wide range of drugs including cannabis. It states 
that the possession, purchase or cultivation of illicit drugs for personal use should be criminal offenses 
encompassed under the criminal legislation of each country in the following terms: "Subject to its 
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Convention, in particular, obliges each country to treat "production, supply and 
possession with intent to supply" of a wide range of drugs, including cannabis, as a 
"criminal offence".280 The same is required for "possession, purchase or cultivation 
for personal consumption", but subject to a country’s "constitutional principles and 
the basic concepts of its legal system".281 European countries have not uniformly 
interpreted this clause, which seems to leave some flexibiblity as to the regulation of 
personal consumption of drug. This is reflected in the different legal approaches 
adopted in Europe in the area of use and possession of drugs for personal use.282 
 
Drug "decriminalization" represents a level intermediate between strict prohibition 
and legalization. It does not really identify a legal framework model, but rather a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each Party shall adopt such 
measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offense under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances for personal consumption" (Article 3, para. 2). As did the 1961 Convention, the 1988 
Convention allows for considerable discretion in the disposal of minor cases. In the first place, 
decisions about appropriate sanctions are clearly left to signatory countries, and are expected to be in 
accordance with the constitutional principles of that country. Furthermore, two sections are explicit 
about non-punitive options in relation to minor cases generally and in cases involving possession, 
purchase or consumption for personal use: "...in appropriate cases of a minor nature, the Parties may 
provide, as alternatives to conviction or punishment, measures such as education, rehabilitation or 
social reintegration, as well as, when the offender is a drug abuser, treatment and aftercare. The Parties 
may provide, as an alternative to conviction or punishment, or in addition to conviction or punishment 
of an offense established in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, measures for the treatment, 
education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social reintegration of the offender". (Article 3, paras 4c and 4d). 
280 Article 3 para. 1, see supra, note prima di questa. 
281 Article 3, para. 2, see supra, note prima di questa. In particular, the requirement of "proportionality" 
in the official response to infractions of the criminal law is the constitutional principle to which states 
have often refered to justify the use of mere administrative sanctions against drug users. 
282 See infra, section 2.2 of this paper. As many authors note, the UN conventions set some clear limits 
to the range of reform options, while leaving individual countries considerable room for manouvre. If, 
on the one side, they oblige each country to treat unauthorized supply as a criminal offense, on the 
other they allow for some forms of decriminalization in relation to possession and cultivation for 
personal use. For a detailed discussion, see N. DORN (ET AL.), European Drug Laws: The Room for 
Manoeuvre, London, 2001 and B. DE RUYVER (ET AL.), Multidisciplinary Drug Policies and the UN 
Drug Treaties, Antwerpen, 2002. Wiht specific regard to cannabis cultivation, the legality of which is 
particularly controversial in many European states at the moment, see See M. HOUGH ET AL (eds.), A 
Growing Market: The Domestic Cultivation of Cannabis, supra note 233. According to M. Hough, the 
UN conventions require signatory countries to prohibit under the criminal law cultivation of cannabis. 
However, they clearly permit (possession and) cultivation for personal use to be dealt with by means 
other than punishment – such as treatment, counselling and education, and simply through warnings. 
Though they are less explicit on this point, they do not appear to rule out dealing with cultivation for 
personal use as a minor offense, dealt with by administrative penalties (such as "ticketing" or fixed 
fines)". Id, at 32. For an analysis, in Italian, of the duties to criminalize drug production/sale/trafficking 
(versus the possibility of adopting non-punitive measure for personal use) deriving from the UN 
Conventions see F.C. PALAZZO, Consumo e Traffico degli Stupefacenti, II ed., Padova, 1994, 27 ff. 
According to the author: "la soluzione proibizionistica è oggi imposta dagli accordi internazionali in 
materia di stupefacenti, che obbligano gli stati contraenti a reprimere come illecito penale i fatti di 
produzione e commercio illegali, mentre per quanto riguarda la posizione di chi sia anche consumatore 
lasciano ai singoli stati la possibilità di scegliere fra la repressione penale e le misure trattamentali". Id 
at 27.  
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movement in relation to a previous situation. In general terms, "decriminalization" is 
used to refer to measures that retain a certain conduct as an offence, but avoid 
criminal prosecution and punishment. As we have seen in chapter IV, 
decriminalization may occur in different European jurisdictions through either of the 
following: (1) downgrading the legal status of offences, so that they are administrative 
rather than criminal offences (i.e. decriminalization in the books) or (2) retaining the 
status of criminal offence on the books while avoiding the imposition of criminal 
penalties (i.e. decriminalization in practice). In particular, the latter approach may 
occur by (2a) allowing for administrative sanctions to be imposed or (2b) issuing 
guidance to police or prosecutors to avoid enforcement in specified circumstance. 
With specific regard to drug policies, the concept of "decriminalization" is 
particularly relevant for the conduct of "use" and "possession for personal use" of 
illicit drugs.283 
  
Different from drug "decriminalization" is drug "depenalization". According to the 
distinction promulgated in 2005 by the ECMDDA, in fact: "decriminalization" 
comprises removal of a conduct or activity from the sphere of criminal law. 
Prohibition remains the rule, but sanctions for use (and its preparatory acts) no longer 
fall within the framework of the criminal law (administrative sanctions without the 
establishment of a police record). By contrast, "depenalization" means relaxation of 
the penal sanction provided for by law. In the case of drugs, depenalization generally 
signifies the elimination of custodial penalties. Prohibition remains the rule, but 
imprisonment is no longer provided for, even if other penal sanctions may be retained 
(fines, establishment of a police record, or other penal sanctions).284 
 
2.2. Legal approaches to use and possession of drugs 
 
In most European countries, the possession of drugs for personal use (and sometimes 
drug use) is a criminal offence punishable by a prison sentence.285 For example, in 
France, 286 Hungary, 287 Greece, 288 Finland,289 Norway290 and Sweden,291 both use and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 See infra chapter V section 2.3. 
284 EMCDDA, Thematic Papers - Illicit Drug Use in the EU: Legislative Approaches, 2005, p. 4. 
285 EMCDDA, Annual Report... 2013, supra note 11 at 60. 
286 In France, the Law of 1970 (Article L-3421-1 of the public health code) makes public or private use 
punishable by one year in prison and a fine of €3,000. Possession of illegal drugs is also a criminal 
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offense. See infra, note 29, for the application in practice of these provisions. Prohibition and 
punishment of mere drug use and possession for personal use has provoked a strong debate in France 
for decades. See EMCDDA country profiles: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
287 In Hungary, according to section 282 of the Hungarian Criminal Code, "whoever without official 
authorization produces, manufactures, acquires, possesses, imports, exports, or transports through the 
country drugs, can be sentenced to up to 5 years in prison". If only a small quantity is involved, the 
punishment is up to 2 years in prison or a fine. Since the 2003 reform of the Hungarian Criminal Code, 
the word "use" or "consume" does not appear in the text anymore, but standard case law has 
established that the notion of "acquiring" or "possessing" includes use and consumption; consequently 
consumption itself is implicitly criminalized and subject to a prison sentence. Users who enter 
treatment before punishment may be exempted from punishment. See EMCDDA country profiles: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
288 In Greece, Law 1987 (Article 12) and amendments establish that "any person who for his own 
exclusive use, obtains or possess whatsoever drugs in small quantity, or makes use of them (...) is 
punished with imprisonment." In 2003, the maximum penalty for use or possession of small amounts 
for own use by a non-dependent user was reduced from five years to one year in prison. This offense 
will not be entered in the criminal record if there is no re-offending during a five-year period. Drug 
addicts receive a more lenient treatment due to the fact that the Greek legal system considers the 
addiction as the dominant cause of the drug related offense. See EMCDDA country profiles: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
289 Finland was the first Nordic country to criminalize drug use. This was done in 1966, after a lively 
debate. The parliament's argument was that the purpose of the legislation was not to punish drug users, 
but to enforce negative attitudes against drugs among the population. However, a study in 1986 showed 
that two thirds of all drug offenses involved the use or possession of relatively small amount of drugs 
for one's own use. Drug legislation was revised in 1994 and again in 2001 (654/2001).  The use of 
drugs was maintained as a criminal offense. The central provisions of drug legislation are laid down in 
chapter 50 of the Penal Code (1993/1304). According to the first section of the chapter, drug offenses 
include the possession, the manufacturing, growing, smuggling, selling and dealing of drugs.  Use of 
drugs as well as possession for own use constitutes a drug-user offense, punishable by a fine or 
maximum six months’ imprisonment (Penal Code 50:2a§). The maximum penalty for an ordinary drug 
offense is two years of imprisonment and for an aggravated drug offense ten years of imprisonment. In 
order to encourage non-prosecution of drug use and possession of small amounts of drugs, a new 
section (50:7) was introduced in 1994 and revised in 2001 (654/2001). Prosecution and punishment 
could be waived if the offense is to be considered insignificant or if the suspect has sought treatment 
(290/2002).  
290 In Norway, the legal status of use and possession of small amounts of drugs changed from 
misdemeanor to crime in 1984. Use and possession of such small amounts do not, however, fall under 
§ 162 of the General Civil Penal Code, but under the more lenient provisions of the Act on Medicinal 
Products of 4. December 1992, no 132, § 31, second paragraph, cf. § 24. The punishment is fines or 
imprisonment for up to 6 months.  It must be explained that the law divides between storage, which 
comes under § 162 of the Civil Penal Code, and possession which falls under § 31 of the Act on 
Medicinal Products, cf. § 24. The purely temporary possession required for a person to use certain 
illegal drugs is covered by the Act on Medicinal Products, § 31, second paragraph. However, if 
possession has been going on for some time it will be considered as storage and punished more 
severely according to § 162 of the Civil Penal Code. In cases where a person is apprehended with a 
considerable quantity of drugs, it is likely that such possession will be regarded as storing regardless of 
whether the drugs were intended for sale or just stored for personal consumption 
291 In Sweden, the Narcotic Drugs Punishments Act (1968/64) lists the behaviors and practices which 
constitute drug crimes: "to pass on narcotic drugs; manufacture narcotic drugs intended for abuse; 
acquire drugs for the purpose of passing them on; procure, process, package, transport, store or in any 
other way, handle narcotic drugs not intended for personal use; offer narcotic drugs for sale, keep or 
mediate payment for narcotic drugs, arrange contacts between vendors and purchasers or take any other 
such action if the conduct is conducive to the furtherance of trade in narcotics; possess, use or have any 
other involvement with narcotic drugs". Each of these actions can constitute a drug crime, which is 
punished according to three degrees of penalties for drug offenses: minor, ordinary and serious. 
Penalties for minor drug offenses consist of fines or up to six months' imprisonment, for ordinary drug 
offenses up to three years, and for serious offenses two to ten years imprisonment. The penalties for 
drug trafficking offenses, regulated in the Law on Penalties for Smuggling (2000/1225), are identical 
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possession for personal use of drugs are a criminal offence punishable by a prison 
sentence. In Cyprus possession of drugs, even for personal use, is viewed as a serious 
criminal offence attracting the same range of penalties as trafficking.292 
 
However, one trend that has swept around Europe since the late 1990s/early 2000s is 
the removal of custodial penalties for the use and possession of drugs for personal use 
(so-called "depenalization"). In the EU Member States, notwithstanding different 
positions and attitudes, according to the EMCDDA293 we can see a trend to conceive 
the illicit use of drugs as a relatively "minor" offence, to which it is not adequate to 
apply "sanctions involving deprivation of liberty." Some countries have changed their 
legislation to remove prison penalties (for example Slovenia294) while others have 
issued national directives to police or prosecutors to use sanctions other than prison 
(for example, France295 and Germany, the latter of which has written the possibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with the penalties provided in the Narcotic Drugs Punishments Act. See EMCDDA country profiles: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
292 In Cyprus, use of controlled drugs is criminalized under section 10 of Law 1977, which originally 
prohibited the use of prepared opium, cannabis or cannabis resin and in 1992 was extended to apply to 
all controlled drugs listed. The 1992 amendment (s.15) also changed the sentencing provisions of the 
Third Schedule of the 1977 Law. Use or possession of a class A or B drug is now punishable, similarly 
to trafficking, with a maximum of a life sentence.  The maximum sentence for use or possession of 
class C drugs, similarly to trafficking, is 8 years. See EMCDDA country profiles: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
293 EMCDDA, Thematic Papers - Illicit Drug Use in the EU: Legislative Approaches, 2005, p. 22. 
294  In Slovenia, the Misdemeanors Act from January 2005 removed prison penalties for all 
misdemeanors, one of which is possession of drugs for personal use. In this way, the maximum penalty 
was reduced from 30 days in prison, or five days for a small quantity, to a fine. See EMCDDA country 
profiles: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
295 In France, in June 1999, the Directive of the Ministry of Justice asked prosecutors to prioritize 
treatment approaches for small offenders both related to drug use or to other small crimes. Particularly 
concerning problematic drug users, the recommendation of the Directive is to apply to the largest 
extent possible therapeutic alternatives to prisons, while "the imprisonment of drug users not having 
committed other related offenses must be the last resort". In practice, mere users are mainly dealt with 
by therapeutic alternatives. However, the "therapeutic order" to avoid penal action is not the only one 
to be applied. In most cases, mere drug users receive a warning which may be accompanied by a 
request to contact a social or health service, without obliging the person to undergo treatment or 
counseling ("no further action" with orientation). The new law of 23 June 1999 provides a legal base to 
the alternatives to prosecutions (art.41-1 penal procedural code). A new instrument, the "penal 
agreement", increases the possibility of waiving prosecution in case of certain minor offenses, 
particularly related to mere drug use. The prosecutors have now a various range of measures by which, 
if accepted and duly accomplished, they can end prosecution. These measures include the voluntary 
payment of a fine or the execution of non-remunerated work useful to society. It appears that, 
concerning prosecution of drug use, the number of legal cases against drug users is diminishing. One 
survey shows that only 10% of all persons arrested by the police for drug use are actually prosecuted, 
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waiving prosecution in the case of possession of small amounts of any drug into its 
Narcotic Act).296  
 
With specific regard to cannabis, a de facto move away from criminalization is 
particularly evident. Here, the trend seems to be not only "depenalization", but rather 
"decriminalization" (i.e. removal of criminal sanctions). In fact, in addition to all 
those countries that have decriminalized possession of all drugs (including cannabis) 
for personal use (such as Italy, 297  Spain,298  Portugal, 299  the Czech Republic300 , 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and prison sentences just for drug use exist, but remain a minority. See EMCDDA country profiles: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
296 German law does not define narcotic drug consumption as such as a criminal offense. However, 
anyone who possesses narcotic drugs and does not have a written authorization for their acquisition, 
shall be considered to commit an offense pursuant to section 29 subs 1 of the Narcotics Act as shall be 
anyone who cultivates, produces, acquires, trades in narcotics or otherwise places them on the market 
without any official authorization. There is a scope of discretion in prosecuting personal use offenses 
that has been further extended since 1992. Since then, the public prosecutor may, on the strength of 
section 31a of the Narcotics Act, refrain from prosecution even without consent of the court if 1) he/she 
considers the offender's guilt to be minor, if 2) there is no public interest in the offense and 3) the 
narcotics were only intended for the offender's own use in small quantities. The decision by the Federal 
Constitutional Court of 9 March 1994 set new standards for the prosecution of personal use offenses. 
The Court affirmed that the penalty-enforced prohibition of cannabis is constitutional. It stated that, 
while the Narcotics Act did not infringe the principles of proportionality, of equality and personal 
freedom, the prosecution authorities of the Federal Laender should observe the "ban on excessive 
punishment" enshrined in the German Basic Law in case of minor offenses involving the personal use 
of cannabis; furthermore, it requested the Federal Laender to ensure a "basically uniform practice of 
application" and, as a rule, to refrain from prosecution if the conditions set out in section 31a of the 
Narcotics Act apply. With its decisions of 29 June 2004 (file no: Az: BVerfG, 2 BvL 8/02) and 30 June 
2005 (Az: BVerfG, 2 BvR 1772/02), the Federal Constitutional Court reaffirmed its earlier decisions 
on criminal liability. In general, the meaning of "small quantity" of drug is still very controversial in 
Germany: there are federal guidelines to be followed by prosecutors but judges are not bound by the 
principles set in those guidelines when deciding the cases. See EMCDDA country profiles: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
297 See infra, chapter V, section 3.1.1. 
298 In Spain, according to Law 17/1967, drug use and possession for personal use do not constitute a 
criminal offense. Nevertheless, in 1992 the Organic Law 1/1992 of 21 February on the Protection of 
Citizens' Security, currently in force, considered drug consumption in public – as well as illicit 
possession, even if not intended for trafficking - as a serious order offense punishable by administrative 
sanctions. Fines are the usual punishment ranging from €300 to €30 000. The law foresees that the 
execution of the fine can be suspended if the person freely attends an official drug treatment program, 
in accordance with the procedure regulated in the Royal Decree 1079/1993. See EMCDDA country 
profiles: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
299 See infra, chaoter V, section 3.2.1. 
300 In the Czech Republic, drug use is not regarded as a criminal offense but only as an administrative 
offense. If anyone is caught with a small quantity of drugs (less than about 10 doses) on him/her 
without intention to supply, the police/prosecutors will deliver the case to the specialized local Police 
units that are competent to impose a non–criminal sanction to the offender (a fine or warning) under 
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Estonia301, Latvia302 and, more recently, Croatia303), Luxembourg and Belgium have 
effectively recently removed criminal sanctions for the possession for personal use of 
cannabis. In Luxembourg, in May 2001, personal possession of cannabis was newly 
established as a separate offence with a lesser punishment, incurring only a fine for 
the first offence, without aggravating circumstances. At the same time, maximum 
penalties for personal possession of all drugs other than cannabis were reduced from 
three years in prison to six months. 304 A similar change took place in May 2003 in 
Belgium. The possession of a small amount of cannabis for personal use, without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Act on Violations. Prosecutorial guidelines define the limit quantities. Since 1998 (Act No. 
112/1998), possession of an amount "greater than small" is a criminal offense with the possibility of up 
to two years’ imprisonment. (This quantification of amount "greater than small" is obligatory for police 
and public prosecutors but not for courts and the judicial practice requires expert opinions in order to 
make a decision, and the opinions are drawn up for both the quantity and the quality of the substance). 
From January 2010, however, the new Penal Code applied a lower maximum punishment for cannabis 
(one year in prison) than for other drugs (unchanged at two years) for personal possession of a quantity 
"greater than small" See EMCDDA country profiles: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries and 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/online/annual-report/2011/policies-law/5 
301 In Estonia, possession of a small amount of illicit drugs for personal use (except use of drugs in 
correctional institutions and arrest houses) is decriminalized since the new Penal Code entered into 
force in September 2002. For such an offense, criminal punishment (fine, custodial arrest or 
imprisonment) no longer exists, and the only sanctions available are administrative fines. These fines, 
however, include the so-called "administrative house-arrest" (for a maximum of 30 days). See 
EMCDDA country profiles: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
302 In Latvia, drug use itself is not criminalized.  Since 1 April 1999, when the new Criminal Law 
entered into force, administrative sanctions are applied for use of narcotic and psychotropic substances 
without medical prescription, or unauthorized acquisition and storage of small amounts of narcotic and 
psychotropic substances, according to the Code on Administrative Offenses, paragraph Nr 46. Usually 
the police start an administrative case according to this paragraph.  Sanctions available, however, 
include not only a fine (max 75LVL, approximately €130) but also the so-called "administrative 
detention" (for a maximum of 15 days). The Cabinet of Ministers' "Regulations on Graduation of 
Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and Medicines Being in Illicit Trafficking, per Quantity", passed 
on 19 September 2000, determines precisely the amount of drugs which is considered large enough to 
open a criminal investigation.  If the amount found is less than this, it will be only an administrative 
offense. See EMCDDA country profiles: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
303 In Croatia, the Law on Combating Drugs Abuse prohibits unauthorized drug possession as an 
administrative offense, punishable by a fine from 140 to 14,000 euros. See EMCDDA country profiles: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
304 In Luxembourg, prior to Law of 27 April 2001, the illicit use of all nationally controlled substances 
was considered a criminal offense. The 2001 law decriminalized cannabis consumption (as well as 
transportation, possession and acquisition for personal use). This means that the use of cannabis 
continues to be regarded as an illicit activity but the punishment will no longer include criminal 
sanctions. In particular, a user of cannabis may be sentenced to pay a fine from 250 to 2,500 euros. 
Prison sentences from 8 days to 6 months remain applicable if cannabis use happens in front of minors, 
in schools or at the workplace. Also, penalties increase up to 2 years of imprisonment in case of adults 
using cannabis with minors and up to 5 years in case of medical doctors or pharmacists using cannabis 
in specific settings (e.g. prison, school, social services). Intermediary acts to the consumption of 
cannabis such as acquisition, transport and possession of personal use (small quantity) are 
decriminalized. For other drugs, possession, acquisition, and transport for personal use can lead to 
penalties of imprisonment between 8 days and 6 months and/or a fine. See EMCDDA country profiles: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
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aggravating circumstances, was previously punishable by up to five years in prison, 
but it now attracts the lowest prosecution priority, leading to a police fine. 305  The 
EMCDDA’s 2007 annual report put it this way: "A general trend in Europe has been 
to move away from criminal justice responses to the possession and use of small 
amounts of cannabis and towards approaches oriented towards prevention or 
treatment".306  
 
However, some developments in the most recent years, roughly from 2005 onward, 
seem to tip the balance back towards more restrictive measures against cannabis.307 
International and European calls for awareness on the presumed cannabis leniency 
and the danger that such a "soft line" on cannabis could provoke were probably some 
of the factors that led to this move. The UN control system has taken a position on 
cannabis in several instances: the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has 
repeatedly raised objections to the way some EU countries deal with cannabis 
offences, in particular where personal use is concerned. For example, the Netherlands 
has often been criticized by the INCB for its "coffee shop" policy,308 and also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 In Belgium, a Policy Note (programmatic policy document) was adopted by the federal government 
in January 2001. This note expressed the intention to modify the law in order to reduce the penalty for 
non-problematic use of cannabis. Since 2 June 2003, Belgian law punishes possession of up to 3 grams 
of cannabis or cannabis resin with a police fine of 75-125 euros. The same applies for possession of 
one cannabis plant in cultivation. Should the offender be found with cannabis again within one year, 
there will be a fine of 130-250 euros, and a third offense within a year of the second may result in 
imprisonment for 8 days - 1 month and a fine of 250-500 euros. Cannabis oil or cake cannot be 
interpreted as for personal use, no matter how small the amount. If there is an element of public 
nuisance, such as smoking in the presence of minors, near schools or army barracks, the penalty will be 
from 3 months to 1 year in prison and/or a fine of 5000 - 500 000 euros. If there is evidence of 
problematic use, the offender will be assigned a case manager by the prosecutor to receive appropriate 
therapeutic counseling. Belgian law punishes possession of drugs other than cannabis by imprisonment 
for between three months and five years, and/or a fine. The term of imprisonment may be increased to 
fifteen or even twenty years in the event of specified aggravating circumstances (drug offenses in 
relation to minors aged less than twelve, or committed in the course of a criminal organization such as 
manager of a criminal organization). Possession for personal use can give rise to a suspended sentence, 
either with a probation order or not. The practical application of the law, especially concerning drug 
use and possession, has been the object of revision by the Federal Ministry of Justice that issued two 
policy guidelines (in 1993 and 1998) in order to harmonize the practical enforcement of the law. See 
EMCDDA country profiles: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. 
306 EMCDDA, Annual Report - The State of the Drugs Problem in Europe, 2007, p. 12.  
307 D. BALLOTTA-H. BERGERON-B. HUGHES, Cannabis Control in Europe, in A Cannabis Reader: 
Global Issues and Local Experiences, Monograph series 8, vol. 1, ECMDDA, Lisbon, 2008, 113. 
308 The Netherlands, with its strategies of normalization of drug use and separation of the markets, 
represents a country with a relatively liberal drug policy. The expediency principle is applied in Dutch 
policy in the investigation and prosecution of Opium Act cases and is formalized in a prosecutor's 
guideline. The public prosecutor may decide not to institute prosecution proceedings if it is in the 
public interest. The possession of small quantities of drugs for personal use is accorded the lowest 
priority in the Opium Act guidelines. Anyone found in possession of less than 0.5 grams of hard drugs 
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Luxembourg, Portugal and the United Kingdom have been the object of scrutiny for 
their new laws on cannabis, allegedly because of their non-alignment with 
international drug control treaties.309 This message was again made clear in a chapter 
on "the new [high potency] cannabis" in the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) World Drugs Report of 2006, which stated that "It is essential (...) that 
consensus be regained, and that what is truly a global issue is again approached with 
consistency on a global level. After all, it is for precisely this that the multilateral drug 
control system was designed". 310  Without suggesting a direct link, some 
acknowledgement may also be detected in the 2004 EU Council Resolution on 
cannabis,311 and increased scrutiny of cannabis in some EU countries. Thus, some 
countries have abandoned their strategy of leniency towards cannabis users and have 
introduced a raft of new measures directed against them. In Denmark, where since the 
1970s people caught for possession of cannabis for personal use were just warned, a 
new directive of 2004 advises prosecutors that a fine should now be the norm and in 
2007 this was established in the law.312  In Italy, where drug use was decriminalized 
in 1975 and ever since cannabis use and supply were treated more leniently than other 
drugs, a 2006 law eliminated the distinction between "hard" and "soft" drugs, on the 
assumption that all drugs are dangerous.313 In France, in 2005, a new campaign was 
launched on the risks of cannabis for young people after the government turned down 
the possibility of substituting penal sanctions with administrative fines for cannabis 
consumption, adducing that such a modification could have been interpreted as 
recognition of the "weak dangerousness" of cannabis and could lead to an increase in 
consumption.314 The situation in the UK is also of interest: in 2004 cannabis was 
made a class C drug, attracting significantly lower penalties than other illicit drugs. 
However, in 2009, this decision was reversed and cannabis was re-included in class 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
will generally not be prosecuted, though the police will confiscate the drugs and consult a care agency. 
See EMCDDA country profiles: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries 
309 See INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD (INCB), Annual Reports 1999, p. 2001-2002. 
310 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (UNODC), 2006 World Drugs Report, p. 186. 
311 THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Council Resolution on Cannabis, Brussels, 7 July 2004, 
11267/04 CORDROGUE 59. 
312 In Denmark, the main law regulating narcotic drugs offenses is the Euphoriants Act of 1955, with 
subsequent amendments. Pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of the Act, it is a criminal offense to import, 
export, sell, purchase, supply, receive, manufacture, process or possess euphoriants. In such cases 
special permission is required. The substances defined as Euphoriants under the Act are contained in 5 
lists in an annex to an Executive Order issued pursuant to the Act. The Executive Order is regularly 
revised. See EMCDDA country profiles: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries 
313 See infra, section 3.1.1 of this chapter. 
314 See Plan Gouvernemental de Lutte Contre les Drogues Illicites, le Tabac et l’Alcool 2004–2008, 
available at www.drogues.gouv.fr. 
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B, which meant that users of cannabis would once again be subject to the same 
penalties as users of drugs such as amphetamines.315  
 
To conclude, there is sufficient evidence to confirm that the legal approach to 
personal use of drugs in general, and personal use of cannabis in particular, is far from 
homogeneous across the European countries. Nevertheless, depenalization (i.e. 
avoiding imprisonment) seems to be the trend for personal use of all drugs and 
decriminalization (i.e. avoiding criminal sanctions) seems to be the trend for personal 
use of cannabis, which can be applied more or less openly, through the law or through 
prosecution powers. However, there are some efforts to limit these trends in the most 
recent years. A rise in concern is visible at international and national level.316 The UN 
system openly condemns "lenient policies" and recent policy shifts in some Member 
States suggest a renewed attention towards cannabis. Overall, it is interesting to note 
that while drug policies which appeared in the 1990s/early 2000s suggested a non-
criminal approach to personal use of cannabis, more recent policies are moving back 
to using more restrictive measures.317  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 In the UK, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA) is the main law regulating drug control. In 
general, drug use or consumption is not in itself an offense under the MDA - it is the possession of the 
drug that constitutes an offense. However, article 9 of the MDA of 1971 does prohibit the smoking of 
opium, although prosecutions are rare, reflecting contemporary patterns of drug misuse. Article 5 of the 
MDA makes a distinction between possession of a controlled drug (art. 5.2) and possession of 
controlled drugs with intent to supply to another (art.5.3). Maximum penalties vary not only according 
to the class of substance but also whether the conviction is a "summary" one made at a Magistrates 
court or one made "on indictment" following trial at a Crown Court. Summary convictions for the 
unlawful possession of class A drugs such as heroin or cocaine involve penalties of up to 6 months 
imprisonment and/or a fine of up to £5 000 (€7,500); on indictment penalties may reach 7 years 
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. Class B drugs, e.g. cannabis or amphetamines, attract penalties 
at magistrates level of up to 3 months imprisonment and/or a fine of up to £2,500 (€3,800), on 
indictment up to 5 years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. Finally, possession of class C drugs, 
such as barbiturates, attracts softer penalties: up to 3 months imprisonment and/or a fine of up to 
£1,000 (€1,500) at magistrates level, or up to 2 years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine on 
indictment. There are a number of alternative sanctions in addition to those listed above for having 
possession of a controlled drug. These may include an Informal warning; a Formal warning, where the 
person is officially warned not to commit the offense again to avoid stronger consequences (no entry 
being made in the criminal record although a local record may be retained); and a Caution, where an 
entry is made in the Police National Computer. See EMCDDA country profiles: 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries. For the evaluation of the UK Advisory Council on the Misuse 
of Drugs on cannabis, which recommended the UK Government in 2005 to maintain cannabis as a 
class C drug, see infra, conlcusions. 
316 An alleged increase of THC content and increased demand for treatment with cannabis being the 
primary drug may have contributed to this concern, see L. KING, Understanding Cannabis Potency and 
Monitoring Cannabis Products in Europe, in A cannabis reader: global issues and local experiences, 
Monograph series 8, vol. 1, ECMDDA, Lisbon, 2008, 239-259. 
317 D. BALLOTTA-H. BERGERON-B. HUGHES, Cannabis Control in Europe, supra note 307. 
	   96	  
 
This, we would like to add, is happening despite statistical data on cannabis, as we 
have seen, suggest the following: a historically high but now generally stable trend in 
use, particularly concentrated among the young population (with stable trends there as 
well, or even slightly decreasing), a significantly minor percentage of cannabis users 
who consumes the substance intensively (1%) and an already conspicuous use of law 
enforcement energies in this area.  
 
3. Case study on drug decriminalization in Europe 
 
This section aims: 1) to describe the Italian and Portuguese decriminalization reforms 
in the field of drugs, 2) to provide an overview of the criminal justice and health 
impacts of these reforms and 3) to discuss the significance of these reforms to the 
existing state of knowledge on drug decriminalization and prison overcrowding. 
 
Italy and Portugal have been chosen as the focus of this study for two main reasons. 
First of all, because they reflect the tendency among some European countries to 
change drug policy direction in recent years. Italy has long been a country with a 
rather liberal national drug policy. Despite some "ups and downs" in the severity of 
the administrative sanctions against drug users, one of the characteristics of the Italian 
system since decriminalization is that cannabis users have always been treated 
relatively leniently in respect to others. Since 2006, however, Italy has abandoned this 
strategy of leniency towards cannabis users and has introduced a raft of new measures 
directed against them. Portugal, instead, introduced a radical new law in 2001 based 
firmly on the principle of harm reduction and decriminalization of possession of all 
drugs for personal use. Thus, Italy and Portugal evidence movement towards either 
more liberal or more repressive approaches to drug policy in Europe. Secondly, the 
cases of Italy and Portugal are particularly interesting to compare because both these 
countries have essentially enacted the same legal framework to deal with the issue of 
drug possession, i.e. "decriminalization". This study aims at highlighting how laws 
that are apparently similar, because both based on the decriminalization policy, can 
produce diametrically different results, depending on the importance given by those 
policies to some aspects such as prevention, treatment, social reintegration and harm 
reduction.  
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3.1. THE CASE OF ITALY - A FAIRLY UNSUCCESSFUL CASE 
3.1.1. The Italian decriminalization reforms 
 
Italy's position on the international drug policy scene is in some respects unique: Italy 
was the first country in the Western world, in contemporary times, to formally 
decriminalized personal use of all drugs.318  This happened in 1975, when law 
685/1975319 decriminalized the holding for personal use of a "limited amount" of "any 
illegal drug". The key provision on personal use was found in Article 80, where the 
possession of a limited amount of psychoactive substances was established as "not 
punishable". The peculiar term "not punishable" is worth noting: it was meant to 
stress that drug use was still not "allowed", least of all "legalized". Nevertheless, drug 
use and addiction as such were considered a health problem, deserving treatment 
and/or education rather than punishment. Other countries, differently from Italy, 
tended at that time to change the previous policy of strict repression by adopting the 
decriminalization of only the use of "soft" drugs, or by the reduction of the sanctions 
for personal use of any drug, or by tacitly allowing the police to turn a blind eye to the 
use of drug and the holding of small amount of it for personal use. Thus, the Italian 
reform was much more explicit in this regard. The Italian 1975 law, moreover, while 
maintaining a tough policy against drug trafficking, introduced a differentiation 
between "soft" drugs (i.e. cannabis - Schedule II drugs) and "hard" drugs (i.e. heroin, 
cocaine, amphetamines - Schedule I drugs), providing much milder sanctions for the 
trafficking in the former. Also, one point worth mentioning is that no defined quantity 
for "personal use" was set in the law, so it was up to the judge to determine whether 
possession was intended for personal use or not, depending on an all-of-the-
circumstances evaluation of the case. In sum, Italy adopted in 1975 a very liberal 
approach toward drug use in general and cannabis use in particular.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 L. M. SOLIVETTI, Drug Use Criminalization v. Decriminalization: an Analysis in the Light of the 
Italian Experience, 2001, available online at http://w3.uniroma1.it/DCNAPS/sol-
ivetti/swissho.pdf#search=%22italy%20decriminalization%20drugs%22 (accessed 19 September 
2013). The author provides a detailed analysis of the Italian decriminalization reforms and their impact 
from 1975 to 1998. 
319  Legge 22 dicembre 1975, n. 685, "Disciplina degli stupefacenti e sostanze psicotrope. Prevenzione, 
cura e riabilitazione dei relativi stati di tossicodipendenza" (GU n. 342 del 30-12-1975). 
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The 1975 law was effective until 1990. However, at the end of the 1980s the diffusion 
of drug use had reached high levels in Italy, by comparison with other European 
countries.320 The government of Bettino Craxi called for a prohibitionist shift, after 
the premier visited the United States (where the "Just Say No" slogan of Nancy 
Reagan was particularly popular). The shift also followed the UN Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, which 
established the possession of drugs for personal use as a criminal offence (although 
the issue of complying with this international treaty was hardly raised in the political 
debate). The Craxi government formulated a revision of the 1975 law, which was 
approved by the parliament in June 1990. Among its main innovations, there was the 
reintroduction of sanctions for the possession of drugs for personal use. The 1990 law 
(D.P.R. 309/90),321 in fact, introduced a long list of administrative sanctions for those 
holding drugs for personal use (e.g. warning, withdrawal of passport, or of driving 
license, or in the case of a foreigner, suspension of the touristic residence permit). 
Also, the addict who failed to undertake treatment at a public or private structure was 
subject to heavier, though non-custodial, sanctions applied by the judiciary (terms of 
probation, community service, prohibition to leave the commune of residence without 
authorization, seizure of the vehicle used to carry drugs, obligation to report to the 
police station at least twice a week). And the same sanctions were applied to the 
addict repeatedly caught in possession of drugs. Ultimately, there was the possibility 
for repeatedly recalcitrant addicts of a heavy fine or arrest up to 3 months. Another 
important innovation of the 1990 law was the definition of a "daily average dose" to 
establish possession for personal use. The daily average doses were identified by the 
Health Ministry a few months after the new law became effective: 100 mg for heroin, 
150 mg for cocaine, and 500 mg for cannabis. Finally, in an effort to avoid that users 
in possession of an amount of drug slightly above the threshold would be punished 
with the heavy sanctions provided for dealers322, a new provision, for crimes of 
"minor relevance" (lieve entità) was also introduced. According to that provision, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 L. M. SOLIVETTI, Drug Use Criminalization v. Decriminalization: an Analysis in the Light of the 
Italian Experience, supra note 318 at 34. 
321 Decreto del presidente della Repubblica 9 ottobre 1990, n. 309, also known as "Testo Unico delle 
norme in materia di disciplina degli stupefacenti e sostanze psicotrope, prevenzione, cura e 
riabilitazione dei relativi stati di tossicodipendenza". For a detailed analysis, in Italian, of the 1990 
legislation and its most crtitical profiles, see F. BRICOLA-G. INSOLERA, La Riforma della Legislazione 
Penale in Materia di Stupefacenti, Padova, 1991. 
322 Sanctions for dealers were imprisonment from 8 to 20 years for substances in Schedule I, from 1 to 
6 years for substances in Schedule II. 
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possession of amounts slightly above the threshold could be punished with penalties 
reduced by one third. But this had limited impact because the law also provided for 
the mandatory provisional arrest of people caught in possession of quantities above 
the threshold. In sum, the harsher administrative sanctions, with the possibility of 
custodial measures, for drug users (who went back to be considered as dangerous) and 
the introduction of the criterion of the "daily average dose" had a severe impact on the 
Italian criminal justice system, particularly in terms of the number of people 
imprisoned for drug law violations, while not affecting the upward trend in drug 
diffusion and in drug-related deaths.323 Thus, the effects of the 1990 Law seemed to 
largely anticipate and mimic the effects of the 2006 Law, which will be analyzed 
below.324 
 
In April 1993, following a period of considerable criticism against the innovations of 
the 1990 law and its effect,325 a national referendum requested by the Radical Party 
led to the abrogation of the prohibition of personal use of drugs and the abrogation of 
any provision of custodial measure or fine for the addict who failed to undertake 
treatment or who was repeatedly caught in possession of drug for personal use. This 
meant that only the other non-custodial administrative measure would be available. 
Also, the referendum abolished the criterion of a "daily average dose" to establish 
possession for personal use, leaving it to judges to consider if the amount of drug, 
together with other circumstantial evidence, would be proof of the aim of personal use 
or the aim of dealing.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 See L. M. SOLIVETTI, Drug Use Criminalization v. Decriminalization: an Analysis in the Light of 
the Italian Experience, supra note 318 at 41. See also G. ZUFFA 's article How to Determine Personal 
Use in Drug Legislation - The “Threshold Controversy” in the Light of the Italian Experience, in 
TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, August 2011, p. 4, where 
the author claims that: "The indiscriminate criminalization led to a sharp rise in imprisonment. On 
December 31, 1990, 7,299 citizens charged with drug crimes were in jail (including addicts charged 
with drug or drug related crimes) By the end of June 1991, this had risen to 9,623 and to 14,818 by the 
end of 1992". 
324 See infra, section 3.1.2. of this chapter. 
325 On the symbolic value of Article 72 D.P.R. 309/90 prohibition of personal use (abrogated by the 
D.P.R 171/93 following the referendum) see L. STORTONI, La Legge sulla Droga, Profili Storici e 
Valutazioni di Politica Criminale, in F. BRICOLA-G. INSOLERA, La Riforma della Legislazione Penale 
in Materia di Stupefacenti, Padova, 1991, 17. More in general, on the symbolic nature of the 1990 
legislation, see A. MANNA, Legislazione "Simbolica" e Diritto Penale: A Proposito della Recente 
Riforma Legislativa, in F. BRICOLA-G. INSOLERA, La Riforma della Legislazione Penale in Materia di 
Stupefacenti, Padova, 1991, 19-58. Also, for a critical analysis of the 1990 legislation, see L. PEPINO, 
Droga e Legge, Milano, 1991. 
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About 10 years later, however, the Berlusconi government once again launched a 
renewed "tough on drugs" campaign. The vice-premier Gianfranco Fini, who was the 
leader of this campaign, speaking at a UN meeting in Vienna in 2002, on the 
international day against drugs, announced a government bill to address more harshly 
the problem of drug use. The bill, in particular, would upgrade cannabis on the 
schedules (eliminating the previous distinction between "soft" and "hard" drugs). 
Also, the bill would fill the legislative breach following the abrogation of the "daily 
average dose" as a boundary line between personal use and dealing. In Fini’s opinion, 
in fact, the abrogation allowing judges to determine whether the drug found in 
possession of the defendant was for personal use or for dealing had given judges too 
many "discretionary powers": as a consequence, quantitative thresholds were to be 
restored in the form of "maximum quantity allowed", to be determined by the 
Ministry of Health.326 The so-called "Fini-Giovanardi bill" was approved by the 
parliament at the beginning of 2006. 327  
 
The "tough on drugs" approach of the 2006 reform is particularly relevant for our 
discussion. It can be summarized in the following terms, which represent the current 
state of the law in Italy in the field of drugs (D.P.R. 309/90, as amended by law 
49/2006):328 
 
- The criminal penalties set by Article 73 (production, dealing and possession of drugs 
above the "maximum quantity allowed") and Article 74 (criminal association for 
trafficking of drugs) of the D.P.R. 309/90 are now much more more severe. They 
range from 6 to 20 years of imprisonment for all substances. While the 1990 law 
(previous Article 73/74 D.P.R. 309/90) provided for different penalties for 
production, dealing, trafficking and possession above the threshold depending on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 The maximum amounts were set as 500 mg (active psychoactive principle) for cannabis; 250 mg for 
heroin; 750 mg for cocaine. 
327 Legge 21 febbraio 2006 n. 49. For an analysis, in Italian, of the 2006 reform see, among many 
others, V. MANNA, Il Commento, in Dir. pen. e proc., 2006, 829 ff; V. MANES, La Riforma della 
Disciplina Penale, in G. INSOLERA (ed.), La Riforma della Legislazione Penale in Materia di 
Stupefacenti, Padova, 2006, 115 ff; C. RUGA RIVA, La Nuova Legge Sulla Droga: Una Legge 
"Stupefacente" in Nome della Sicurezza Pubblica, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 2006, 234 ff. 
328 For the most relevant provisions on Italian drug legislation, as amended by the 2006 reform, see 
Testo Unico sulla Droga, Titolo VIII - Della Repressione delle Attività Illecite (artt. 72-103), available 
at 
http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/site/it/sezioni/servizi/legislazione/droga/Testo_unico_sulla_droga
.html 
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Schedules (from 1 to 6 years for cannabis in Schedule II; from 8 to 20 years for “hard 
drugs” in Schedule I), the 2006 law (current Article 73/74 D.P.R. 309/90) now sets 
the same penalties for all substances (6 to 20 years). Several criminal law scholars in 
Italy have argued that these penalties infringe on the constitutional principle of 
proportionality and should be reassessed.329 
 
- Cannabis has been upgraded to Schedule I. This means that there has been a 
substantial rise in criminal penalties for production, dealing, trafficking and 
possession of cannabis above the threshold (from the previous range of 1 to 6 years 
imprisonment to the current range of 6 to 20 years imprisonment: what used to be the 
maximum penalty for cannabis sale is now the minimum penalty). One point to be 
noted with regard to the threshold is that it has different wording from the "daily 
average dose" in the 1990 law. The "daily average dose" still made reference to the 
amount, which presumably would be consumed by the addict in 24 hours. In other 
words, there was a sort of subjective reference, which allowed some (though small) 
flexibility in the interpretation of the norms. This subjective reference is totally absent 
in the "maximum quantity allowed". As a result, the person found in possession of an 
amount of substance above the threshold will be a "virtual" dealer.330 
 
- Harsher administrative sanctions may now be imposed for possession for personal 
use of all drugs, including cannabis. The previous administrative sanctions for 
personal possession were provided by Article 75 of the 1990 law, as amended by the 
1993 referendum. They included warning, withdrawal of passport, or of driving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 See, among others, C. RUGA RIVA, Droga e Immigrazione: il Diritto Penale Ingiusto, i suoi Giudici 
e i suoi Studiosi, in Critica del diritto, 2006, 222. More in general, and for a list of Italian sources on 
the constitutional screening of criminal penalties, see S. CORBETTA, La cornice edittale della pena e il 
sindacato di legittimità costituzionale, in Riv. it. dir e proc. pen., 1997, 134 ff. 
330 L. PEPINO, Delinquenti virtuali. Le tabelle della Fini Giovanardi, in Fuoriluogo, 2006, p. 8, 
available at http://www.fuoriluogo.it/sito/home/archivio/arretrati/2006/aprile/delinquenti-virtuali 
(accessed 30 September 2013). See, however, C. RUGA RIVA, Droga: Il Superamento dei Limiti 
Tabellari Non Costituisce Prova della Finalità di Spaccio, in Corriere del Merito, 2007, 1173 ff. The 
author claims that possession of a greater amount of drug than the "maximum quantity allowed" should 
have, according to an intepretation of art. 73 paragraph 1-bis that is in line with the Italian Constitution, 
only limited procedural consequences. It should not establish a de iure nor a rebuttable presumption of 
"intent to sell". Rather, it should be a so-called indice probatorio of "intent to sell", which imposes a 
duty on the judge to give a specific motivation in case he/she decides that the drug is not "for sale" in 
the specific case at issue (and viceversa, if he/she decides that the drug is "for sale" despite being the 
amount of drug possessed inferior to the "maximum quantity allowed"). The author explains that this is 
the only interpretation of art. 73 paragraph 1-bis that does not conflict with the principle of 
"independent evaluation by the judge" (libero convincimento del giudice) and with the constitutional 
principles enshrined in art. 13 paragraph 2 of the Italian Constitution (e.g. presumption of innocence). 
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license, or in the case of a foreigner, suspension of the touristic residence permit. 
According to the new Article 75 and Article 75-bis, sanctions for possession for 
personal use (below the threshold) now include prohibition to leave the place of 
residence during some hours, a prohibition to drive cars and mandatory checking in at 
local police stations at least twice a week. Also, these measures may be enforced for 
longer periods. 331 More importantly, therapeutic programs are no longer alternative to 
administrative sanctions but are provided in addition to them. 
 
- As to the penalties for drug crimes of "minor relevance" (lieve entità), paragraph 5 
of Article 73 of the 2006 law still maintains the provisions of the 1990 law for less 
severe penalties in case the person is found in possession of quantities slightly above 
the "maximum quantity allowed", with penalties ranging from 1 to 6 years of 
imprisonment. Nevertheless, this is not a specific provision, but only a mitigating 
circumstance. For quantities above the threshold, the charge always refers to Article 
73 as a whole (and the mitigating circumstance would be taken into account by the 
judge only in the final verdict). Thus, people caught in possession of quantities above 
the threshold are more likely to be subjected to provisional arrest than they would be 
if paragraph 5 of Article 73 were a specific provision. Furthermore the mitigating 
circumstance may not be applied in the presence of aggravating circumstances, such 
as recidivism. For example, a person found in possession even of limited amounts 
above the threshold may be sentenced to the full sanction of six years in prison. 
 
- With the aim of mitigating the impact of harsher penalties, drug addicts sentenced to 
less than 6 years imprisonment (or with 6 years remaining in prison) may now be sent 
to alternative therapeutic programmes (the limit was 4 years in the previous 
legislation).332 Also, according to paragraph 5-bis Article 73, drug addicts sentenced 
for drug crimes of "minor relevance" may now be sent to community service (lavoro 
di pubblica utilità), rather than prison.333 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 For the full Italian text of Article 75 and Article 75-bis Testo Unico, supra note 328. 
332 According to Article 656 c.p.p.: "Se la pena detentiva, anche se costituente residuo di maggiore 
pena, non è superiore a tre anni o sei anni nei casi di cui agliarticoli 90 e 94 del testo unico approvato 
con decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 9 ottobre 1990, n. 309, e successive modificazioni, il 
pubblico ministero, salvo quanto previsto dai commi 7 e 9, ne sospende l'esecuzione". 
333 In 2013, with L. 9 August 2013, n. 94, a new paragraph was also added to art. 73 in an effort to 
further limit the incarceration of drug addicts. However, amendments that were made to the original 
version of this provision during the conversion into law of the law decree 78/2013 largely reduced its 
application. According to the newly introduced paragraph 5-ter, community service, which was already 
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One final point should be stressed. The constitutionality of both the tightening of 
sanctions for "soft drugs" (in relation to the proportionality principle and the principio 
di offensività, being now "soft drugs" and "hard drugs" treaded in the same way as to 
criminali penalties) and the parliamentary procedure through which this tightening of 
sanctions occurred (i.e. the adoption of alleged "unnecessary and unrelated" measures 
in the context of a decree law334 that was originally adopted to face public security's 
threat during the Turin Olympics) have been the subject of harsh debate in Italy, and 
they are currently under the scrutiny of the Italian Corte Costituzionale.335  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
listed by art 73 paragraph 5-bis as an alternative sanction to incarceration for drug addicts that 
committed art. 73 drug crimes (i.e. production, dealing and possession of drugs above the "maximum 
quantity allowed") when of "minor level" (lieve entità), has now been extended as an available 
alternative to incarceratin for any drug-related crimes committed by drug addicts (with some 
exceptions as to major crimes), when the sentence is less than one year inprisonment and when the 
drug-related crime has been committed only once. Scholars have criticized these limited conditions of 
applicability: see, for a brief comment, A. DELLA BELLA, Convertito in Legge il Decreto Carceri 
78/2003: Un Primo Timido Passo per Sconfiggere il Sovraffollamento, 2013, available at 
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it (accessed 30 October 2013. 
334 Decreto legge 30 dicembre 2005, n. 272. 
335 The Italian Corte di Cassazione has raised the issue of the unconstitutionality of the Fini-
Giovanardi legislation in relation to the points that have been mentioned (Cass., Sez. III pen., ord. 9 
maggio 2013). The issue originated from the case of a defendant, Maniscalco Vincenzo, who was 
convicted by the Trento Court of Appeal for drug trafficking under art. 73 D.P.R. 309/90. The 
defendant was sentenced to 4 years in prison and a 20,000-euro fine for possession of 3,860 kg hashish. 
The decision by the Italian Corte di Cassazione, which on 9 May 2013 suspended its judgment waiting 
for the decision of the Corte Costituzionale, is available at  www.penalecontemporaneo.it (accessed 30 
September 2013): "La terza sezione della Cassazione ha sollevato questione di legittimità 
costituzionale: 1) dell'art. 4-bis d.l. 272/2005, introdotto in sede di conversione dalla legge n. 49/2006, 
nella parte in cui ha modificato l'art. 73 t.u. stup. (d.P.R.. 309/1990), segnatamente nella parte in cui, 
sostituendo i commi 1 e 4 di tale norma, ha parificato ai fini sanzionatori le sostanze stupefacenti 
previste dalle tabelle II e IV previste dal previgente art. 14 a quelle di cui alle tabelle I e III, elevando 
conseguentemente le relative sanzioni dalla pena della reclusione da due a sei anni e della multa da 
euro 5.164 a euro 77.468 alla pena della reclusione da sei a venti anni e della multa da euro 26.000 a 
euro 260.000; e 2) dell'art. 4-vicies-ter comma 2, lett. a) e comma 3 lett. a) n. 6 del medesimo decreto 
legge, nella parte in cui sostituisce gli artt. 13 e 14 del d.P.R. 309/1990, unificando le tabelle che 
identificano le sostanze stupefacenti, e in particolare includendo la cannabis e i suoi derivati nella 
prima di tali tabelle. La Cassazione assume, in proposito, la rilevanze e la non manifesta infondatezza 
della questione, sotto il profilo della contrarietà delle norme impugnate all'art. 77 co. 2 Cost.". For an 
analysis, in Italian, of the arguments that support the unconstitutionality of the 2006 reform (also with 
regard to the uniform penalties tha have been set for "hard drugs" and "soft drugs"), see: L. SARACENI, 
Perchè la Legge Fini-Giovanardi è Incostituzionale, in 4 Libro Bianco sulla Legge Fini-Giovanardi, 
2013, p. 23 available at http://www.fuoriluogo.it/blog/2013/06/25/on-line-il-4-libro-bianco-sulla-fini-
giovanardi/ (accessed 30 September 2013). For an analysis of similar issues raised by the Court of 
Appeal of Rome in a previous case (Corte d'appello di Roma, Sez. III, ord. 28 gennaio 2013), see: L. 
ROMANO, Art. 73 del d.P.R. n. 309 del 1990: la Parola alla Corte Costituzionale, in Dir. pen. cont., 28 
maggio 2013 (accessed 20 November 2013). The issues raised by both the Corte di Cassazione and, 
previously, the Court of Appeal of Rome, are currently pending in front of the Italian Constitutional 
Court. If the Court decides to deal with the merit of the concerns that have been raised in relation to the 
severity of criminal sanctions for "soft drugs", the decision may have important consequences. See 
infra conclusions of this thesis. 
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3.1.2 Evaluating the Effects of the 2006 Reform (2006-2013) 
 
In 2009, a study was carried out by Forum Droghe, an Italian NGO, and by the 
Fondazione Michelucci to evaluate the 2006 law and its impact on imprisonment and 
the use of therapeutic programs.336 The study, while focusing on an in-depth analysis 
of the four main prisons in the region of Tuscany, also offered an overview of the 
national situation from 2006 to 2008.  In 2011, Grazia Zuffa updated to 2010 the 
results of this study.337 Below, we provide a list of the main effects of the 2006 
reform, as they have been identified in the above-mentioned studies, which we 
updated, when possible, to 2012. In order to update the results of these studies to 
2012, we adopted the information provided in the 2013 article by Grazia Zuffa, "Sette 
anni di Applicazione della Legge Antidroga (2006-2012): Uno Sguardo d'Insieme 
sugli Effetti Penali e Sanzionatori":338  
 
1) Increase in anti-drug police operations. In 2006, 20,775 anti-drug police 
operations were reported; this rose to 22,064, in 2010 and 22,748 in 2012, with a top 
figure of 23,262 in 2009 (the highest in the last ten years).  
 
2) Despite drug seizures being generally stable, increase in cannabis seizures 
(with a peak in 2012). The amount of drug seizures in the period 2006-2010 
appeared to be generally stable, around 32,000 kilos per year, apart from a boom of 
42,740 kilos in 2008. In 2011, overall seizures increased to 39,000 kilos, and in 2012 
there was a boom of 50,156 kilos overall seizures. It is worth noting, though, that 
cannabis seizures make up by far the majority of overall seizures and have increased 
in numbers and proportion. In 2006, cannabis seizures equaled 24,672 kilos (74% of 
overall drug seizures); in 2009, 28,400 kilos (83,2%); in 2010, 25,487 kilos (82,2%). 
In 2012, there were more than 40,000 kilos of cannabis seizures out of the overall 
number of seizures (50,156 kilos, +308.85% with respect to 2011): the quantity of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 The study is available, in Italian, at http://www.michelucci.it/node/155 (accessed on 30 October 
2013). 
337 G. ZUFFA, How to Determine Personal Use in Drug Legislation - The “Threshold Controversy” in 
the Light of the Italian Experience, supra note 323. 
338 G. ZUFFA, Sette anni di Applicazione della Legge Antidroga (2006-2012): Uno Sguardo d'Insieme 
sugli Effetti Penali e Sanzionatori, in 4 Libro Bianco sulla Legge Fini-Giovanardi, 2013, available at 
http://www.fuoriluogo.it/blog/2013/06/25/on-line-il-4-libro-bianco-sulla-fini-giovanardi/ (accessed 30 
September 2013). 
	   105	  
marijuana seizures almost doubled (+96.73% with respect to 2011) and there was a 
significant increase in the number of cannabis plants.339 Thus, cannabis seizures 
have more than doubled since 2006. 
 
3) Increase in drug law offences, particularly for cannabis. As to the offences 
reported by the police for violation of Article 73 (production, dealing, possession 
above the threshold) and Article 74 (criminal association for trafficking) of the drug 
legislation, they rose from 33,056 in 2006 to 35,427 in 2008, to 36,458 in 2009 and 
39,053 in 2010. With regard to the different substances, most police activity for 
violation of Article 73/74 is against cannabis offenders and has steadily increased 
(12,805 cannabis offences in 2008, 13,344 in 2009, 16,030 in 2010). Also, as to the 
offences against Article 75 (possession of drugs for personal use) of the drug 
legislation, 78,56% of the 2012 reports by the police to the public office in charge 
of applying the administrative sanctions (Prefettura) for violation of Article 75 
concerned cannabis.340  
 
4) Increase in the yearly imprisonment rate for violation of Article 73 
(production, dealing and possession of drugs above the threshold) In the period 
2006-2012 there has been an increase in the proportion of people who are imprisoned 
each year, i.e. entered prison, for violation of Article 73. In yearend 2006, 25,399 
people were imprisoned out of an overall of 90,774, i.e. 28,03%. This rose to 29,84% 
in 2007, 31,10% in 2008, 32,21% in 2009, 30,88% in 2010, 31,76% in 2011 and 
reached the peak of 32,47% in 2012. Thus, one detainee out of three is imprisoned 
each year for violation of Article 73.341 
 
5) Increase in the number of detainees who were in prison each year for violation 
of Article 73 (production, dealing and possession of drugs above the threshold) 
out of the total number of detainees. On December 31 2006, 14,640 people were in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 In 2012, with respect to the previous year, increases of seizures of heroin (+17.27%), hashish 
(+7.70%), marijuana (+96.73%), amphetamines in doses (+26.52%), LSD (+13.99%) and of the 
number of cannabis plants were recorded, totaling a remarkable increase of 308.85%. See ITALIAN 
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, DIREZIONE CENTRALE PER I SERVIZI ANTIDROGA, 2012 Annual Report, 
available, in English, at http://www.poliziadistato.it/articolo/view/29541/ 
340 This increased from 73% in 2009 and 74% in 2010 to the most recent percentage of 78,56% in 
2012. See G. ZUFFA, Sette anni di Applicazione della Legge Antidroga, supra note 338. 
341 Ibidem. 
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jail for violation of Article 73 (37.53%). This rose to 37,42% in 2007, 39,10% in 
2008, 40,21% in 2009, 40,16% in 2010, then decreased to 39,70% in 2011 and 
38,26% in 2012 (i.e. 25,269 people). Overall, and to have a better understanding of 
the impact of the 2006 reform on the problem of prison overcrowding, with 
particular regard to the incarceration of users342/small dealers, we should note 
that detainees for violation of Article 73 have almost doubled from 2006 to 2012: 
they went from 14,640 by yearend 2006 to 25,269 by yearend 2012. By contrast, 
people in prison by yearend 2012 for violation of Article 74 (criminal association for 
trafficking in drugs) were much less, 761.  
 
6) Increase in the yearly imprisonment rate of drug addicts. In 2006, 24,637 
addicts were imprisoned, i.e. entered prison (27,16% of the overall figure). The 
number rose to 29,52 (33%) in 2008, the highest figure since 2001, and then 
decreased in the following years and stabilized to 18,225 (28,92%) in 2012. Thus, 
around one out of three detainees who enter prison each year is a drug addict.343  
 
7) Increase in the proportion of drug addicts in prison. In relation to the number of 
drug addicts in prison, in 2006 all prisoners benefited from a pardon law so 
interpretation of statistics may result complicated. A large number of drug offenders 
were released from jail, which may explain the sharp decrease in the number of 
addicts in prison: they went from 16,145 (26,4%) before the pardon law to half that 
figure after the pardon law, i.e. 8,363 (21,44%). However, this decrease last very 
short: already in 2007 the number of addicts in prison had risen back to 13,424 
(27.57%) and this number stabilized to 23,84% in 2012. Thus, around one out of 
four detainees who are in prison is an addict.344 
  
8) Steady increase in the application of administrative sanctions for personal use 
and dramatic drop in the use of therapeutic programs (programmi terapeutici) by 
sanctioned users. In 2006, before the reform, 7,229 administrative sanctions were 
applied. They increased to 16,205 in 2012.345 While the number of sanctions more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 who are found in possession of more drugs than the "maximum quantity allowed". 
343 G. ZUFFA, Sette anni di Applicazione della Legge Antidroga, supra note 338. 
344 Ibidem. 
345  ITALIAN MINISTRY FOR HOME AFFAIRS, Analisi dei Mutamenti del Consumo tra le Persone 
Segnalate ai Prefetti per uso Personale di Sostanze Stupefacenti dal 1991 al 2006 (updated to 2012). 
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than doubled from 2006 to 2012, in the same period there was a dramatic drop in 
use of therapeutic programs by sanctioned users, from 6,713 therapeutic programs 
in 2006 to 340 in 2012. As it was previously noted, therapeutic programs after the 
reform are no longer alternative to administrative sanctions but are provided in 
addition to them. The choice to participate in the programs does not, as it used to, 
suspend the application of the administrative sanctions. Thus, users who are invited to 
participate in the programs according to Article 75 may have no real incentive to 
attend them, because they appear to them simply as an additional burden, almost a 
punitive measure against them.346 
 
9) Decrease in the use of therapeutic programs (affidamento in prova) as 
alternatives to imprisonment. In the years 2006-2012 there was an overall decrease 
in the use of therapeutic programs as alternative sanctions to imprisonment. This 
happened despite the milder provisions in the 2006 law in favor of alternatives to 
incarceration (i.e. the possibility to use alternative therapeutic programs for drug 
addicts sentenced to less than 6 years imprisonment, instead than sentenced to less 
than 4 years imprisonment).347 As Grazia Zuffa notes, it is difficult to analyze the 
trend, because in 2006 all prisoners benefited from a pardon law of three years: a 
large number of drug offenders were released from jail, which may explain the sharp 
decrease of participants in alternative programs to prison. On 1 January 2006, 3,852 
drug offenders (diagnosed as addicts) were in a therapeutic program. This dropped to 
708 after the pardon law. Thereafter the figure started slowly to increase, but did not 
reach the rate that preceded the pardon law: on 1 January 2012, the figure had only 
risen to 2,777. More importantly, there has been a significant decrease in the number 
of addicts directly sentenced to therapeutic programs (without spending any time in 
jail). In 2006, out of the 3,852 drug offenders that entered therapeutic programs 2,901 
were directly sentenced to therapeutic programs, without having spent any time in 
jail. To the contrary, in 2012 out of the 2,777 drug offenders that entered 
therapeutic programs, the great majority, 1,811 people, was released and sent to 
alternative treatments after having previously spent some time in jail. This is a 
major change in trends, as addicts directly sentenced to alternative programs have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 G. ZUFFA, Sette anni di Applicazione della Legge Antidroga, supra note 338. 
347 Article 656 c.p.p., see G. ZUFFA, Sette anni di Applicazione della Legge Antidroga, supra note 338. 
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consistently outnumbered people released from prison since the 1990s. 348 And it 
further exacerbates the problem of prison overcrowding.  
 
In short, these figures show the striking impact of the 2006 drug legislation on: (a) the 
law enforcement system - in terms of increased anti-drug police operations and drug 
seizures; and (b) the criminal justice and prison systems - in terms of increased rates 
of imprisonment for drug crimes, particularly for small dealers/users, and 
imprisonment of addicts.  
 
Notably, there is a strong argument that minor drug crimes may be the target of law 
enforcement. One important point that was made by Grazia Zuffa, in fact, is that 
there is a lack of official data on the number of crimes of "minor relevance" in 
relation to the overall number of drug-related offences. Data on this would allow 
an assessment of whether law enforcement is focused on major or minor drug crimes. 
Also, a large prevalence of these crimes may indicate a disproportionate punishment 
of drug possession for personal use, due to the inflexibility of the threshold (the so-
called criminalization of users as dealers)349. Grazia Zuffa points to the in-depth 
qualitative research in Tuscany as a valuable effort to fill the void. Notably, what 
emerges from that study is that, in the Florence prison of Sollicciano, the rate of 
prisoners (sentenced or charged) for drug crimes of "minor relevance" made up 
40% of the overall drug crimes, suggesting that law enforcement is mainly 
focused on punishment of users/small dealers.350 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 For a detailed analysis, in Italian, of the decrease in use of alternative measures to imprisonment for 
addicts, see A. SCANDURRA, Le Misure Alternative e la Legge sulle Droghe, in 4 Libro Bianco sulla 
Legge FIni-GIovanardi, 2013, available at http://www.fuoriluogo.it/blog/2013/06/25/on-line-il-4-libro-
bianco-sulla-fini-giovanardi/ (accessed 15 October 2013). 
349 The main reason for possessing amounts of drugs above the threshold is that many users may prefer 
to buy larger quantities of drugs, simply to avoid too frequent contact with the illegal market. 
350 G. ZUFFA, How to Determine Personal Use in Drug Legislation - The “Threshold Controversy” in 
the Light of the Italian Experience, supra note 323 at 8. As Grazia Zuffa notes, the researchers of the 
study in the region of Tuscany stress that this rate is probably underestimated, as the mitigating 
circumstance of "minor relevance" can only be acknowledged for sentenced prisoners, while for 
prisoners in provisional arrest the records only mention the charges for Article 73. Moreover, the study 
found that the rates of imprisonment for drug crimes were higher in Tuscany than the average figures 
in Italy: for example, in the Florence prison (Sollicciano), in 2008, of a total figure of 777 people 
entering prison, the rate of people imprisoned for drug crimes was 43%, while the rate of addicts 
(imprisoned for drug or drug related crimes) was as high as 61.4%. Similar rates could probably be 
found in many other big cities, such as Turin, Milan, Bologna. 
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Also, these figures show the unintended consequences of a punishment-oriented 
approach for the health of those people who make use of drugs. In fact, (c) the rise in 
sanctions for personal use of drugs and (d) the dramatic drop in therapeutic programs 
for sanctioned users are evidence that less people (who might have needed them) 
benefited from treatment programs.  
 
A lesson may be learnt from the decrease in the number of addicts directly sentenced 
to therapeutic programs in alternative to prison (without spending any time in jail): 
the milder provisions in the 2006 law in favor of alternatives to incarceration (i.e. the 
possibility to use alternative therapeutic programs for drug addicts sentenced to less 
than 6 years imprisonment, instead than sentenced to less than 4 years imprisonment) 
have been totally ineffective. This probably happened because they were not 
consistent with the overall "tough on drugs" approach of the reform, so they were not 
able to counteract the rise in imprisonment due to the higher penalties and the harsher 
law enforcement.351 
 
With specific regard to cannabis, the upgrading of cannabis on the schedules and the 
related emphasis on the "cannabis threat" seem to have led to an indiscriminate 
enforcement and punishment of cannabis-related offences, evidenced by the 
overwhelming rise in police operations and seizures of this substance and in the 
notable increase in cannabis offences (both criminal and administrative).352 To this, 
we would like to add an important consideration. As is was shown in this chapter, 
Italy is among the highest prevalence countries for lifetime use, last year use and last 
month use of cannabis.353 The harsher measures of the 2006 drug legislation did 
not lead to a decrease in drug use, cannabis in particular. To the contrary, as it is 
evidences by the tables below, the upward trends in prevalence use among the 
population were confirmed for all indicators of cannabis use after the enactment of the 
new law. Thus, if the effectiveness of this "tough on drug" policy - primarily directed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 G. ZUFFA, How to Determine Personal Use in Drug Legislation - The “Threshold Controversy” in 
the Light of the Italian Experience, supra note 323 at 8. 
352 Ibidem. 
353 Supra section 1.1. 
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against cannabis users - was to be measured by prevalence of cannabis use amongst 
the population, it could fairly be said that the policy was not a success.354 
 
Table 1 Lifetime prevalence of cannabis use among all adults (aged 15 to 64 years 
old) in nationwide surveys among the general population - Italy 
 
Lifetime prevalence  2001 15-44 21.9%  
Lifetime prevalence  2003 15-54 22.4%  
Lifetime prevalence  2005 15-64 29.3%  
Lifetime prevalence  2008 15-64 32.0%  
 
Table GPS-3. Last year prevalence of cannabis use among all adults (aged 15 to 64 
years old) in nationwide surveys among the general population - Italy 
 
Last 12 months prevalence 2001 15-44 6.2%   
Last 12 months prevalence 2003 15-54 7.1%  
Last 12 months prevalence 2005 15-64 11.2%  
Last 12 months prevalence 2008 15–64 14.3%  
  
Table GPS-5. Last month prevalence of cannabis use among all adults (aged 15 to 64 
years old) in nationwide surveys among the general population - Italy 
 
Last month prevalence 2001 15-44 4.4%  
Last month prevalence 2003 15-54 4.6%  
Last month prevalence 2005 15-64 5.8%  
Last month prevalence 2008 15-64 7.2%  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354  Data are taken from the Annual Statistical Bulletins of the ECMDDA, available at 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats/archive. Significant differences in the methodology of the most 
recent surveys conducted in Italy make them not comparable with previous surveys, and this is why we 
decided not include those data in our analysis. In the words of the ECMDDA, "the most recent general 
population survey reported by Italy (i.e. 2012 data) display a wide variation in results compared with 
the previous surveys, which may reflect methodological differences. The data is proided for 
information, but given the lack of comparability between surveys, they should be treated with caution". 
See, for example, note 4 at http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats13#display:/stats13/gpstab1b. 
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One final point should be emphasized: several NGOs355 note that the more punitive 
measures that were introduced in 2006 are at odds with the more recent European 
strategy towards drugs. This strategy, in fact, currently focuses on the four pillars of 
"prevention", "treatment", "social reintegration" and "harm reduction" rather than on 
criminal punishment.356 Italy has only in the very last years adopted two new national 
drug policy documents. The national plan of action 2010–2013,357 in particular, 
developed after the 5th National Conference on Drugs, now covers two main areas 
(demand and supply reduction) and five specific pillars: prevention; treatment and 
prevention of the related pathologies; rehabilitation and reintegration; evaluation and 
monitoring; and legislation (counter narcotics/crime). Ironically, this plan was 
introduced by Carlo Giovanardi, who was one of the two main supporters of the 2006 
drug reform together with Gianfranco Fini. It will be interesting to see the impact of 
this national plan at the end of the trimester 2010-2013. However, it can safely be 
predicted that if more profound legisaltive measures on drug regulation are not 
adopted (such as the reintroduction of a distinction between cannabis and other more 
harmful drugs) the impact of the Fini-Giovanardi reform on prison overcrowding in 
Italy is not likely to be reduced in any appreciable way. 
 
3.2. THE CASE OF PORTUGAL - A FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL CASE 
3.2.1. The Portuguese decriminalization reform 
 
Portugal, differently from Italy, provides an example of a country that has, in terms of 
illegal drug policy, relatively recently made a bold move from a rather central 
position along the liberal-repressive continuum to a much more liberal one.358 In July 
2001, a radically new law (Law 30/ 2000) went into effect that removed criminal 
sanctions from the personal use and possession of all illegal drugs. The law was part 
of a structured national plan to reduce health problems associated with drug use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355  See e.g. 4 Libro Bianco sulla Legge Fini-Giovanardi, 2013, available at 
http://www.fuoriluogo.it/blog/2013/06/25/on-line-il-4-libro-bianco-sulla-fini-giovanardi/ (accessed 30 
September 2013), p. 18. 
356 EMCDDA, Annual Report - The State of the Drugs Problem in Europe, supra note 268, p. 28-37. 
357  Piano di Azione Nazionale Antidroga 2010–2013, available at 
http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/documenti/droga/0093
_2011_02_28_Piano_nazionale_antidroga_2010-2013.html_8783074.html. 
358 C. CHATWIN, Drug Policy Harmonization and the European Union, Basingstoke, 2011, p. 130.   
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(heroin in particular), and it was enacted in the framework of an increasing emphasis 
on treatment and harm reduction principles.  
 
The 2001 reform can be summarized in the following terms, which represent the 
current state of the law in Portugal in the field of drugs: 
 
- Drug use and possession for personal use are now merely administrative offences. 
According to Article 2(1) of Law 30/2000): "The consumption, acquisition and 
possession for one’s own consumption of plants, substances or preparations" of illicit 
drugs "constitute an administrative offence". Previously, these forms of conduct were 
criminal offences punishable with up to 1 year’s imprisonment (Decree Law 
15/93).359 The 2001 reforms applies to use and possession for personal use of all illicit 
drugs, but it is restricted, according to Article 2(2), to the threshold of "the quantity 
required for an average individual consumption during a period of 10 days".360 
 
- Central to the 2001 reform is the role of the Commissions for the Dissuasion of 
Drug Addiction (CDTs), which are in charge of sanctioning drug users. The CDTs are 
regional panels made up of three people, including a lawyer, a social workers and a 
medical professional. If individuals are found in possession of modest amounts of 
drugs for personal use, the drug will be confiscated and the case referred by the police 
to the CDTs, who then discuss with the individuals the motivations for and 
circumstances surrounding their offence and are able to provide a range of sanctions, 
including community service, fines, suspensions on professional licenses and bans on 
attending designated places. However, their primary aim is to dissuade drug use and 
to encourage dependent drug users into treatment. Towards this end, they determine 
whether individuals are dependent or not. For dependent users, they can recommend 
that a person enters a treatment or education program instead of receiving a sanction. 
For non-dependent users, they can order a provisional suspension of proceedings, 
attendance at a police station, psychological or educational service, or impose a fine. 
The panel members of the CDTs are supported by staff employed by the Instituto da 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 In practice, it was rare that people were imprisoned for drug use/possession alone, but criminal 
convictions were the norm. 
360 This amounts, in practice, to 0.1 g heroin, 0.1 g ecstasy, 0.1 g amphetamines, 0.2 g cocaine or 2.5 g 
cannabis. 
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Droga e da Toxicodependencia (IDT - Institute for Drugs and Drug Addiction), which 
is the central government agency on drugs. 
 
- Individuals found with more than the quantity allowed for personal use will be 
charged and referred to the courts, where they may face charges for trafficking or 
trafficking/consumption (where the offender is found in possession of more than the 
consumer amount, but deemed to have obtained the plants, substances or preparations 
for personal use only). 
 
- Despite the drastic changes to the treatment of drug users in Portugal, hefty 
sanctions are still in place against drug dealers and traffickers. 
 
3.2.2. Evaluating the Effects of the 2001 Reform (2001-2009) 
 
The Portuguese reform has been in force for more than 12 years and there have since 
been several studies to evaluate its effect. We will hereby analyze the most influential 
ones. 
 
The report published by Greenwald for the think-tank Cato Institute in 2009 is one of 
the most quoted studies on the impact of drug decriminalization in Portugal.361 
Despite the criticism that this report has received from some conservative 
commentators in Portugal, allegedly due to its overstatements and lack of conclusive 
evidence,362 several commentators have used it as the primary base for claiming the 
success of the Portuguese reform in tackling the problem of drug use. Thus, its 
findings are certainly worth reporting. In its analysis, Greenwald claims that the 
change in law, initially surrounded by doubt and uncertainty, has eventually been "a 
resounding success judged by virtually every metric".363 According to Greenwald, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 G. GREENWALD, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Successful 
Drug Policies. Washington DC, 2009.  
362 Cohelo Pinto is certainly the most popular opposer to the Portuguese decriminalization reform: for 
an overview of his position see C. M. PINTO, Decriminalization of drugs in Portugal - the real facts! 
Stockholm, 2 February 2010, available at: http://www.wfad.se/latest- news/1-articles/123-
decriminalization-of-drugs-in- portugal-the-real-facts (accessed 24 September 2013) and C. M. PINTO, 
Britain should not make the same mistakes as Portugal, Stockholm, 2 October 2010, available at: 
http://www.wfad.se/ latest-news/1-articles/365-britain-should-not-make-the- same-mistakes-as-
portugal (accessed 24 September 2013). 
363 G. GREENWALD, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal, supra note 361 at 1. 
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none of the "nightmare scenarios" touted by pre-enactment decriminalization 
opponents have occurred. First of all, the statistical data indicate that 
decriminalization has had no adverse effect on drug usage rates in Portugal, which, in 
numerous categories, are now among the lowest in the EU, particularly when 
compared with states with stringent criminalization regimes. Moreover, although 
post-decriminalization usage rates have remained roughly the same or have even 
decreased slightly, drug-related pathologies - such as sexually transmitted diseases 
and deaths due to drug usage - have decreased dramatically. Drug policy experts 
attributed those positive trends to the enhanced ability of the Portuguese government 
to offer treatment programs to its citizens - enhancements made possible, for 
numerous reasons, by decriminalization. Finally, fears of drug tourism have turned 
out to be unfounded. Before the enactment of the decriminalization law, Greenwald 
notes that opponents insisted that the proposed change in law would make Portugal a 
center of drug tourism.364 To the contrary, data show that roughly 95% of those cited 
for drug offenses every year since decriminalization has been Portuguese.365 Close to 
zero have been citizens of other EU states.366 Therefore, Greenwald concludes that the 
overwhelmingly positive results of the Portuguese experiment, confirmed by the fact 
that there is currently no real debate about whether drugs should once again be 
criminalized, "should guide drug policy debates around the world".367 
 
A more objective - and the most comprehensive as of today - peer-reviewed, 
evidence-based study of the Portuguese reform was conducted by Caitlin Elizabeth 
Hughes and Alex Stevens in 2010.368 Drawing upon independent evaluations and 
interviews conducted with 13 key stakeholders in 2007 and 2009, their study critically 
analyzed the criminal justice and health impacts of the Portuguese reform against 
trends from neighboring Spain and Italy. These are the some of the main effects of the 
decriminalization reform that were identified and are relevant to our analysis: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 Paulo Portas, leader of the conservative Popular Party, said: "There will be planeloads of students 
heading for [Portugal] to smoke marijuana and take a lot worse, knowing we won’t put them in jail. We 
promise sun, beaches and any drug you like". 
365 INSTITUTO DA DROGA E DA TOXICODEPENDE ̂NCIA DE PORTUGAL (Institute on Drugs and Drug 
Addiction of Portugal), The National Situation Relating to Drugs and Dependency, Annual Report, 
2006, p. 39. 
366 Id at 99. 
367 G. GREENWALD, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal, supra note 361 at 1. 
368 C. E. HUGHES-A. STEVENS, What Can We Learn from the Portuguese Decriminalisation of Illicit 
Drugs? in British Journal of Criminology, 50, 2010, p. 999–1022. 
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1) No major increase in drug use: small increases in illicit drug use amongst 
adults were counterbalanced by reduced illicit drug use among problematic drug 
users and adolescents, at least since 2003. According to the study, while trends in 
Portugal suggest slight increases in lifetime and last year illicit drug use among the 
general population, studies of young and problematic drug users suggest that use has 
declined. The similarity in general population and youth trends in Portugal, Italy and 
Spain adds support for the argument that reported increases in general population use 
in Portugal reflect regional trends and are thus not solely attributable to the 
decriminalization. Moreover, the fact that Portugal is the only of these nations to have 
exhibited declines in problematic drug users provides strong evidence that the 
Portuguese decriminalization has not increased the most harmful forms of drug use.369 
 
2) Reduced burden of drug offenders on the criminal justice system: decrease in 
the number of people arrested for drug related offences and no major increase in 
the number of people detected for administrative offences. First of all, following 
decriminalization there was a substantial reduction in the number of alleged drug 
offenders being arrested and sent to the criminal courts. Indeed, the number of people 
arrested for criminal offences related to drug decreased from over 14,000 
offenders in 2000 to an average of 5,000–5,500 offenders per year.370 Secondly, 
and equally importantly, the number of people detected under the new law for 
administrative drug use/possession offences has remained fairly constant at 
about 6,000 per year, thereby indicating no overall increase in the amount of formal 
contact that drug offenders are having with Portuguese police and so no net-widening. 
This is a notable finding in light of the data from Spain and Italy, where the burden on 
the police has grown as a result of increases in the number of offenders detected 
through the administrative system for drug use/possession and through the criminal 
system for drug trafficking.371 Thus, data suggest that the Portuguese reform may 
have increased efficiency of police or court operations as they became less crowded 
with drug offenders. 372 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Id at 1005. 
370 Id at 1008. 
371 Id at 1009. 
372 Id at 1011. 
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3) Decrease in the number of drug-related offenders in prison and in prison 
overcrowding. According to Portuguese national reports, there has been a continued 
decrease in the number of individuals imprisoned for drug law offences. The 
proportion of drug-related offenders in the Portuguese prison population, that is 
offences committed under the influence of drugs and/or to fund drug consumption, 
has dropped from 44% in 1999 to 21% in 2008. This has been very welcome, due 
to the historic overcrowding of Portuguese prisons. The prison density (i.e. the 
number of prisoners per 100 prison places) fell from 119% in 2001 to 101.5% in 
2005.373 
 
4) Increases in the amounts of drugs seized by the authorities, particularly those 
destined for external markets. The study notes that between 1995–1999 and 2000–
2004, the amount of drugs seized increased by 499%: 116% for cocaine, 134% for 
hashish, 219% for heroin and 1,526% for ecstasy. Annual data from the Instituto da 
Droga e da Toxicodependencia (IDT) provide further insight into the nature of the 
increases. In particular, they reveal that in Portugal, there has not been a linear or 
constant increase in the amounts seized.374 Instead, there have been spikes in seizures 
of a number of different substances with large seizures of ecstasy between 2001 and 
2003, hashish between 2003 and 2006, cocaine between 2004 and 2006 and even 
larger quantities of hashish between 2007 and 2008. This is remarkably different from 
trends in Spain, where there has been an almost linear growth in cocaine and hashish 
seizure amounts. It is also different from Italy, where there had been relatively flat 
trends with no discernable spikes in hashish or ecstasy seizure quantities since 
1999/2000. As suggested by the study, the absence in Portugal of a consistent growth, 
in one product, and instead seizures of a number of different products is more in line 
with evidence of increased law enforcement intervention as opposed to domestic 
growth in the market.375 
 
5) Reduction in opiate-related deaths and infectious diseases. Since the Portuguese 
introduction of its drug strategy and decriminalization reform, all three nations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 Id at 1010. 
374 INSTITUTO DA DROGA E DA TOXICODEPENDENCIA, (Institute on Drugs and Drug Addiction of 
Portugal), The National Situation Relating to Drugs and Dependency, Annual Report, 2009. 
375 C. HUGHES-A. STEVENS, What Can We Learn from the Portuguese Decriminalisation of Illicit 
Drugs?, supra note 368, at 1011. 
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showed declines in drug-related deaths. However, declines in drug-related deaths 
were more pronounced in Portugal and Italy than in Spain. The number of new drug 
users who were diagnosed with HIV and AIDS also declined. For example, between 
2000 and 2008, the number of cases of HIV reduced among drug users from 907 to 
267 and the number of cases of AIDS reduced from 506 to 108. This is a highly 
significant trend that has been attributed primarily to the expansion of harm-reduction 
services. Given that heroin problems were the major driver of the reform, these 
reductions in overdose and opiate-related death were deemed by key informants in the 
study as a considerable achievement of both the decriminalization and the broader 
drug strategy of the Portuguese reform.376 
 
6) Increased uptake of drug treatment. The overall numbers of drug users in 
treatment expanded in Portugal from 23,654 to 38,532 between 1998 and 2008.  As 
it is noted in the study, the reductions in opiate-related deaths are likely to reflect the 
large increase in the provision and uptake of treatment, particularly low-threshold 
opiate substitution treatments.  The data on treatment clients - outpatient, inpatient 
and prescribed - all indicate that the population of drug users has aged. For example, 
in 2000, only 23% of treatment clients admitted for the first time were aged over 34, 
but this rate has increased steadily to a rate of 46% in 2008. Together with the data on 
the decline in the prevalence of problematic drug use, this suggests an encouraging 
trend of reductions in the number of young people who are becoming dependent on 
illicit drugs.377 
 
In short, the analysis of Hughes and Stevens shows the striking impact of the 2001 
decriminalization reform on: (a) the law enforcement system - in terms of increased 
efficiency of police and court operations as they became less crowded with drug 
offenders; (b) the criminal justice and prison systems - in terms of decrease in the 
number of people arrested for drug-related offences, decrease in the number of drug-
related offenders in prison and in prison overcrowding; and (c) the social system - in 
terms of reduction in opiate-related deaths and infectious diseases, together with the 
increase in uptake of drug treatment by users.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 Id at 1014. 
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Hughes and Stevens note that, by comparing the trends in Portugal and neighboring 
Spain and Italy, while some trends clearly reflect regional shifts (e.g. the increase in 
use amongst adults) and/or the expansion of services throughout Portugal, some 
effects do appear to be specific to Portugal. Indeed, the reduction in burden of drug 
offenders on the criminal justice system and the reduction in problematic drug users 
were in direct contrast to those trends observed in neighboring Spain and Italy. Also, 
Hughes and Stevens argue that the small increases in drug use reported by Portuguese 
adults are far less important than the major reductions in opiate-related deaths and 
infections, as well as the reductions in problematic drug users and drug use among 
adolescents.378 
 
4. The significance of these reforms to the existing state of knowledge on drug 
decriminalization and prison overcrowding 
 
A comparative analysis between the decriminalization reforms adopted by Italy and 
Portugal shows how limited a strategy merely based on decriminalization measures 
can be in addressing the problems related to drug use. Two apparently similar regimes 
(both based on the use of administrative sanctions against drug users) can achieve 
diametrically different outcomes, depending on the global drug strategy to which 
these policies attach. In particular, many possible positive outcomes are "left on the 
table" by a decriminalization policy that only provides for the elimination of criminal 
sanctions for drug use without emphasizing the role of social measures such as 
"prevention", "treatment", "social reintegration" and "harm reduction".  
 
In fact, whereas the case of Portugal is evidence that - contrary to some predictions - 
decriminalization measures coupled with effective social measures: 1) do not 
inevitably lead to rises in drug use; 2) can significantly reduce the burden upon the 
criminal justice system and the problem of prison overcrowding and 3) can further 
contribute to social and health benefits for drug users, which more often approach 
therapeutic programs, the case of Italy, with its 1) lack of impact on drug use 
(cannabis in particular), 2) significant increase in drug-related offenders in prison and 
in prison overcrowding, and 3) dramatic drop in the use of therapeutic programs by 	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drug users, is evidence that decriminalization measures alone, and particularly when 
part of a global repressive strategy, are much less effective in addressing drug use.  
 
As it has been seen in this chapter, the stated objective of Portugal’s policy of 
decriminalization, i.e. "to lower the incidence and related harms of dependent drug 
use", has undoubtedly been achieved. To the contrary, Italy's "tough on crime" 
reform, aimed at reducing drug use and targeting cannabis users and dealers 
particularly, has had significantly negative consequences and few (if any) positive 
results. Thus, Portugal offers a much more successful model of decriminalization than 
Italy for other nations that wish to provide, in Hughes and Stevens' words, "less 
punitive, more integrated and effective responses to drug use". Ultimately, the success 
of the Portuguese reform lies in the consistent application of a decriminalization 
policy within the framework of a health-oriented drug strategy. Also, the Portuguese 
Commissions for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction seems to have been empowered to 
provide much more tailor-made responses than the Italian Prefetto to the problems of 
drug use, focusing on the concept of "dissuasion" rather than "sanctioning". The 
evidence presented in this case study shows that this is the way to go, rather than the 
many "ups and down" of Italy - with its recent, counterproductive, punitive 
setbacks.379 
 
To conclude, Italy was a pioneer in the decriminalization of personal use of all drugs 
and this should be praised. However, as it will be better explained in the next chapter, 
we believe that current Italian drug legislation should be amended to reintroduce a 
distinction between cannabis and more harmful drugs. Ideally, not only should 
cannabis be included in a different schedule for which less severe custodial measures 
are provided, as it was before the 2006 reform, but depenalization (i.e. the removal of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Interestingly, the Committee that has been put in charge of analyzing prison conditions in Italy in 
2012 by the Italian Senate made the recommendation of adopting decrimimalization measures similar 
to the ones that have been adopted in Portugal in the field of drug: "Una delle risposte più interessanti 
al problema del sovraffollamento arriva dal Portogallo. Nei primi anni del 2000 è stata cambiata la 
legge sulla custodia cautelare. In seguito alla riforma è stato stabilito che questa possa essere applicata 
solo per i reati che prevedono una pena superiore ai cinque anni di detenzione. Inoltre nel 2001 è stato 
depenalizzato il consumo di droga e le persone trovate a farne uso sono obbligate a comparire davanti a 
speciali commissioni anti-droga e non davanti a un tribunale. La popolazione carceraria è fortemente 
diminuita in seguito all'entrata in vigore delle due norme e il Portogallo ha registrato una diminuzione 
del numero dei detenuti del 16% dal 2002 al 2007". COMMISSIONE STRAORDINARIA PER LA TUTELA E 
LA PROMOZIONE DEI DIRITTI UMANI DEL SENATO, Rapporto Sullo Stato dei Diritti Umani negli Istituti 
Penitenziari e nei Centri di Accoglienza e Trattenimento per i Migranti, 2012, available at 
http://leg16.senato.it/1383?documento=2501&voce_sommario=90. Id, at 37. 
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custodial measures) should be adopted for all cannabis-related offences 380 At a 
minimum, there should be a reduction in the severity of custodial measures provided 
for cannabis-related offences, as it is argued by several criminal law scholars and 
NGOs.381 Based on the data that have been provided in this chapter (that show that 
cannabis is widely used among the population, cannabis seizures have more than 
doubled since 2006, detainees for violation of Article 73 have almost doubled from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Depenalization (i.e. the removal of custodial measures) for all cannabis-related offenses, while 
desirable for many reasons, ma not be, at the moment, a feasible option. This, in light of the Council of 
the European Union Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA "laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking", that require 
states to adopt custodial measures for several forms of conduct linked to trafficking in drugs. In 
particular, Article 2 of the Framework Decision (Crimes linked to trafficking in drugs and precursors) 
lists the conduct that should be "punishable". According to Article 2(1), they are: (a), the production, 
manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any 
terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of 
drugs; (b) the cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant; (c) the possession or purchase 
of drugs with a view to conducting one of the activities listed in (a); and (d) the manufacture, transport 
or distribution of precursors, knowing that they are to be used in or for the illicit production or 
manufacture of drugs. According to Article 2(2), the conduct described in Article 2(1) shall not be 
included in the scope of this Framework Decision "when it is committed by its perpetrators exclusively 
for their own personal consumption as defined by national law". Thus, States remain free not to punish 
those acts that are committed with the intent to obtain drugs for personal use. Also, according to Article 
3, states are required to punish "incitement to commit, aiding and abetting or attempting" one of the 
offenses referred to in Article 2. As to the minimum penalties, the Framework Decision, in Article 4, 
provides the following:"1. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the 
offenses defined in Articles 2 and 3 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
penalties. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offenses referred to 
in Article 2 are punishable by criminal penalties of a maximum of at least between one and three years 
of imprisonment. 2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offenses 
referred to in Article 2(1)(a), (b) and (c) are punishable by criminal penalties of a maximum of at least 
between 5 and 10 years of imprisonment in each of the following circumstances: (a) the offense 
involves large quantities of drugs; (b) the offense either involves those drugs which cause the most 
harm to health, or has resulted in significant damage to the health of a number of persons." Thus, there 
seems to be a duty, deriving from the Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA, to establish penaties 
between a minimum of x and a maximum of at least 1 year-inprisonment for Article 2 offenses and 
penalties between a minimum of x and a maximum of at least 5 years-inprisonment for (a) large 
quantities of any drugs and (b) offense that either involves those drugs which cause the most harm to 
health, or has resulted in significant damage to the health of a number of persons. The Framework 
Decision, making reference to "drugs which cause the most harm to health", seems to mandate a 
distinction in the severity of penalties for "soft drugs" and "hard drugs", despite mandating that 
custodial measures be provided in both cases. 
381 This view is shared by several criminal law scholars and NGOs, such as Open Society, La Società 
della Ragione, Forum Droghe and Antigone, who have recently proposed an amendment to the current 
Italian drug legislation that would: 1) fully legalize drug use and possession for personal use, 
eliminating the administrative sanctions that are now provided; 2) reduce the criminal penalties for 
possession with intent to supply, which would only lead to prison time from 6 months to 6 years, plus a 
fine, for all drugs but cannabis (new art. 73 co. 1), and prison time from 3 months to 3 years, plus a 
fine, for cannabis (new art. 73 co 2); 3) make non-punishable the cultivation for personal use of 
cannabis and the delivery to third people of small amounts of cannabis, except when the third person is 
less than 16 years (new art. 73 co. 3); 4) establish less severe penalties (3-month to 2-year inprisonment 
plus a fine) for crimes of "minor entity", which would become a separate provision; 5) make possible 
the substitution of prison time with community service for drug addicts; 6) reduce criminal penalties 
for promoters and participants to associations aimed at committing the above-mentioned drug crimes. 
For the full text of the proposal, see 4 Libro Bianco sulla Legge Fini-Giovanardi, supra note 355, p. 
99-100. 
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2006 to 2012 and most police activity for violation of Article 73/74 is against 
cannabis offenders and has steadily increased) this could have a significant impact on 
the urgent problem of prison overcrowding.  
 
VI. POLICY PROPOSALS IN THE FIELD OF DRUG LEGISLATION 
 
This chapter will make two policy proposals in the field of drug legislation, in light of 
the analysis and case study that have been conducted so far. The first proposal will 
support "decriminalization" (i.e. the elimination of criminal sanctions) for use and 
possession for personal use of any kind of drug. The second proposal will support 
"depenalization" (i.e. the elimination of custodial sanctions) or, at a minimum, a 
reduction in the severity of custodidal measures, for any cannabis-related conduct. 
Thus, the first proposal will be addressed to those legislators in Europe and the United 
States that at the moment still criminalize drug use and possession for personal use, 
while the second proposal will be specifically addressed to the Italian legislator, being 
drug use and possession for personal use in Italy decriminalized already but having 
the Italian legislator eliminated the distinction between cannabis and other more 
harmful drugs since the 2006 reform.  
 
1. Why drug use and possession should be decriminalized 
 
Legislators in Europe and the United States that at the moment still criminalize drug 
"use" and "possession" - and as we have see they are still quite a few382 - should 
seriously consider decriminalization reforms. Core criminal law doctrines require 
decriminalization. 
First of all, the paradigm of "harm plus culpability", which has been analyzed in 
chapter III as the fundamental principle for any criminalization decision, is not 
satisfied in the crime of using or possessing drugs for personal use. Scholars from 
both the Anglo-American and the European-continental world have consistently 
stressed this.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 See supra, chapter V, section 2.2. 
	   122	  
Several Anglo-American legal scholars have taken this position. Andrew Ashworth, 
in his recent article "The unfairness of risk-based possession offences", reiterates that 
no "harm to others" is present in risk-based possession offences, 383 among which is 
the conduct of possessing an illegal substance for one's own personal use (and, a 
fortiori, the conduct of using it). Douglas Husak, also, has recently tried to apply the 
core liberal doctrines elaborated by Joel Feinberg to the "recreational use of illicit 
drugs", in order to assess whether drug prohibitions may be justified within the liberal 
theory of law defended by Feinberg. Feinberg’s theory provides an excellent 
framework for critically examining the several rationales that might be employed to 
defend the justifiability of criminal laws against the use and possession of illicit 
drugs. The principles elaborate by Feinberg can help us understand whether and under 
what conditions the government is justified in criminalizing the use of drugs. Husak, 
in his article "Illegal drugs: a test case of the 'Moral limits of the criminal law' by Joel 
Feinberg" 384 , concludes that none of the principles identified by Feinberg as 
legitimate reasons for the use of the criminal law are applicable in the case of 
recreational use of illicit drugs. Moreover, he claims that drug use has some positive 
value that a defense of criminalization must rebut.385  
Several scholars from the European-continental tradition have also pointed out that 
legislation on drug use appears to be based on purely paternalistic grounds and should 
therefore be reassessed.386  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 The author states "possession offenses are one of the most ubiquitous form of crime in modern 
systems of criminal law. They comply, much more fully than many other crimes, with rule-of-law 
requirements such as fair warnings and certainty of definition. However, I will argue that some of the 
current forms of possession offense fall so far outside normal criminal law paradigms as to require 
serious re-assessment". A. ASHWORTH, The Unfairness of Risk-Based Possession Offenses, supra note 
148, p. 238. While Ashworht's analysis focus on possession of illicit weapons, rather than possession of 
illicit drugs, most of the arguments that he puts forward also apply to drug use. For a recent critic of 
possession offenses see also M. D. DUBBER, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of 
Criminal Law, in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 91, 2001, p. 829–996; ID, The Possession 
Paradigm: the Special Part and the Police Power Model of the Criminal Process, in R. A. DUFF-S. P. 
GREEN (eds.), Defining Crimes, Oxford, 2005. 
384 D. HUSAK, Illicit Drugs: A Test Case of Joel Feinberg's "The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law", 10 
Libertaria, 2008, p. 39-59. See also ID, Predicting the Future: A Bad Reason to Criminalize Drug Use, 
in Utah Law Review, 2009, pp.105-115. 
385 D. HUSAK, Illicit Drugs: A Test Case of Joel Feinberg's "The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law", 
supra note 384. 
386 See, among others, A. CADOPPI, Liberalismo, Paternalismo e Diritto Penale, in G. FIANDACA-G. 
FRANCOLINI (eds.), Sulla Legittimazione del Diritto Penale. Culture Europeo-Continentale e Anglo-
Americana a Confronto, Torino, 2008, 102, mentioning drug legislation as one of the areas of the law 
where criminalization seems to be based on purely paternalistic grounds and is thus in need of serious 
reassessment. Similarly, G. FORTI, Per Una Discussione sui Limiti Morali del Diritto Penale, tra 
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Secondly, criminalization of drug use and possession appears to infringe on the 
principle of ultima ratio, i.e. the idea of using the criminal law only as a last resort 
measure. This principle is at the basis of any liberal model of the criminal law and 
requires making use of the criminal sanctions only for most heinous behaviors, those 
that cannot effectively be deterred without the stigma of criminal punishment. The 
ultima ratio principle has mainly been discussed in German and Italian legal 
literature. 387  Nevertheless, scholars from the Anglo-American tradition, such as 
Andrew Ashworth, have also made reference to the principle of "minimum 
criminalization".388  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Visioni "Liberali" e Paternalismi Giuridici, in E. DOLCINI-C. E. PALIERO (eds.), Studi in Onore di 
Giorgio Marinucci, Milano, 2006, 283 ff. With specific regard to the criminalization of personal use of 
"soft drugs" see, recently, C. ROXIN, Was Darf der Staat unter Strafe stellen? Zur Legitimation von 
Strafdrohungen, in Studi in Onore di Giorgio Marinucci, supra, 715 ff. Finally, for a recent summary 
of the debate on drug prohibition in Italy, G. VERGA, La droga espiatoria. Un’analisi critica del 
proibizionismo, Milano, 2004; and, for a critic on prohibitionism to combat drug use and drug 
trafficking, ID., Gli Effetti Collaterali del Proibizionismo, in Cass. pen., 2005, 2787 ff.  
387 As to German literature, see, also for a useful bibliography, YOUNG-CHEOL YOON, Strafrecht als 
Ultima Ratio und Bestrafung von Unternehmen, Frankfurt am Mein, 2001, 22-58. As to Italian 
literature, see, among many other university manuals, S. CANESTRARI-L. CORNACCHIA-G. DE SIMONE, 
Manuale di Diritto Penale. Parte Generale, Bologna, 2007, 142 ff..; F. MANTOVANI, Diritto Penale. 
Parte Generale, 7 ed., Padova, 2011, XLII ff.; D. PULITANÒ, Diritto Penale, 4 ed., Torino, 2011, 48 ff.; 
A. MANNA, Corso di Diritto Penale. Parte Generale, 2 ed., Padova, 2012, 26 ff.; In general, there is a 
consensus among criminal law scholars in Italy that the criminal law should be used "minimally". See 
E. MUSCO, L’illusione penalistica, Milano, 2004. According to the author: "il diritto penale di uno 
Stato di diritto dovrebbe, insomma, essere razionale, minimo ed effettivo: l’extrema ratio 
dell’intervento statuale sui diritti di libertà, costituzionalmente garantiti, dei singoli". Id. at 3. See also, 
arguing for the need to reduce the area touched by the criminal law, L. FERRAJOLI, Il Diritto Penale 
Minimo, in Dei delitti e delle pene, 1985, 463 ff.; ID., Per un Programma di Diritto Penale Minimo, in 
L. PEPINO (ed.), La Riforma del Diritto Penale. Garanzie ed Effettività delle Tecniche di Tutela, 
Milano, 1993, 57 ff..; ID., Sul Diritto Penale Minimo (Risposta a Emilio Dolcini e Giorgio Marinucci), 
in Foro it., 2000, V, 125 ff..; ID., Crisi della Legalità e Diritto Penale Minimo, in U. CURI-G. 
PALOMBARINI (eds.), Diritto Penale Minimo, Roma, 2002, 9 ff.; ID., Diritto e Ragione. Teoria del 
Garantismo Penale, 10 ed., Roma–Bari, 2009; A. BARATTA, Principi del Diritto Penale Minimo. Per 
una Teoria dei Diritti Umani come Oggetti e Limiti della Legge Penale, supra note 175.; M. PAVARINI, 
Per un Diritto Penale Minimo: “in the Books” o “in the Facts”? Discutendo con Luigi Ferrajoli, in 
Dei delitti e delle pene, 1998, 3, 125 ff.; ID., La Penalistica Civile e la Criminologia, ovvero 
Discutendo di Diritto Penale Minimo, in Studi in ricordo di Giandomenico Pisapia, III, La 
criminologia, Milano, 2000, 563 ff.; G. MARINUCCI–E. DOLCINI, Diritto Penale Minimo e Nuove 
Forme di Criminalità, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 1999, 802 ff.; F. MANTOVANI, Il Vero “Diritto Penale 
Minimo”: La Riduzione della Criminalità?, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 2005, 864 ff. See also, very 
recently, G.P. DE MURO, Ultima Ratio: Alla Ricerca di Limiti all’Espansione del Diritto Penale, in Riv. 
it. dir. proc. pen., 2013. 
388 See A. ASHWORTH, Principles of Criminal Law, 3 ed., 1999, 67-68. Ashworth puts forward a 
principle of minimum criminalization in the following terms: "This principle (...) is that the ambit of 
the criminal law should be kept to a minimum. (...) [T]he point is not so much to reduce criminal law to 
its absolute minimum, as to ensure that resort is only had to the criminalization in order to protect 
individual autonomy or to protect those social arrangements necessary to ensure that individuals have 
the capacity and facilities to exercise their autonomy. (...) [E]ven if it appears to be justifiable in theory 
to criminalize certain conduct, the decision should not be taken without an assessment of (...) the 
possibility of tackling the problem by other forms of regulation and control". Id. See also A. P. 
SIMESTER-G.R. SULLIVAN, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 2001, 6–11. They write: "[Criminal 
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In general, the state may seek to change the behavior of its citizens by many other 
means that criminalizing the conduct.  As Gerald Dworkin has recenlty noted, the 
state may influence people's behaviors by any of the following: by providing 
incentives for people to act one way rather than another (e.g. if you have children you 
get a break on your income taxes), by making it costly to engage in certain conduct 
(e.g. if you smoke you will have to pay a very large tax on each pack of cigarettes), by 
using the law of torts to make it the case that if you act in certain ways you are open 
to civil suits which may cost you lots of money (e.g. you can be held liable for the 
torts of those to whom you serve alcoholic beverages), it can make it more difficult 
for you to enter into contracts, (e.g. minors may not be sued for breach of contract, 
gambling debts are  not enforceable), it can provide warnings and information about 
dangerous products, it can tie the receipt of federal funds to state’s adopting certain 
laws (e.g. only states that require cyclists to wear helmets may get federal highway 
funds)". 389  In Dworkin's words, "those who think that when the state cannot 
legitimately criminalize conduct it is helpless to try and change behavior are as 
mistaken as those who think that because Mill argues the state cannot punish people 
for self-destructive behavior we are left without resources of criticism, social 
pressure, and ostracism to use on those who act foolishly, irrationally or 
imprudently".390 In the context of drug use, other forms of dissuasion (such as 
prevention campaigns and warnings on the health effects of drug use similar to the 
ones that have been recently adopted for smoking and drinking) could prove effective 
in shaping people's behavior without resorting to the "expressing censure" of the 
criminal law.391 
Finally, criminalization of drug use and possession lies at the intersection of two 
major areas of the law where the adoption of criminal sanctions seems highly 
contestable, i.e. "preventive measures" and "victimless crimes". A long list of 
scholars, on both sides of the Atlantic, has argued that the adoption of criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
censures] should not be deployed merely as a tool of convenience, and where possible other forms of 
social control ought to be used in their stead". Id. at 11. 
389 G. B. DWORKIN, Harm and the Volenti Principle, in Social Philosophy and Policy, 29, 2012, p. 309. 
390 Ibidem. 
391 However, arguing that ultima ratio may not be an appropriate principle to suggest avoiding criminal 
sanctions in relation to drug use, see D. HUSAK, Applying Ultima Ratio: A Skeptical Assessment, in 
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 2, 2005, p. 535-545. 
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sanctions is not justified in these areas. We very firmly add to that list, and hope that 
legislators that still have not done so will start taking these views more into account.  
 
2. Why cannabis should be treated differently 
 
In relation to cannabis, not only "decriminalization" of use and possession but also 
"depenalization" (or at a minimum a reduction in the severity of custodidal measures) 
for cannabis-related offences seems to be desirable. There are several reasons to 
support this claim, the most important of which will be analyzed below. 
  
2.1. Social sciences: the normalization of cannabis use among young adults 
 
First of all, cannabis use has become increasingly normalized among the population, 
in a way that certainly is not true for other drugs. According to a UK sociological 
study conducted by Parker in 2002, "sensible, recreational use of cannabis" is 
becoming increasingly "normalized" among conventional young adults.392 The term 
"normalization" refers to the process through which stigmatized or deviant individuals 
and groups become included in as many features of normal life as possible. The 
concept initially emerged from studies and politics of disabilities and learning 
difficulties, but it was adapted by Parker to describe why large groups of adolescents 
in the UK had knowledge of or tried drugs, and why many abstainers seemed to 
accept illegal drug use.393 Five key dimensions of "normalization" were identified by 
Parker: 1) availability/access; 2) drug trying rates; 3) usage rates; 4) accommodating 
attitudes to "sensible" recreational drug use especially by non users; and 5) degree of 
cultural accommodation of illegal drug use. The 2002 study by Parker, after having 
analyzed recent UK research for each measure, concluded that all the normalization 
criteria had been adequately satisfied in relation with the recreational use of 
cannabis.394  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 H. PARKER-L. WILLIAMS-J. ALDRIDGE, The Normalization of 'Sensible' Recreational Drug Use: 
Further Evidence from the North West England Longitudinal Study, in Sociology, 36, 2002, p. 941 ff. 
The online version of this article can be found at http://soc.sagepub.com/content/36/4/941. 
393  H. PARKER-J. ALDRIDGE-F. MEASHAM, Illegal Leisure: The Normalization of Adolescent 
Recreational Drug Use, London, 1998. 
394 H. PARKER-L. WILLIAMS-J. ALDRIDGE, The Normalization of 'Sensible' Recreational Drug Use, 
supra note 392, p. 961. 
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More recent studies have also confirmed the normalization of cannabis use among 
young people.395 Essentially, cannabis has turned into a normal drug - not normal in 
the sense that everybody uses it but normal in the sense that cannabis use is seen as 
legitimate by both users and non-users.  
Normalization theory is the most important development in contemporary sociology 
of drug use and dominates recent interpretations of illegal drug use. 396  The 
normalization concept has been acquisitioned by official and academic drugs 
discourses. For societies which maintain and enforce blanket prohibition of all 
popular illicit drugs and refuse any review of their drugs laws, the notion of 
normalization to explain the growth of recreational drug use is anathema because it 
highlights the loss of moral and social authority of the law and, by implication, the 
government and enforcement agencies. However, for societies that are committed to 
social inclusion and a pro-active approach to recognizing that social policy and laws 
must adapt to social and cultural change, the concept is positively helpful.397  
 
2.2. Public attitudes: increasing support for cannabis legalization 
 
Secondly, public attitudes show an increasing support for cannabis legalization in 
recent years. Public surveys on citizens' attitudes on drug regulation are more often 
conducted in the United States than in Europe. What emerges from the most recent 
U.S. surveys conducted on the issue is that there has been a significant increase in the 
number of people who support cannabis legalization. In 2005, for example, only 36% 
of Americans said they believed that the use of marijuana should be made legal.398 A 
Pew Research Center poll released on 4 April 2013, instead, showed that, for the first 
time in more than four decades of polling on the issue, a majority of Americans (52%) 
favored legalizing the use of marijuana.399 This survey, conducted March 13-17 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 See, among many, M. JÄRVINEN-J. DEMANT, The Normalization of Cannabis Use among Young 
People - Symbolic Boundary Work in Focus Groups, in Health, Risk and Society, 13, 2011, p.165-182. 
396 F. MEASHAM-M. SHINER, The Legacy of Normalisation: The Role of Classical and Contemporary 
Criminological Theory in Understanding Young People’s Drug Use, in International Journal of Drug 
Policy, 20, 2009, p. 502-508. 
397 H. PARKER-L. WILLIAMS-J. ALDRIDGE, The Normalization of 'Sensible' Recreational Drug Use, 
supra note 392, p. 943. 
398 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (2005) - Table 2.67, 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ind/PUBLIC%20OPINION.Drugs.Legalization.2.html. 
399 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Majority Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana, 4 April 2013, available at 
http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/04/majority-now-supports-legalizing-marijuana/ (accessed 18 
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among 1,501 adults, found that young people are the most supportive of marijuana 
legalization. Fully 65% of Millennials - born since 1980 and now between 18 and 32 
years old - favor legalizing the use of marijuana, up from just 36% in 2008. Yet there 
also has been a striking change in long-term attitudes among older generations, 
particularly Baby Boomers - born between 1946 and 1964.400 The long-term shift in 
favor of legalizing marijuana has accelerated in the past three years: while support has 
generally tracked upward over time, it has spiked 11 percentage points since 2010. 
About half of adults (52%) today support legalizing the use of marijuana, up from 
41% in 2010. Support for legalization has increased among all demographic and 
political groups. Nearly two-thirds of those under 30 (64%) favor legalizing 
marijuana use, as do about half or more of those 30 to 49 (55%) and 50 to 64 (53%). 
There is far less support for legalization among those 65 and older (33%); still, there 
has been an 11-point rise in support among older Americans since 2010. Opinions 
about legalizing marijuana vary little among states that have more permissive 
marijuana laws and those that do not. A majority (55%) of those in states that have 
legalized medical marijuana or have decriminalized (or legalized) marijuana for 
personal use favor legalizing marijuana. Yet 50% of those in states in which 
marijuana is not decriminalized (or legal for any purpose) also favor its 
legalization.401  
Also, there has been a major shift in attitudes on whether it is immoral to smoke 
marijuana. Currently, only 32% say that smoking marijuana is morally wrong, an 18-
point decline since 2006 (50%). As with many of the changes in opinions about 
marijuana and its use, the decline has occurred across most demographic and political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
November 2013). For a list of other surveys that, despite not showing a majority, found that the number 
of Americans supporting legalization has increased to 50% in 2012 see H. J. ENTEN, Make Marijuana 
Legal Says a New Poll, but Reality is More Smoky Than That, in The Guardian, 5 April 2013, available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/05/pew-poll-majority-americans-support-
marijuana (accessed 20 November 2013). The Gallup surveys, that have been conducted since 1969, 
show the following attitudes to legalization: 12% in 1969, 15% in 1972, 16% in 1973, 28% in 1977, 
25% in 1979, 25% in 1980, 23% in 1985, 25% in 1996, 31% in 2000, 34% in 2001, 34% in 2003, 36% 
in 2005, 44% in 2009, 46% in 2010, 50% in 2011, and 48% in 2012. According to the 2012 Gallup 
survey, support remained in the mid-20s from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, but has crept up since, 
passing 30% in 2000 and 40% in 2009 before reaching the 50% level in 2012 Oct. 6-9 annual Crime 
survey. See the 2012 Gallup survey available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/150149/record-high-
americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx. 
400 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Majority Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana, supra note 399, p. 1-2. 
401 Id at 4. 
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groups.402 Graphs from the 2013 Pew Research Center poll on cannabis legalization 
and the moral implications of smoking are provided below:403 
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Despite the high profile of drugs policy, little data is available in Europe on public 
attitudes on drug regulation among the general population, with a particular deficit in 
data that is comparable over time. Additional research should address this deficit and 
provide evidence to support or refute the claim of a similar shift in attitudes. At the 
moment, the only large studies that provide data on public attitudes to cannabis 
regulation in Europe are the 66 Standard Eurobarometer (conducted by the European 
Commission among the general population in 2006) and the 233 and 330 Flash 
Eurobarometers (conducted among the young population in 2008 and 2011).  
The 66 Standard Eurobarometer404 found that only about one quarter of European 
adults believed marijuana should be legalized for personal use throughout Europe in 
2006. In the survey of 29,000 EU residents, pollsters found 26% adults were ready to 
legalize personal consumption of cannabis while two thirds disagree with this idea 
(68%). Even young Europeans opposed to the legalization of cannabis use according 
to the survey (57% of respondents aged 15 to 24 disagreed with the statement). 
However, opinions varied widely from country to country. In Finland (8%) and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 Id at 3. 
403 Id at 1 and 3. 
404 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 66 Standard Eurobarometer, 2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm. The graph that we report is available there 
at p. 44. 
	   129	  
Sweden (9%) the idea was rejected outright, whereas in the Netherlands, where the 
personal consumption of cannabis is decriminalized in practice, almost half of the 
respondents felt that cannabis should be legalized throughout Europe (49%). A graph 
from the 66 Standard Eurobarometer is provided below to offer the details of the 
different European countries: 
   
EUROBAROMETER 66 First Results 
- 44 - 
 
2.6 LEGALISATION OF CANNABIS 
 
“Clear opposition to the legalisation of cannabis throughout Europe” 
 
The high level of opposition to the idea that personal consumption of cannabis 
should be legalised throughout Europe provides further evidence that Europeans feel 
that there is too much tolerance nowadays. Only around a quarter of European Union 
citizens agree with this stat m nt (26%), whil  two thirds disagree ith it (68%). 
Moreover, even young Europeans tend to be opposed to the legalisation of cannabis (57% 
of respondents aged 15 to 24 disagreed with the statement). However, it must be noted 
that opinions vary from country to country. In Finland (8%) and Sweden (9%) the idea is 
rejected outright, whereas in the Netherlands, where the personal Consumption of 
cannabis is legal, just under half of the respondents feel that cannabis should be legalised 
throughout Europe (49%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 2011 Flash Eurobarometer on "Youth attitudes on drugs" (No 330),405 instead, 
evidenced that young European citizens show less and less support for the prohibition 
of cannabis use in the most recent period. The European Commission started studying 
youth attitudes on drugs in 2002 and 2004, when surveys were conducted among 
young people in the then 15 EU Member States (Special Eurobarometer No 172 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 330 Flash Eurobarometer - Youth Attitudes on Drugs, 2011, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch_en.htm. 
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Flash Eurobarometer No 158).406 In 2008, a survey was conducted among a similar 
group in the 27 EU Member States (Flash Eurobarometer No 233).407 The 2011 Flash 
Eurobarometer on "Youth attitudes on drugs" (No 330) built on those earlier surveys 
in order to measure the trend in attitudes of this target group towards drugs. This 
survey’s fieldwork was carried out between 9 and 13 May 2011. Over 12,000 
randomly selected young people (aged 15-24) were interviewed across the 27 EU 
Member States. What emerges from the 2011 Flash Eurobarometer is that there is a 
broad consensus among young people that heroin, cocaine and ecstasy should 
continue to be "banned" in EU Member States – almost all respondents agreed with 
this: 96% for heroin, 94% for cocaine and 92% for ecstasy.408 These opinions did not 
significantly change compared to the results of the 2008 survey. To the contrary, 
opinions were more diversified when young people were asked if cannabis should 
continue to be "banned": the proportion thinking that governments should uphold 
such a ban ranged from 33% in the Netherlands and 39% in the Czech Republic, to 
87% in Romania. A comparison with the 2008 results shows that, in the most recent 
survey, a significantly lower proportion of young European people thinks cannabis 
should continue to be "banned": 67% in 2008 vs. 59% in 2011, as shown in the graphs 
provided below. 409 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 Data from the 2002 Special Eurobarometer No 172 and the 2004 Flash Eurobarometer No 158 will 
not be specifically analyzed here because no distinction was made, in those surveys, in relation to the 
different types of drugs, so they are not particularly useful for our discussion. The question that was 
asked there was only if "people should be punished for using drugs". Already in 2004, only a minority 
of respondents was in favor of punishing drug consumers at European level: only 47% respondents, in 
fact, agreed that drug consumers should be punished, while 43% tended to disagree. Nearly 10% of the 
young respondents did not answer the question. Results differed significantly from one country to 
another: more than 60% respondents in Scandinavian countries appeared to be in favor of punishing 
drug users, while only 37% of young people in Spain and the Netherlands agreed with this statement. 
407 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 233 Flash Eurobarometer - Young People and Drugs, 2008, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch_en.htm. 
408 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 330 Flash Eurobarometer - Youth Attitudes on Drugs, supra note... p. 46. 
409 Ibidem. In the 2001 survey 34% people thought that cannabis should be "regulated" and 5% people 
thought that it should be "available without restrictions", so a total of 41% agreed with the idea that 
cannabis should not be "banned". In the 2011 survey, a "spontaneous" response option (i.e. should be 
"available without restrictions") was added. This option was not read out by the interviewers; only 
when respondents spontaneously gave this response, interviewers coded their response in this category. 
In 2008, if respondents spontaneously answered that cannabis (or another substance) "should have been 
available without restrictions", these responses were coded as "other" responses. 
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2008 Flash Eurobarometer - Young People and Drugs (No 233), p. 36. 
 
!"#$%&'(&)*&+,,&!&-*./0&12*1"2&#/3&34.0$&& 5/#"6789#"&421*47 
 
 
 
 
1#02&,:&
regulation of all three substances, with none being banned (7% vs. the EU27 average of 2%) followed 
by the young Maltese (6%) and young Cypriots (5%).  
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The opinions of young people in the different Member States, however, were more diversified when 
they were asked if cannabis should continue to be banned. The proportion of respondents who thought 
the government should uphold such a ban ranged from 38% in the Czech Republic to 91% in 
Romania.  
 
The Netherlands joined the Czech Republic at the lower end of the Member State distribution, with 
only 45% of respondents wanting to ban cannabis. More than half of the Czech and Dutch respondents 
(53% and 52%, respectively) said the sale and consumption of cannabis should be regulated. The 
openness of young Dutch towards regulating cannabis might be explained by the country!s long-
standing "relaxed# policy towards the drug. The explanation for the Czech Republic might be found in 
the widespread use of cannabis in the country $ survey data showed that, when looking at 15-24 year-
olds across the EU, the Czechs were the most likely to say they had used cannabis in the past year15.  
  
Sweden and Cyprus, on the other hand, joined Romania at the higher end of the country rankings $ 
with more respondents who supported a ban on cannabis (89% and 84%, respectively). Only 8% of 
Romanian, 9% f Swedish and 16% of Cypriot respondents aid the government should relax the ban 
on cannabis and instead adopt a set of rules to regulate the sale and consumption of this illicit drug16. 
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Romanian youth were also the strongest advocates of banning tobacco and alcohol $ 31% were in 
favour of banning tobacco and 22% of banning alcohol. Respondents in the UK and Sweden (both 
                                                    
 
15 EMCDDA website: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index39570EN.html  
16 In the Standard Eurobarometer 66 (2006), EU citizens were asked if they agreed or disagreed that personal consumption of 
cannabis should be legalised throughout Europe. Comparing the results of this survey with those of the current one, it was 
noted that for the Member States where young people were more in favour of regulating the use of cannabis, instead of opting 
for a ban, then the population at large were more likely to say that cannabis should be legalised (e.g. the Netherlands, Spain, 
the UK and Italy). In addition, the countries where young people most often advocated a continuation of the ban on cannabis, 
also saw the highest level of rejection among the general population to legalise the substance (e.g. Romania and Sweden). 
 
2011 Flash Eurobarometer - Youth attitudes on drugs (No 330), p. 48. 
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The opinions of young people in the different Member States were more diversified when they were 
asked if cannabis should continue to be banned; the proportion thinking that governments should 
uphold such a ban ranged from 33% in the Netherlands to 87% in Romania.  
 
As in 2008, the Czech Republic was close to the Netherlands with just 39% of respondents wanting to 
ban cannabis. About half of Dutch and Czech respondents (52% and 50%, respectively) said the sale 
and consumption of cannabis should be regulated, while roughly a tenth spontaneously said that 
cannabis should be available without restrictions (13% and 9%, respectively). The openness of Dutch 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????
towards the drug. The explanation for the Czech Republic might be found in the widespread use of 
cannabis in that country ? see section 1.2.  
 
Sweden and Cyprus, on the other hand, joined Romania with more respondents who supported a ban 
on cannabis (78% and 82%, respectively). Only 10% of Romanians, 14% of Cypriots and 16% of 
Swedes said that governments should relax the ban on cannabis and instead adopt a set of rules to 
regulate the sale and consumption of this illicit drug; 2%-3% of young people in these countries 
spontaneously said that cannabis sh ld be freely available. The 2008 survey also found the highest 
levels of opposition to the legalisation of cannabis in Romania, Sweden and Cyprus. 
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Also, the 2011 Flash Eurobarometer evidenced that young people prefer other 
measures than prohibition to tackle drug problems, including prevention, information 
and health care services. About half (49%) of interviewers preferred information and 
prevention campaigns and almost 4 in 10 (37%) selected the treatment and 
rehabilitation of drug users, as opposed to a third (33%) who opted for tough 
measures against drug users. This last-named measure received the lowest support in 
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Greece (17%), Denmark and Portugal (22%-23%) and the highest support in Romania 
(50%) and the Czech Republic (47%).410 
Over the long run, the attitudes of American and European citizens with ambivalent 
views on the question of cannabis legalization will be shaped by whether the various 
experiments with legalization, decriminalization, and the use of marijuana for medical 
purposes are deemed successes or failures. It is important to note, in fact, that in 
January 2013, in a remarkable first, the recreational use of marijuana became legal in 
Colorado and Washington. Over a dozen other states in the United States have 
decriminalized possession of small amounts, and Massachusetts recently became the 
18th state to allow its use for medicinal purposes. Though federal law still bans both 
the sale and possession of marijuana, President Obama has said the federal 
government has more compelling issues to deal with and won’t aggressively 
prosecute cannabis-related offenses in states where use is legal. Colorado repealed 
alcohol prohibition in 1932, a year before it was repealed nationwide. Some argue that 
the state is now blazing a trail for the rest of the country. Also the Uruguayan 
Parliament, on August 1, 2013, voted to pass a Bill that will legalize and regulate the 
production, sale, use and personal cultivation of cannabis for non-medical use by 
adults. The Bill passed to the Senate for a vote (and possible amendments) in October 
2013, before it will return to the Congress for final approval from the Board of 
Deputies. Although these are potential stumbling blocks, the Congress vote was the 
most difficult to obtain and it looks likely that the Bill will now pass into law later in 
the year. If the legislative procedure is finalized, Uruguay will be the first national 
government in the world to have voted through a new law to legalize and regulate 
cannabis - or indeed any drug prohibited by the UN drug conventions. To this extent, 
the change differs from the groundbreaking developments in Washington and 
Colorado, where the legalization measures were passed by popular vote (via ballot 
initiatives), with both local state and federal governments firmly opposed. By 
contrast, Uruguayan public opinion is not yet behind the legalization move, with 
Uruguayan politicians tackling drugs by showing something alien to most 
governments around the world: leadership. More in general, if the current trend on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 330 Flash Eurobarometer - Youth Attitudes on Drugs, supra note 405, p. 
54 ff. 
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legalizing marijuana continues, stronger pressure may build to bring laws into 
compliance with people's attitudes.  
 
2.3. The need to develop more specific surveys on public attitudes on cannabis 
regulation 
 
Two points emerge from the data that have been analyzed in the previous section. 
First, there is a compelling need to conduct new surveys on public attitudes on 
cannabis regulation among the general population in Europe. The 66 Standard 
Eurobarometer tracks back to 2006. Only additional surveys could provide evidence 
to support or refute the claim of a shift in attitudes among the general population 
similar to the one that has occurred in the most recent years (and particularly in the 
period 2010-2013) in the United States.411 What can be noted from the available data, 
nevertheless, is that young people's opinions in Europe seem to be in line with the 
U.S. trend of increasing support for cannabis legalization: as evidenced by the 2011 
Flash Eurobarometer, in fact, views supporting cannabis prohibition registered an 8-
point decline in the period 2008-2011. Thus, a persuasive predictive argument can be 
made that a new survey among the general population in Europe would reveal less 
support for cannabis prohibition than in the past years.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Also surveys conducted at the national level in European Member States are scarce and not 
particularly up-to-date. Some of the most recent surveys on the issue have been conducted in the 
Netherlands. There, three opinion polls have been conducted on Dutch cannabis policy since 2010. One 
in February 2010, a second in May 2012 and the most recent in August 2013. The August 2013 survey 
showed that a majority of the population (54%) are in favor of legalizing cannabis, while 38% oppose 
it. The survey, which asked "Should the Netherlands adopt the same law as has been adopted on the 
legalization of marijuana in Uruguay this week?", is available at 
http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/weblog/item/4960-majority-of-the-dutch-favour-cannabis-
legalisation. The 26th British Social Attitudes surveys is also one of the few recent surveys that 
included questions on public attitudes on drugs. It found that 58% people in Britain thought cannabis 
should be illegal, 34% believed it should be legalized but only made available from licensed shops and 
4% thought it should be legalized without restriction. According to the report published by NatCen 
Social Research, which analyzed the 26th British Social Attitudes data, views about the legalization of 
cannabis are more liberal now than they were in 1993, when two thirds (67%) thought it should be 
illegal. But there has been a hardening of attitudes over the last decade; in 2001, 46% thought cannabis 
should be illegal, rising to 58% in 2008. According to the report, this reflects increased concern since 
2001 about the dangers of cannabis, which have resulted in its reclassification as a Class B drug. A 
quarter (24%) agreed with the view that cannabis "isn't as damaging as some people think", down from 
nearly a half (46%) in 2001. This survey analyzed 2008 data. Thus, additional data should be obtained 
to evaluate the most recent trends in public atttitudes on cannabis.  
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Also, there is a need to develop more specific surveys on public attitudes on cannabis 
regulation, both in the United States and in Europe. So far, surveys have tried to 
assess people's attitude on cannabis regulation asking the following questions: 
 
1) 2013 Pew Research Center poll (similarly to questions of other U.S. polls in 
previous years) - Q85: Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal, or 
not? Yes, legal/No, illegal 
2) 2006 Standard Eurobarometer - QA47_10: Personal consumption of cannabis 
should be legalised throughout Europe? Agree/Disagree 
3) 2008 Flash Eurobarometer - Q5A: Do you think the following substances should 
(continue to) be banned or regulated? - Cannabis 
4) 2011 Flash Eurobarometer - Q7A: The sale of drugs such as cannabis, cocaine, 
ecstasy and heroin is officially banned in all EU Member States. The sale of legal 
substances such as alcohol and tobacco is not prohibited but is regulated in all EU 
countries. Do you think the following substances should (continue to) be banned or 
should they be regulated? - Cannabis 
These questions, despite a good start in investigating public opinion on cannabis 
regulation, have several shortcomings, some of which will be summarized below. 
The first two questions only inquire on public attitudes on "legalization" of  "use" 
(2013 Pew Research Center poll) and "personal use" (2006 Standard Eurobarometer) 
of marijuana/cannabis. Strictly speaking, they do not provide any insights on other 
cannabis-related offences, such as cultivation or sale. Also, they do not give people 
the option of chosing among different kinds of sanctions, i.e. less stigmatizing 
sanctions than those provided by the criminal law. Only being able to answer "Yes, 
legal" or "No, illegal" underestimates the fact that the term "illegality" has several 
different meanings: for example, cannabis use may still be considered "illegal" but 
addressed through administrative sanctions rather than criminal sanctions (so-called 
"decriminalization"), as it is currently provided by the Italian legal system for 
possession of all drugs for personal use.  
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The third question refers to the general status of cannabis as a prohibited or regulated 
substance, rather than to the specific conduct of personal consumption. However, it 
puts an emphasis on the "continuance" of a prohibition approach versus the adoption 
of a new regulatory approach ("cannabis should continue to be banned or regulated"). 
Stressing the current state of the law, i.e. that cannabis is curently "banned" in all EU 
Member States, may have an impact on the answers, based on acceptance of the state 
of the law itself rather than on moral acceptance. Also, this question, similarly to the 
first two questions, does not give people the option of chosing among different kinds 
of sanctions, i.e. less stigmatizing sanctions than those provided by the criminal law. 
Only being able to express support for a "ban" or a "regulation" of cannabis overlooks 
the possibility of using administrative sanctions for cannabis-related offences. 
The fourth question seems to specifically focus on "sale" of cannabis, through the 
comparison between legal and regulated sale regimes (e.g. tobacco and alcohol) and 
illegal sales (other drugs). Thus, answers nay have been given in relation to the 
specific conduct of "sale" of cannabis, when people were asked if "continue to ban" or 
"regulate" cannabis. Also, the same comments that have been previously made as to 
the concept of "banning" and "regulating" apply here. 
In essence, none of these questions investigate the issue of cannabis 
"decriminalization", i.e. the elimination of criminal prosecution and punishment 
through, for example, the use of administrative sanctions for cannabis-related 
offences. 412  Neither do these questions investigate the issue of cannabis 
"depenalization", i.e. the elimination of custodial penalties for cannabis-related 
offences.413 If questions are framed in the above-menioned terms thay provide limited 
help in capturing people's sentiment, for example, towards 
decriminalization/depenalization of cannabis use and cannabis sale. When the 
alternative is only given between "banning" (i.e. generally prohibiting, with no 
specification as to whether this is done through the criminal law or through other 
measures) and "regulating" (i.e. complete "legalization") there is no way of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 Decriminalization may occur, as we have seen in chapter III, section 1, through either of the 
following: (1) downgrading the legal status of offenses, so that they are administrative rather than 
criminal offenses (i.e. decriminalization in the books) or (2) retaining the status of criminal offense on 
the books while avoiding the imposition of criminal penalties (i.e. decriminalization in practice). In 
particular, the latter approach may occur by (2a) allowing for administrative sanctions to be imposed or 
(2b) issuing guidance to police or prosecutors to avoid enforcement in specified circumstance.   
413 See supra chapter V, section 2.1. 
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understanding how many people - and we have reasons to believe they are many, in 
light of the widespread use of cannabis and the limited moral judgment attached to it - 
would support a system that only provides for non-criminal (and in any case non-
custodial) measures for cannabis-related offences.  
So, surveys should be framed in a different way to have a better idea of citizens' 
opinion on the use of the criminal law to address cannabis-related conducts. Rather 
than asking people, as it was done in the 2006 Standard Eurobarometer and in the 
2008 and 2011 Flash Eurobarometer, if they generally agree with the idea of 
"banning" vs. "regulating" cannabis, citizens should be asked whether they agree or 
disagree with the idea of "using criminal sanctions" - and "custodial measures" in 
particular - for cannabis-related offences. The set of questions developed by Giuseppe 
Di Gennaro and Cesare Pedrazzi to assess attitudes on the use of criminal sanctions 
for economic crimes414 have been identified by criminal law scholars as a valuable 
tool for investigating public opinion on the use of criminal sanctions to regulate social 
conducts.415 Thus, they could be used as a model for assessing public attitudes on the 
use of the criminal law for cannabis-realted offences. Adapting that model to the case 
of cannabis, questions could be framed in the following terms: 
"When you get to know that a person... (used cannabis - cultivated cannabis - sold 
cannabis to another person - ...) you believe that this is: 
1) something for which that person should be judged in a criminal tribunal and go to 
prison (if it is proved that that person did it); or 
2) something for which that person should be judged in a criminal tribunal and be 
fined, but not go to prison; or 
3) something that should be disapproved, but not judged in a criminal tribunal; or 
4) something that should not be disapproved. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 G. DI GENNARO-C. PEDRAZZI, Criminalità Economica e Pubblica Opinione, Milano, 1982. 
415 See A. CADOPPI, Il Reato Omissivo Proprio. II. Profili Dogmatici Comparatistici e de Lege 
Ferenda, supra note 179, p. 703. 
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2.4. Why public attitudes are relevant for policy proposals - The role of 
Kulturnormen 
 
Obtaining new data - and more specific data - on public attitudes on cannabis 
regulation is crucial for policy proposals. In particular, it is crucial if one adopts the 
theory of Kulturnormen, according to which the criminal law can legitimately be used 
only for those forms of conduct, for which there is a consensus, among the majority of 
the population, that the criminal sanctions are an appropriate measure. More 
specifically, in the view of Alberto Cadoppi, who deserves the most credit for having 
defended the theory of Kulturnormen in Italy, only if citizens predominantly answer 
to the above-mentioned questions saying that they would support the use of custodial 
measures (i.e. only if they give answer number 1) the legislator could legitimately 
criminalize that act. That is to say, only if the great majority of the population 
believes that custodial measures should be used to address cannabis use/cannabis 
sale/etc., the legislator is free to adopt criminal measures against those acts; to the 
contrary, if no majority is found to support the use of custodial sanctions for such 
acts, the legislator is considered to have no legitimate grounds for adopting criminal 
measures.416 
We believe that the theory of Kulturnormen should play an important role in criminal 
policy in general and cannabis regulation in particular.  
In general, this theory has the advantage of restraining the use of the criminal law - an 
approach that should be very much favored in light of the overcriminalization 
phenomenon that most modern democracies face - depending on public sentiments, 
which are considered only as a limiting condition for the use of the criminal law and 
not as a condition that may, by itself alone, justify criminalization.417 This reflects 
changes in the moral values of the population and it reduces the divide between mala 
in se and mala quia prohibita,418 bringing the criminal law more in line with public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 See A. CADOPPI, Il Reato Omissivo Proprio. II. Profili Dogmatici Comparatistici e de Lege 
Ferenda, supra note 179, p. 705. 
417 This is because the legislator should always "filter" the most punitive sentiments of society, which 
could sometimes support criminal measures based on purely irrational emotions. See A. CADOPPI, Il 
reato omissivo proprio, supra note 179, p. 706. See also A. CADOPPI-P. VENEZIANI, Elementi di diritto 
penale. Parte generale, supra note 174, p. 94 ff. 
418 The term mala quia prohibita is used by criminal law scholars to describe those "non-core" offenses 
that are largely regulatory in nature and do not directly violate moral norms. See, among many others, 
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opinion. As a result, the criminal law regains its legitimacy and the general and 
special preventive functions of criminal punishment are strengthened. In fact, when 
the criminal law is not too distant from citizens' view of what is "right" and what is 
"wrong", people comply with the law in light of "normative acceptance" (based on 
shared moral values) rather than mere "instrumental acceptance" (based on a cost-
benefit analysis, aimed at avoiding criminal sanctions). This form of compliace is 
much more effective, as it has been evidenced in the most recent studies.419  
In particular, there seems to be an increasingly wider disconnect between the law and 
the public opinion in relation to cannabis regulation. The widespread use of cannabis, 
even among people who lead healthy, productive lives, shows that the moral blame 
related to cannabis use is very low. This was evidenced by the 2013 Pew Research 
Center poll, which showed that only 32% people believed that smoking marijuana is 
"morally wrong". So, there is a need to better investigate the most current 
Kulturnormen in relation to cannabis-related offences. If drug prohibition has long 
been enforced on moral basis (as it was the case for alcohol prohibition) and criminal 
law scholars have long argued against the use of the criminal law in this area,420 
cannabis prohibition is today a stand-alone concept in the wider picture of drug 
prohibition and it should be given particular attention.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
D. HUSAK, Malum Prohibitum and Retributivism in R. A. DUFF-S. GREEN (eds.), Defining Crimes. 
Essays on the Special Part of Criminal Law, Oxford, 2005, p. 65-90. Such an offense is committed 
"when the conduct prescribed is not wrongful to or independent of the law that defines it as criminal". 
Id, at 66. 419	  For an analysis of "normative" and "instrumental" compliance see P. CAMPANA-M. HOUGH-
E.VACCARI-S. MAFFEI, The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Deterrence and Inclusive 
Crime Control Strategies, supra note 267.	  
420See S. A. KADISH, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 156, p. 24-25. According to the 
author, "The irrepressible demand for gambling and drugs, like the demand for alcohol during 
prohibition days, survives the condemnation of the criminal law. Whether or not the criminal restriction 
operates paradoxically, as some have thought, to make the conduct more attractive, it is clear that the 
prohibitions have not substantially eliminated the demand". Ibidem. Threats of criminal punishment 
have proved ineffective in deterring drug consumption. See, among many others, J. FAGAN, Do 
Criminal Sanctions Deter Drug Offenders? in D. MACKENZIE-C.UCHIDA (eds.), Drugs and Criminal 
Justice: Evaluating Public Policy Initiatives, Newbury Park, 1994, p. 188. 
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Conclusion 
Obtaining new and more specific data on public attitudes on cannabis regulation and 
applying the theory of Kulturnormen to those data could have important 
consequences. If no consensus among the general population emerges on the fact that 
criminal sanctions, and in particular custodial measures, are an appropriate measure 
against cannabis-related offences - and we have reasons to believe that this could be 
the case - "decriminalization" and "depenalization" reforms should seriously be 
adopted by those legislators in Europe and the United States that still haven't done so. 
"Decriminalization", "depenalization" or at a minimum a substantial reduction in the 
severity of custodial measures for cannabis-related offenses could significantly reduce 
prison overcrowding. As we have seen, in fact, drug legislation highly impacts on 
prison overcrowding and cannabis-related offences account for the great majority of 
reported drug offences. One effective solution to the problem of prison overcrowding, 
thus, would be the elimination from the realm of the criminal law of (or the 
elimination of custodial measures for) any cannabis-related conduct (i.e. cannabis use 
and possession, also above the threshold, and cannabis cultivation/sale/etc.). If this 
solution may not be feasible at the moment, in light of supra-national obligations,421 at 
a minimum, there is a need to establish more lenient custodial measures for cannabis-
related offenses. This is especially true for Italy, where the distinction between 
cannabis and other drugs has been eliminated since the 2006 reform, that has led to a 
substantial increase in penalties for cannabis-related offenses.  
"Decriminalization", "depenalization" or at a minimum a substantial reduction in the 
severity of custodial measures for cannabis offences would not only give substantial 
weight to public attitudes to cannabis, which show an increasingly less moral 
reprovation towards the use of cannabis than towards the use of other illegal 
substances, but it would also bring the law more in line with its basic principles. First 
of all, with the criminalization principles that have been identified in chapter xxx. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 See supra, chapter V section 2.1, for the UN Conventions that oblige signatory Countries to prohibit 
several cannabis-related forms of conduct (such as sale) in order to combat drug trafficking. See, also, 
the 2004 Council of the European Union Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA "laying down minimum 
provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking", supra chapter V, note 380.  	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Current Italian legislation on cannabis seems to be a typical case of 
"overcriminalization", in both meanings of this term.422 Secondly, with the so-called 
principio di ragionevolezza, which is a fundamental principle of the Italian 
Constitution and requires that different situations be treated differently in terms of 
punishment.423 Cannabis is different from other drugs, as all relevant official studies 
on its health effects have evidenced.424 So, less severe punishment should be provided 
for cannabis than for other more harmful drugs, in order nor to infringe on the 
constitutional principle of ragionevolezza. As criminal law scholars have noted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  422	  The term "overcriminalization", as we have seen in chapter II, indicates the use of the criminal 
justice system without adequate justifications. It relates to both 1) the enactment of new criminal 
offenses and 2) the use of excessive punishment. The most common complaint against drug legislation 
both in Europe and in the United States is not that criminal sanctions are applied, but that punishments 
for drug offenders are too severe. See D. HUSAK, Desert, Proportionality, and the Seriousness of Drug 
Offenses, in A. ASHWORTH-M. WASIK (eds.), Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory, Oxford, 1998, p. 
187.  
423 See, among others, V. MANES, Produzione, Traffico e Detenzione Illeciti di Sostanze, in G. 
INSOLERA (ed.) La Disciplina Penale degli Stupefacenti, Milano, 2008, p. 30. The author claims: "I 
dubbi di ragionevolezza, in effetti, sono immediatamente rilevabili anche limitandosi a richiamare il 
paradigma più consolidato della ragionevolezza-uguaglianza, registrato sul raffronto con disposizioni 
che possono essere assunte a tertium comparationis". Ibidem. 
424 The ECMDDA has issued a report specifically dedicated to cannabis in 2008. A summary of the 
most relevant national studies on cannabis health effects is provided there. See D. BALLOTTA-H. 
BERGERON-B. HUGHES, Cannabis Control in Europe, supra note 307, p. 104-113. It may be useful to 
provide some extracts from the EMCDDA report. According to the report, "At the level of national 
authorities, evaluations of cannabis and its effect on health have been carried out on a regular cycle 
(...). Despite their differences in scope, methods and conclusions, the recommendations of several 
governmental enquiries reveal interesting common patterns: (1) cannabis is not a harmless substance; 
(2) its dangers, in comparison with other controlled substances, have been overstated; and (3) civil 
sanctions, fines, or compulsory health assessments should be established in place of criminal penalties 
for personal use offenses". Id. at 106. Also, "The overall picture suggests that cannabis consumption 
potentially poses risks both to individual health and to society, and on this basis some sort of legal 
control seems justified. At the same time, it is acknowledged that the dangers of cannabis have in some 
cases been overstated, that there has been a lack of separation between cannabis and other more 
dangerous substances and that its consumption does not necessarily lead to crime or other drug use. 
Alternative forms of criminal sanctions, such as civil sanctions, fines or compulsory health 
assessments, have been suggested. In a few cases, enquiries have included in their suggested options 
the regulation of cannabis consumption and sale, while drawing attention to the political 
impracticability of the option". Id. at 109. In line with this report, stressing that the only point of 
agreement that has been reached so far in the medical field on the issue of drug effects is that "soft 
drugs" and "hard drugs" should be kept separate because they have very different effects on health, see 
also, in Italian, V. MANES, Produzione, Traffico e Detenzione Illeciti di Sostanze, supra note 423, p. 
22. The author states: "tornando alla parificazione del trattamento delle diverse droghe (...), è 
opportuno mettere in rilievo come una tale scelta - che dovrebbe radicasi in un rigoroso confronto con 
le valutazioni empiriche ricavabili dagli studi di settore - non sembri confortata da acquisizioni 
indiscusse della letteratura scientifica, in seno alla quale (...) l'unico punto di convergenza sembra 
limitarsi a segnalare l'esigenza di mantenere, in linea di principio, una distinzione tra le due categorie". 
Ibidem. One of the most recent authoritative studies on the issue of cannabis effects on health has been 
conducted in the UK, in 2005, by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. The study, that was 
commissioned by the UK Government, recommended that cannabis be maintained as a class C drug. 
Despite these recommendations, however, cannabis was reclassified as a (more dangerous) class B 
drug in 2009, leading to considerable criticism. The study by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of 
Drugs is available at www.homeoffice.gov.uk. 
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already, one can find both domestic and "European" tertia comparationis on which an 
assessment of the principio di ragionevolezza in relation to current cannabis 
legislation can be conducted.425 As to "domestic" tertia comparationis, it is sufficient 
to note that the minimum penalties for cannabis sale (6 years imprisonment) 
corresponds to double the penalty for serious assault (lesioni personali gravi dolose, 
art. 583 co.1 c.p.), 12 times the penalty for negligent homicide (omicidio colposo, art. 
589 c.p.) and it is greater than the penalty for sexual violence (violenza sessuale, art. 
609 bis c.p.); while the maximum penalty for cannabis sale (20 years inprisonment) is 
greater than the penalty for attempted murder (tentato omicidio volontario, artt. 
56/575 c.p.) and the penalty for sexual violence (violenza sessuale art. 609 bis c.p.).426 
As to "European" tertia comparationis, it has already been underlined that the 
Council of the European Union Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA, which sets 
minimum principles for drug legislation in Europe, seems to differentiate between 
drugs that are "most harmful to health" and others. It provides for differentiated 
minimum penalties in the maximum (setting a minimum baseline as to the maximum 
penalties): they are "a maximum of at least between 1 and 3 years of imprisonment", 
which increases to "a maximum of at least between 5 and 10 years of imprisonment" 
for "drugs which cause the most harm to health". Obviously, these penalties are much 
inferior to the penalties currently provided by the Italian legislation in relation to 
cannabis (or "soft drugs" more in general). 
To conclude, that cannabis is different from other drugs is apparent from both the 
medical studies that have been conducted over the years, which consistently stress the 
appropriateness of differentiating between "hard drugs" and "soft drugs", and from the 
most recent public surveys, which show that today no significant moral condemnation 
is attached by society to the use of cannabis. It is time for the legislator to 
(re)recognize this.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 On the possibility of using, as a parameter for the constitutional evaluation of the 2006 legislation in 
terms of "ragionevolezza" (as a tertium comparations), not only domestic law but also the Framework 
Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 (which sets minimum principles for drug legislation in 
Europe and seems to differentiate between drugs that are "most harmful to health" and others, 
providing for differentiated penalties), see, in Italian, C. RUGA RIVA, Il Ruolo della Decisione Quadro 
nell'Interpretazine del Diritto Interno, e nel Giudizio di Legittimità Costituzionale: L'Esempio della 
Legislazione Antidroga, in F. SGUBBI-V. MANES (eds.), L'interpretazione Conforme al Diritto 
Comunitario in Materia Penale, 2007, Bologna, 128-132. Also, V. MANES, Produzione, Traffico e 
Detenzione Illeciti di Sostanze, supra note 423, p. 31-32. 
426 V. MANES, Produzione, Traffico e Detenzione Illeciti di Sostanze, supra note 423, p. 33. 
